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The U.S.–Japan alliance continues to be the cornerstone of the U.S.-led security structure 
in East Asia. Within the parameters of this alliance, the unresolved status of Taiwan still 
presents one of the most precarious security situations in the region, one that could lead 
to a major war with China. Within the larger scope of U.S.–China–Japan–Taiwan 
relations, Japan and Taiwan’s relationship would generally be considered the least 
prominent of all possible combinations. Despite this reality, when pulling back the veneer 
from this seemingly tertiary regional relationship, there is a depth of interaction that is 
difficult to categorize and that has the potential to greatly influence security and stability 
in the region. This thesis examines Japan and Taiwan’s special relationship through the 
lens of Japan’s national interests and assesses the implications for the future of the U.S.-
Japan alliance.  
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“To discuss the strategic importance of Taiwan is a delicate task. It is in 
itself delicate to discuss any strategy openly. Strategy is based on 
calculation of naked national interests. It is irrelevant to current norms or 
ethics of international conduct. If not unethical, it could be discourteous. 
“He is neither rich nor promising. Therefore, I wouldn’t think of marrying 
him.” Any lady has the right to think so. But it is definitely impolite to 
explicitly say so.” 
—Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki,  
U.S.–Japan–Taiwan trilateral dialogue, 2003 
The U.S.–Japan alliance is the cornerstone of the U.S.-led security structure in East Asia, 
which has provided the region’s fundamental balance of power from the Cold War to the 
present day. Within the parameters of this alliance, the unresolved status of Taiwan 
presents one of the most precarious security situations in the region, one that could lead 
to war with China. Within the larger scope of relations among the U.S., China, Japan, and 
Taiwan, the Japan–Taiwan relationship is generally considered the least prominent of all 
possible combinations. It is important to establish that Japan and Taiwan do not maintain 
official state-to-state relations, and unlike the United States, Japan lacks a legislative 
mandate to guide its interaction with Taiwan. Despite this reality, when pulling back the 
informal veneer from this seemingly tertiary regional relationship, a depth of interaction 
is revealed that is difficult to categorize.  
Though it may be typical for commentators and military planners to view Taiwan 
strictly as one of the primary security challenges and justifications of the U.S.–Japanese 
alliance, this would be a significant over-simplification and a misinterpretation of how 
the Japanese evaluate the Taiwan issue. In the same vein, Sino–U.S. relationship 
commentators generally view Japanese involvement in the Taiwan issue as a 
destabilizing factor, rather than in the context of an important regional ally with a unique 
vantage point on and potential leverage in the relationship with Taiwan.  
In his 80s now, Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki remains one of Japan’s most 
prolific realist actors in foreign affairs and grand strategy and has spent over forty years 
involved in the Taiwan issue. In his seminal 2008 work, Taiwan Mondai wa Nihon 
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Mondai (The Taiwan Problem is Japan’s Problem) he provides his perspective on how 
the issue of Taiwan has evolved and makes a convincing case that any potential 
resolution of the issue will greatly affect Japan. Indeed, many on the U.S. side of foreign 
and defense strategy and policy might be shocked at the assertion that Taiwan is 
somehow “Japan’s problem,” as the U.S. has been the primary guarantor of peace in 
Taiwan Strait for the past sixty-plus years. The people and government of Taiwan would 
likely take issue with their island home being deemed a “problem” in the first place, and 
more perturbed that it would be some other nation’s “problem.” What, then, drives 
Okazaki’s bold assertion that Japan must take a leadership role in resolving the Taiwan 
issue?  
First and foremost, the reality that Japan has an independent strategic perspective 
on Taiwan should be recognized. Despite continued U.S. engagement, forward 
deployment of military forces, and the codification of the recent “re-balancing” strategy 
for the region—all of which Okazaki is very much in favor of—the fact remains that the 
U.S. is an external actor in an issue largely driven by regional geography. Put bluntly, the 
U.S. does not live in the East Asian neighborhood, so the stakes for the U.S. will 
naturally be different from a regional actor’s. Other substantial factors that have allowed 
Japan to maintain deep ties and realize its interests in Taiwan include shared history, 
culture, language, bureaucratic and economic institutional development, and a common 
appreciation for pragmatism and order—all still relevant dynamics of the interaction. One 
conclusion that can be derived from the nature of Japan and Taiwan’s relationship is that 
while the U.S. may be more heavily invested in facilitating the process of reconciliation 
in the Taiwan Strait, Japan is more invested in, and vulnerable to, the outcome. Though 
this outlook may seem simplistic, Okazaki might retort that, “in making geopolitical 
judgments, the basics are more important than temporary political fluctuations.”1 
The substantial limitations on Japan’s interaction with Taiwan and its 
involvement in the resolution of the Taiwan Strait question form another basic governing 
reality that should not be downplayed. At various times in history, the desires and 
                                                 
1 Hisahiko Okazaki, “Japan-U.S. Alliance a Guarantee for Peace,” Daily Yomiuri, October 23, 2005. 
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pressures of the U.S. or the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) have completely 
overshadowed Japan’s basic interests in Taiwan. Additionally, the will of 24 million 
Taiwanese people for self-determination should not be dismissed. In the midst of this 
constrained environment, Japan’s interests in Taiwan have converged or complemented 
U.S. interests to a great extent, and even China and Japan have reached a level of implicit 
understanding about Japan’s interaction with Taiwan through the years. As it stands now, 
Japan has built a niche as a pragmatic economic partner to Taiwan and an effective 
“passive balancer” to the PRC’s increasing influence over Taiwan.2 An interesting 
follow-on question is, can Japan be more than a passive balancer for Taiwan? And 
further, what is the utility of a more assertive role in the Taiwan issue for Taiwan, Japan 
independently, and Japan as an ally of the United States?  
Some Interesting Statistics 
Though analysis of the special relationship between Japan and Taiwan through 
history is extensive, it is curious to note that since 2008, there has been relatively little 
attention given to important new developments in the relationship due to the shifting 
strategic situation in East Asia, including cross-Strait rapprochement. This gap is even 
more surprising when considering some basic statistics on public sentiment in Japan and 
Taiwan. For example, in 2009, in a public-opinion poll conducted in Taiwan, when 
asked, “What is your favorite country? (other than Taiwan),” 52 percent of the 
respondents answered Japan (an increase from 38 percent the previous year), compared to 
8 percent for the United States, and only 5 percent for the PRC.3 This friendly sentiment 
of the Taiwanese public was expressed monetarily as Japan was dealing with the massive 
Great Eastern Japan Disaster of March 2011. The Taiwanese government donated 260 
million USD to the relief effort—the largest monetary contribution by any one nation, by 
far. Economically, Japan is Taiwan’s second-largest trade partner, following only the 
                                                 
2 Yasuhiro Matsuda, “Japan-Taiwan Relations in the New Era,” Japan –Taiwan Dialogue for the New 
Era, Sep 2012. 
3 The Public Opinion Research in Taiwan on Perceptions about Japan, Interchange Association, Japan, 
available at 
http://www.koryu.or.jp/taipei/ez3_contents.nsf/04/4B83AF9AE8363E8D492576EF002523D4?OpenDocu
ment, accessed on December 21, 2012. 
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PRC. In the political realm, when Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeoh gave his inaugural 
speech in 2012, he cited Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts with specific emphasis on Japan, 
saying, “Our ‘special partnership’ with Japan represents the friendliest state of bilateral 
ties in forty years.” This statement was furthered in Taiwan’s latest foreign policy report 
(Oct 2012), where, outlining Taiwan’s strategy for coping with continuing change in the 
strategic environment, a “deeper friendship with Japan” was the second most important 
tenet listed, even before “closer relations with the United States.”4  
Japanese public opinion of Taiwan has become more favorable since 2009 as 
well, with a 91.2 percent (increase from 76 percent in 2009) of random Japanese survey 
respondents indicating they believed relations with Taiwan were “good” in 2011, and 
84.2 percent responding that they “trust Taiwan” (an increase from 64.7 percent in 2009). 
In 2011, 1.3 million Japanese traveled to Taiwan—an increase of nearly 20 percent from 
2010. Economically, Taiwan is Japan’s second-largest import market, with 52.21 billion 
USD in trade in 2011, and Japan is Taiwan’s fourth largest importer of goods, with 18.24 
billion USD in trade in 2011. In conjunction with this high level of commerce, the 
Interchange Association of Japan (IAJ) and Taiwan’s East-Asian Relations Commission 
passed a slew of functional economic agreements in 2010–2012, such as investment-
protection protocols and patent-registration cooperation. Foreshadowing Taiwan’s 
importance to the current Japanese political leadership, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
traveled to Taiwan in 2010 and 2011 for semiofficial visits as an opposition party 
member during the DPJ’s short-lived reign.5 As an example of how a closer Japan–
Taiwan de facto governmental relationship could manifest, in a recent event 
commemorating the second anniversary of the Great Eastern Japan Disaster (March, 
2011), Taiwan’s TECRO representatives were allowed to sit in the official diplomatic 
section. While this was a small gesture of appreciation for Taiwan’s overwhelming 
                                                 
4 “President Ma’s Inaugural Address,” 21 May 2012, Taiwan MOFA website, 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial, accessed on 1 Mar 2013. 
5 Matsuda, 11.  
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support during a tremendous time of need, it was also a deliberate effort to show support 
for Taiwan in spite of certain Chinese diplomatic protests.6  
Despite this trend of closer ties, rough seas would appear to dominate the 
headlines of the current relationship. A Google search of “Japan and Taiwan” in March 
2013 produced pages of developments on the East China Sea dispute over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, claimed by Japan, the PRC, and Taiwan. Though Taiwan has 
indicated it will not coordinate with the PRC on the issue and has committed to resolving 
the issue peacefully, Taiwan and the PRC are ephemerally aligned against Japan’s claims 
over the islands. Herein, however, lays one of the most intriguing dynamics of current 
Japan–Taiwan relations: as the Taiwanese government and the PRC focus on actively 
seeking areas of convergence, Japan has found that it can be an increasingly important 
role-player for Taiwan. Indeed, Taiwan seems to use its deep relationship with Japan to 
prove to its own citizenry that it is actively maintaining diplomatic space. This reality is 
captured in Okazaki’s optimistic article, “Fighting Peace for Taiwan,” published 
following Ma’s reelection in 2012, which notes that Ma has begun to balance 
increasingly unpopular cross-Strait initiatives with popular functional private and 
cultural-appreciation agreements with Japan.7 A recent example can be found in the 
announcement of the Japan–Taiwan East China Sea fishery agreement signed in April 
2013, in spite of the recent tensions in the East China Sea.8 In essence, despite a serious 
shift in equilibrium, as embodied in Ma’s rapprochement agenda towards cross-Strait 
reconciliation, a deeper relationship with Japan offers important diplomatic space for 
Taiwan, even as its reliance on the United Sates potentially decreases and dependency on 
the PRC increases.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Matsuda, 6–9; Zhang Yunbi, “Beijing Protests Tokyo’s One-China Policy Violation,”China Daily, 
12 March 2013.  
7 Hisahiko Okazaki, “Fighting Peace for Taiwan,” The Japan Times, 05 Jun 2012. 
8 Elaine Hou, “Taiwan-Japan Fishery Rights Meet Set for Wednesday in Tokyo,” Central News 
Agency, Taipei, Taiwan, 12 Mar 2013  
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Research Questions 
Japan and Taiwan have a special relationship that, despite its lack of prominence 
on the surface of foreign affairs in the region, has the potential to greatly affect security 
and stability in the region. In recognition of the depth and complexity of Japan–Taiwan 
interaction, the following questions are submitted: 
1. What are Japan’s national interests in Taiwan and how have they been 
realized throughout the history of interaction? How have they diverged 
from/converged with U.S. interests in Taiwan through recent history 
(1945–2008)? 
2. What are the dynamic forces at work in the current Japan–Taiwan 
relationship in the new era of cross-Strait rapprochement (2008–present)?  
3. What are the implications of Japan’s enduring and current interests in 
Taiwan for the U.S.–Japan alliance and how can the unique relationship 
between Japan and Taiwan be leveraged most effectively for the benefit of 
the alliance and the stability of the region? 
Preliminary Hypotheses 
First, Japan’s primary interests in Taiwan from 1945–2008 were economic, 
followed by regional balance-of-power concerns, and only brief, intermittent periods 
where crisis management interests dominated the interaction. Japan has realized its 
interests consistently throughout the history of this interaction, despite major change in 
the cross-Strait situation, by utilizing a pragmatic approach focused on developing 
mutually beneficial commercial ties and cultural exchange. In comparison to U.S. 
interests in Taiwan through recent history, Japanese interests have generally converged 
with, but more often complemented, U.S. interests, and have rarely diverged or detracted 
from the U.S. stance. For instance, that the U.S. took the lead role in balance-of-power 
and crisis management issues in the Strait allowed Japan to focus more intently on a 
smooth, practical economic relationship with Taiwan, even facing major shifts in the 
strategic situation.  
Second, Japan’s interests in Taiwan continue to be attained through a variety of 
formal and informal mechanisms. Currently, private business partnerships, cultural 
exchanges, and consequential personal interactions, in conjunction with robust 
government-sponsored political exchanges and expanded track-II security dialogues, 
xxiii 
have formed the most pervasive and effective method to maintain a positive interaction. 
An undeniable cultural affinity between the people of Japan and Taiwan continues to 
facilitate a meaningful interaction, even in the midst of significantly heightened territorial 
tensions. A shared understanding and appreciation of bureaucratic institutionalism has 
facilitated highly purposeful de facto governmental relationships that continue to 
influence all major sectors of power in Japanese and Taiwan foreign policy. The Taiwan 
lobby in the Diet has proven to be the power center of Japan’s support for Taiwan, and 
continues to influence policies that indirectly and directly benefit Japan’s interests in 
Taiwan. As the possibility of ultimate reconciliation between the PRC and Taiwan 
appears more likely, Japan is poised to play a more independent and assertive role in 
balance-of-power issues for Taiwan, while the U.S. interests in Taiwan have shifted, ever 
so slightly, away from balance of power, as crisis management and economic interests 
with China have taken precedence.  
Finally, looking forward, in the case that PRC–Taiwan unification appears more 
likely or comes to fruition, Japan’s fundamental interests in Taiwan might diverge 
significantly from U.S. interests, and significant coordination would be required to 
manage these differences within the framework of the alliance. Specifically, the reality 
that Japan has a greater interest in Taiwan’s maintaining some form of political 
separation from the PRC, regardless of the process used in reconciliation, could either 
complicate U.S. policies towards China and Taiwan or augment U.S. strategic interests in 
the region, depending on a wide variety of variables. Furthermore, Japan could feasibly 
play a more assertive role in the triangular relationship with the United States and 
Taiwan, not just as a passive balancer, but as a proactive balance to Taiwan’s increasing 
dependency on China. Specifically, as the U.S. edges away from more controversial 
cross-Strait issues, such as arms sales, Japan could provide diplomatic space for Taiwan 
in other ways. While any official defense-oriented arrangement would be highly 
problematic and a greater risk to Japan’s interests in China, recent developments show it 
is not entirely out of the realm of possibility. To a certain extent, Japan could also provide 
a non-military balance to the PRC that functionally accomplishes the intent of the 
traditional U.S. role—providing more equal footing for fair negotiations between the 
xxiv 
PRC and Taiwan. Furthermore, a more assertive balance against the PRC for Taiwan 
could also allow the U.S. to advance the alliance in other more problematic areas, such as 
basing and functional arrangements for collective self-defense in areas surrounding Japan 
and beyond.  
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Auer, James, Tetsuo Kotani, Michael McDevitt, Yoshihide Soeya, Philip Yang. “Japan – 
Taiwan Interaction: Implications for the United States.” National Bureau of Asian 
Research,Volume 16, Number 1, October, 2005. 
 
Green, Michael. Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an era of 
Uncertain Power. New York: Palgrave, 2003. 
 
Hou, Elaine. “Taiwan-Japan Fishery Rights Meet Set for Wednesday in Tokyo,” Central 
News Agency, Taipei, Taiwan, 12 Mar 2013. 
Kan, Shirley. “U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues,” Congressional 
Research Service, June 15, 2012. 
 
Ma, Ying-jeou. Inaugural Address,” 21 May 2012, Taiwan MOFA website, 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial, accessed on 1 Mar 2013. 
Matsuda, Yasuhiro. “Japan-Taiwan Relations in the New Era.” Japan –Taiwan Dialogue 
for the New Era, Sep 2012. 
Okazaki, Hisahiko. “Fighting Peace for Taiwan,” The Japan Times, 05 Jun 2012. 
_____. “Japan-U.S. Alliance a Guarantee for Peace.” Daily Yomiuri, October 23, 2005. 
Public Opinion Research in Taiwan on Perceptions about Japan, Interchange Association, 
Japan, available at 
http://www.koryu.or.jp/taipei/ez3_contents.nsf/04/4B83AF9AE8363E8D492576E
F002523D4?OpenDocument, accessed on December 21, 2012. 
Zhang Yunbi, “Beijing Protests Tokyo’s One-China Policy Violation,”China Daily, 12 






First and foremost, my two thesis advisers have been everything I could have 
hoped for and more in my first endeavor into academia. Dr. Alice Miller and Dr. Robert 
Weiner, both true experts in their fields, are also outstanding professors, mentors, and 
genuinely good people. Thank you for your enthusiasm, your guidance, and your 
patience. I have also greatly benefitted from the teaching of other professors here at NPS, 
and feel truly fortunate to have had the opportunity to spend some time in the realm of 
ideas. I am in debt to many other friends and mentors who have helped me throughout 
my career, and with this thesis in particular. Thank you all! Last, but certainly not least, I 








THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. JAPAN–TAIWAN RELATIONS: A SURVEY 
 
Figure 1.  Japanese map of the Meiji Japan Empire in 1895  
(From Wikipedia Commons)1 
A. PREAMBLE: TAIWAN AS A COLONY OF JAPAN (1895–1945) 
Any discussion of the history of interaction between Japan and Taiwan should 
start with a quick examination of a map of East Asia. A close look reveals that Yonaguni 
Island, the westernmost island in the Nansei island chain of Japan, is less than seventy 
miles from the port of Suao in Taiwan, which is about twenty miles closer than the 
shortest distance from the island of Taiwan to Mainland China. Proximity between 
nations in East Asia certainly does not guarantee mutual goodwill or even a functional 
relationship, but, particularly in the case of Japan and Taiwan, geography is fundamental 
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in understanding the history of interaction between these two peoples and their national 
interests. This thesis offers several basic, geographically derived conclusions as a 
foundation from which to move forward. One conclusion is that to Japan, a nation heavily 
reliant on maritime trade for basic resources, including food and fuel, Taiwan represents 
the northern boundary of a key chokepoint (the Bashi Channel of the Luzon Strait) for 
critical imports transiting from the Middle East and Southeast Asia through the South 
China Sea. Second, the island of Taiwan has offered Japan a strategic buffer to mainland 
China in the past, present, and, as long as the status quo exists in the Taiwan Strait, the 
future. Finally, a third, and perhaps the most controversial conclusion, is that the 
proximity of Japan and Taiwan necessitates interaction. Regardless of what regime holds 
power on the island, it will be in Japan’s interests to maintain a functional relationship.  
It is curious to note that Taiwan’s geostrategic importance in East Asia is a 
relatively recent development. Throughout most of China’s interaction with the island, it 
was generally regarded as a backwater territory with minimal commercial or resource 
significance. Not until the 17th century was it conquered by the Great Qing Empire, and 
was not designated a province until 1885.2 Though various Western colonial powers had 
occupied portions of the island, primarily as outposts for trade, the island as a whole was 
not considered commercially viable, administratively manageable, or strategically 
significant to the West. Like those of European colonial powers, U.S. interests in Asia in 
the mid-19th century were primarily commercial, but outward-bound America’s initial 
impressions of Taiwan diverged from its European predecessors. U.S. Navy Lieutenant 
John Rodgers, after leading a survey expedition in 1856 of areas around Japan and the 
coasts of China as endpoints for the Great Circle route, concluded “commercial 
possibilities are so vast as to dazzle sober calculation.”3 The U.S. Commissioner to the 
Qing Empire at the time went as far as to recommend the seizure of Taiwan to be used as 
a trading base and as leverage against China for trade concessions, but this 
recommendation did not effectively force any policy development or concerted action 
                                                 
2 Bruce Elleman, Modern China: Continuity and Change, 1644—Present, (Boston: Prentice Hall, 
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towards Taiwan.4 From the beginnings of Japan–Taiwan interaction, it should be noted 
that Taiwan as well as the Ryukyu Islands chain, fell into a gray area of territorial 
boundaries and administrative control between Japan and China, which were not truly 
clarified even through the late 19th century, and further complicated by cessation of 
Taiwan to Japan in 1895, following the first Sino–Japanese War. Indeed, it was not until 
after Japanese colonization that Taiwan’s strategic importance would be fully recognized 
in Asia and to the Western world; and to a certain degree, it was Japanese strategic 
foresight regarding a deliberately ignored territory that began Taiwan’s transformation. 5  
As Japan’s interests in Taiwan were codified in the late 19th century, it did not 
take long before aspirations became reality. In 1874, a Japanese expedition to the 
southern Ryukyu Islands occupied a portion of the northern coast of Taiwan. While the 
rapidly declining Qing dynasty threatened retaliation, it did not have the naval 
capabilities to challenge the occupation. Though the Japanese occupation could have 
been considered a clear violation of Japan and China’s nonaggression pact of 1871, China 
acquiesced to the Japanese interpretation that it did not violate the pact, despite the Qing 
dynasty’s nominal administrative control over the vast, rugged aborigine-controlled areas 
of the island. Following this incident, China even paid an indemnity covering the cost of 
the Japanese expedition, which only served to solidify Japanese sovereignty claims of the 
Ryukyu Island chain and further encourage Japan’s larger ambitions in Taiwan. By 1875, 
the Ryukyu kingdom ceased paying tribute to China, and by 1879 was fully incorporated 
into Okinawa prefecture of Japan. With the Ryukyu Islands and a foothold in the north of 
Taiwan, Japan would gain complete control of Taiwan in less than twenty years.6 Figure 
1 depicts the Meiji Japan Empire in 1895. 
At the conclusion of the first Sino–Japanese War in 1895, Taiwan became a 
colony of Imperial Japan, and remained so until the end of World War II (WWII). 
Taiwan was Japan’s first colony and, arguably, remained the most important colony 
throughout Japan’s fifty-year imperial adventure. Though the Japanese colonial legacy in 
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Taiwan is a worthy study on its own, for the purpose of this thesis, it will only be dealt 
with as a precursor to a historical survey of Japan’s interests in Taiwan, beginning in 
1945 with the conclusion of WWII. From the onset, however, it should be noted that 
Japan’s colonial legacy is still very much relevant to the current interaction between 
Japan and Taiwan. It is also important to understand that, while Japan’s imperialistic 
actions throughout Asia and the Pacific from the late 19th century until the end of WWII 
are notorious and the root of much animus directed at Japan in the region today, Japan’s 
legacy in Taiwan has generally received a more favorable historical judgment. Taiwan, 
unlike Japan’s other strategic colony, Korea, was somewhat accustomed to foreign rule. 
Portions of Taiwan were declared Dutch territory from 1624–1662 and a Spanish territory 
from 1626–1642, before being annexed by the Chinese Qing dynasty in 1683. It also is 
relevant to mention that following Japanese rule, Kuomintang (KMT) rule as the 
Republic of China (ROC) was analogous to another foreign invasion in most respects to 
the people of Taiwan. In essence, the long pre- and post-history of colonialism in Taiwan 
establishes a baseline for understanding favorable Taiwanese impressions of Japanese 
rule. Figure 2 indicates the place of Taiwan in Japan’s co-prosperity sphere. 
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Figure 2.  Taiwan in Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere7 
Compared to Korea, the people of Taiwan were much more willing to submit to 
Japanese rule, but that did not eliminate a generally chaotic first endeavor in colonial 
conquest. Japan’s initial effort to establish control on Taiwan was “no more or less 
ruthless than the average colonial campaign,” and immediate resistance from Qing 
officials declaring Taiwan as the “Republic of Formosa” was crushed over a five-month 
period from May to October of 1895.8 As with the rest of the history of Japan–Taiwan 
relations, however, specific individuals made major, lasting impacts. One important 
figure still prominent in the Japanese colonial narrative is Goto Shinpei, the chief of 
home affairs for Taiwan from 1896–1918. Goto was the primary engineer behind 
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Taiwan’s dramatic transformation from an “embarrassment to a colonial showcase” 
within the first decade of Japanese rule. 9  
Goto’s colonial philosophy entailed a meticulous scientific approach based on 
thorough sociologic research and the effective institution of well-planned and coordinated 
colonial policies. These policies included the incremental eradication of opium and the 
first reliable census and land survey, both of which allowed for more efficient taxation. 
Currency, weights, and measures were standardized during Goto’s administration. 
Perhaps the most noticeable material achievements in the first decades of Japanese rule 
was the construction of economic infrastructure, including a modern railway from the 
main northern port city Keelung to the southern port Kaoshiung, modern port facilities, 
and power plants.10 Overall economic productivity under Japanese colonial rule would 
increase at a rate three times that of population increases during the same period.11 In 
1918, when Goto returned to Japan, Taiwan, a formerly ignored province of the Qing 
dynasty, had been changed into a modern, economically self-sufficient, lucrative 
agricultural producer, which was central to Japan’s larger ambitions in the region.12  
While much of the literature on Taiwan as a Japanese colony has focused on the 
cultural efficiency of Japanese governance and personalities such as Goto, Caroline 
Ts’ai’s book, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building, provides a recent technical study of 
the methods of Japanese colonial rule, including social engineering, institutionalism, 
colonial mobilization during WWII, and the legacy left behind. Ts’ai paints a nuanced 
picture of an ad-hoc Japanese approach that, though it had its origin in Meiji Japan’s 
concurrent experience with development and modernization, grew with the organic 
development of Taiwan. Additionally, Ts’ai stresses that in this learning process, the 
Japanese effectively managed Taiwanese participation in colonial administration by 
incorporating indigenous social forces only when truly feasible. As an example, by 
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conducting a thorough land survey, the extent of all towns and villages in Taiwan was 
precisely delineated—every major field, plantation, and any substantial production 
capacity was included. Though the survey was heavily supervised by Japanese 
professionals and information consolidated within the central bureaucracy, Taiwanese 
village headmen were appointed by the government as survey commissioners. Accuracy 
was incentivized, and the net result was increased production efficiency and taxation, 
based on a balanced interplay between centralized control and local management of 
arable land.13  
The negative aspects of Japanese rule in Taiwan should not be overlooked. 
Japanese administration of Taiwan may be judged successful in almost every material 
way, but was not successful in gaining the true loyalty of the people of Taiwan. Negative 
commentaries on Goto’s leadership style labeled him a samurai authoritarian of the same 
order as found in the classic Chinese legalist literature, the Book of Lord Shang, and his 
aims for regimented sociological obedience, while effective for administration and 
productivity, can certainly be criticized. On the streets of Taipei even through the 1960s, 
Japanese colonial rule was occasionally referred to as the “era of the dogs.”14  
Generally, Japan’s colonial administration of Taiwan has been divided into three 
periods: “the Early Years” (1895–1915); “Doka (Integration)” (1915–1937); and 
“Kominka (Subjects of the Emperor)” (1937–1945). In the Kominka phase of colonial 
leadership, militaristic policies in Japan took precedence, and Taiwan was crucial to this 
effort. As a result, the natural resources, industrial and agricultural infrastructure, and 
most importantly, the people of Taiwan, were subject to the needs of the empire, which 
included fighting and dying in the Japanese imperial army in Southeast Asia and the 
South Pacific. Cultural assimilation policies encouraged the strict use of the Japanese 
language and elimination of Taiwanese social movements, especially any movement 
towards self-determination. By the mid-1930s, Taiwan’s geostrategic position came into 
the forefront, with potential military objectives extending outwards from colonial 
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territories. The commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s combined fleet, Admiral 
Takahashi Sankichi, put it in simple terms, arguing that “Japan’s economic advantage 
must be directed southward with either Formosa or the South Sea islands as a 
foothold.”15 Though the large-scale mobilization of the Taiwanese people to support the 
Imperial Japanese war machine would have some second-order beneficial effects, such as 
increased industrial productivity and opportunities for participation in Japanese 
governance, it was generally an ugly conclusion to what was otherwise one of the most 
successful examples of the modernizing effects of Japanese colonial rule.  
In reconciling the legacy of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan and how it shaped 
later interactions between Taiwan and Japan, this thesis offers the assessment that 
Western-imperialism-dominated regional dynamics, Japan’s own internal reformation 
and modernization efforts, strong Japanese leaders during transitional periods, and strong 
institutions built for the long-term vitality of Taiwan were the primary factors that 
allowed the Japanese colonial experience in Taiwan to be a favorable one. Caroline Ts’ai 
emphasizes the institutional aspects of Japanese rule and concludes that Japanese rule of 
Taiwan “left a legacy of discourses on modernity, whose effects continue to be felt in 
Taiwan today.”16 Indeed, what the Japanese accomplished in Taiwan was an impressive 
display of the right mix of colonial adaptation, a shared belief in the applicability of Meiji 
reforms for modernization, an appropriate amount of colonial space, and institutional 
depth. It is also fascinating to transpose the Japanese colonial legacy onto the current 
cross-Strait environment, where the prospect of Chinese Communist control of Taiwan is 
very distasteful to the vast majority of the people of Taiwan, who likely need to be 
convinced that another takeover by another off-island regime will be an improvement 
over what has been done before.  
The Japanese colonial period in Taiwan remains a key narrative of historical 
memory still relevant to the Japan–Taiwan relationship today. With regard to Japan’s 
interests in Taiwan during the colonial period, one key observation is that from 1895–
1945, Japan was a prolific balance-of-power actor in the region, both politically and 
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militarily; and further, its actions had a direct effect on Taiwan. After 1945, Japan’s role 
in the region and for Taiwan would shift dramatically, but the legacy of Japan’s interests 
in Taiwan would persist.  
B. OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE ROC (1945–1972) 
1. Introduction 
The following sections distill the current drivers of the Japan–Taiwan relationship 
from their historical roots through the lens of Japan’s national interests. This historical 
survey will proceed by examining three distinct periods of time: post-WWII/Cold War 
(1945–1972); post- formal ties (1972–1996); and Taiwan as a democracy (1996–2008). 
Each period includes a historical survey of key junctures within that period and concludes 
by attempting to extract Japan’s primary interests in Taiwan during that period in terms 
of national objectives, foreign-policy methods used to achieve those objectives, and a 
judgment on outcomes, including a comparison against U.S. interests in Taiwan during 
the same period.  
In general, the Japan–Taiwan relationship remained strong, functional, and 
surprisingly adaptive from 1945–2008, despite periods of tension, conflicts, and even 
major strategic shifts in the region. This was due to geographic proximity, a positive 
colonial legacy, pervasive cultural and institutional similarities, a pragmatic approach to 
trade, and mutual interests in balancing against regional dominance by the People’s 
Republic of China. The period from 1945–1972 best exemplifies how the Yoshida 
doctrine, focused on economic development and expansion, dominated Japan’s foreign 
policy and was skillfully represented by the mainstream factions of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 
These mainstream elements, united under the “1955 system,” drove Japanese interests in 
Taiwan while complementing U.S. Cold-War balance-of-power politics in the region. 
From 1972–1996, though never the primary determining interest in Japan’s relations with 
Taiwan, crisis-management actors, principally the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
and left-leaning factions of the LDP, came to the forefront in Japan’s relationship with 
China, which, in turn, dominated Japan’s interaction with Taiwan. These crisis-
10 
management efforts also offered reassurance of stability as Japan attempted to reconcile 
the shocking reversal of American foreign policy with regard to diplomatic recognition of 
the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China. From 1996–2008, balance of 
power interests in Japan, represented by right-leaning elements of the LDP, the 
increasingly powerful Taiwanese lobby in the Diet, and the newly empowered Ministry 
of Defense (formerly the Japan Defense Agency) emerged more prominent in Japan’s 
relationships with China and Taiwan, as manifested through key advancements of the 
U.S.–Japan Alliance. New, more assertive forms also emerged as Japan reluctantly 
acknowledged its own strategic security needs in the region, independent from the U.S.–
Japan alliance.  
2. The Yoshida Doctrine and the “1955 System” 
It is interesting and tragic that the governance of Taiwan throughout history has 
had very little to do with the desires of the people of Taiwan. Taiwan’s post-WWII future 
was essentially decided at the Cairo Conference of 1943, when allied powers attempted to 
agree on a postwar world order. The Cairo declaration explicitly states, “all territories 
Japan has taken from China, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be 
restored to the Republic of China.”17 While the U.S. officially stated that Cairo was not a 
binding agreement, the immediate post-WWII order played out essentially as detailed. In 
1945, however, Japan and China entered into a complicated strategic environment, where 
the utility of the alliance structure forged during WWII rapidly dissipated. Initially, the 
Chinese civil war was the immediate hindrance to the resumption of Japan–Taiwan 
relations. Chiang Kai-shek, who had garnered the support of the West, and the U.S. 
specifically, through military and financial aid to his Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist 
struggle against the Japanese during WWII, had failed to attain victory against the Mao 
Tse-tung -led Communists. When the dust settled after Communist victory on mainland 
China in 1949, both Taiwan and Japan were left in a precarious situation.  
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Even after a full-scale retreat to Taiwan, however, Chiang had ambitions of an 
eventual reinvasion of the mainland. Through an exceptional public-affairs campaign 
conducted most deftly by his Wellesley-educated, Methodist wife, he surprisingly 
convinced the U.S. Congress, and later the Eisenhower administration, to support this 
vision to an extent.18 As the U.S. position took shape in the midst of larger concerns of 
post-WWII world order, Japan, as an occupied country, was left with no influence over 
the political situation between Taiwan and China.  
Instead, Japan’s efforts were focused inward during a period of internal political 
disunity. Though the Yoshida doctrine may appear to be strategically clairvoyant in 
hindsight, it was at the time a middle-of-the-road political compromise, incorporating the 
focus on rebuilding economic strength desired by the remnants of the zaibatsu and 
economic ministries, allying with the U.S. for security needs to address anti-Communist 
concerns, and placating pacifists and idealists, who wanted either a strict interpretation of 
Article 9 of the constitution or a near-total reliance on the United Nations to prevent 
conflict.  
Looking into the mainstream LDP focus of economic recovery and development, 
a key event occurred in May of 1949 with the establishment of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). Chalmers Johnson said it most compellingly, 
that “the particular speed, form, and consequences of economic growth in Japan are not 
intelligible without references to the contributions of MITI.”19 In the 1950s, MITI 
provided the institutional mechanism for aligning Japanese government and private 
enterprise, which formed the strength of Japanese internal and external economic 
development and expansion. During the Yoshida government, MITI gained regulatory 
control over all imports and established the Japan Development Bank, which provided 
Japanese enterprise with low-cost capital for long-term development. Successive prime 
ministers after Yoshida, Hatoyama (1954–1956) and Kishi (1956–1960), though greatly 
supportive of Japanese business, served to consolidate the LDP’s power through faction 
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building and the signing of the crucial amendment to the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, 
albeit through notoriously heavy-handed means. MITI’s preeminence was not truly 
consolidated until the later Ikeda government (1960–1964), which established the 
framework for heavy industrialization through the development of an overarching 
industrial policy with private conglomerates, or keiretsu, centered on long-term growth 
strategies based on market share instead of short-term profits. In the decades following 
WWII, the primary driver of the Japan–Taiwan relationship was Japan’s interest in 
economic recovery, development, and later, regional expansion under the umbrella of 
U.S. leadership in Cold War power politics. The Yoshida doctrine, also referred to as the 
“1955 system”, would provide the baseline methodology for Japan’s new foreign policy 
and MITI would provide the central bureaucracy for nearly thirty years after WWII.20  
With U.S. Cold war leadership and the Yoshida doctrine as the two main pillars of 
foreign policy, Japan would seek to establish a relationship with Taiwan that reflected the 
deep connection with the people of Taiwan, but focused on mutually beneficial trade. At 
the same time, Japan attempted to reconcile the ominous reality that there was a separate 
government in charge of mainland China. To get a sense of the calculus involved for 
Japan in recognizing the Republic of China (ROC) in Taipei or the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) in Beijing diplomatically, it is helpful to examine Prime Minister Yoshida’s 
statements on the issue: 
At that time, in the minds of the Japanese officials, they would like to keep 
a good relationship with Taiwan and further deepen their economic 
connections. However, Tokyo could not appear to deny Beijing at the 
same time. The KMT government was initially the enemy of Japan during 
the Second World War and occupied an important seat at the United 
Nations, which sent Japanese soldiers and civilians safely back to their 
homeland at the end of the war. This must not be overlooked when 
considering Taiwan as the object of making peace, but the United States 
Senate has concerns about this. Although the relationship with the 
Mainland China was also important, it was difficult to attain approval for 
it from the Senate of the United States. Thus, we had to take a stand 
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earlier…. If a choice must be made immediately, Japan had to take the 
KMT government as the object of making peace with.21 
Indeed, Yoshida believed that some type of official recognition of mainland China 
was necessary, but in the end complied with U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s 
pressure not to, in favor of seeking a quicker way to establish terms of peace, which was 
indeed the first order of business for the new Japanese government. What is evident 
through Yoshida and Dulles’s correspondence and other ROC official, and, later, 
declassified documents, was that there was indeed a schism that had already formed 
between Japan and the United States in the perception of what should be done in 
appropriately recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the ROC.22  
The onset of the Korean War, however, solidified the U.S. position supporting 
Taiwan. With Communist China pledging support of the Communist regime in North 
Korea in October 1950 and the U.S. drawing one of the first lines in the sand of the Cold 
War in Asia on the Korean peninsula, the second line drawn by the U.S. was in the 
Taiwan Strait. In 1954–1955 and again in 1958, this line would be tested. While these 
early tests in the Taiwan Strait were more about China’s probing the perimeter of U.S. 
resolve, it showed how limited Japan was as an independent crisis-management actor in 
the region, with almost no involvement—as exemplified by its non-interference with the 
utilization of U.S. military forces based in Japan, such as the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet. In 
general, this non-interference would be the guiding principal of Japan’s implicit support 
of U.S. containment policy in Asia from the Korean War, through the Strait crisis, to 
Vietnam.23  
Ironically, the solidified U.S. position for Taiwan helped to transform the island 
into a beacon of post-WWII hope for third-world development in the face of Communist 
expansion… at least for a while.24 Taiwan, at the time, was far from an exemplary 
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political entity, and far from the strong economy and liberal democracy it has become. 
Under the U.S.-led information campaign initiated in the late 1950s—“Free China”—the 
KMT regime as the Republic of China (ROC) was fully supported by the U.S. and most 
Western powers as the rightful government of China; it represented China on the Security 
Council of the United Nations and at the steering committee of the Bretton Woods 
convention. The PRC, on the other hand, was left out of the critical post-WWII power 
structure and had nowhere to turn except to the Soviet Union.25  
Though Japan had little space to diverge or detract from the U.S. stance in the 
1950s, Japan and the U.S. continued to evaluate the recognition of China differently. In 
October of 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida’s chief cabinet secretary, Okazaki Kazuo, 
expressed his thoughts to Taipei’s representative in Tokyo, Tung Hsien-kuang:  
What worries us most is whether signing the bilateral peace treaty with 
Taiwan would result in hatred towards our country by the Mainland 
Chinese people. So we try to avoid it. At present, our policy is to bide our 
time and take no action, at least before the Mainland ratifies the signed 
peace treaty. We naturally will take full account of this, and choose which 
one of the Chinese governments to sign a treaty with, when our country 
achieves independence and sovereignty. We highly respect the Nationalist 
government. However, it is a pity that the territory of the Nationalist 
government only covers Taiwan. 26  
Japan, however, signed the Peace Treaty of San Francisco in September 1951, 
which took effect on April 28, 1952, officially ending the war with Japan for most of the 
allies. China, whether the PRC or ROC, was neither represented nor a signatory to the 
treaty, but seven hours prior to the treaty’s taking effect, Japan and the Republic of China 
(ROC) signed their own bilateral peace treaty. The terms of this were especially favorable 
for Japan, considering Taiwan’s potential claims regarding Japan’s wartime exploitation 
of Taiwan. In explaining this, Chiang Kai-shek responded: 
Of course (the terms are) generous, because the relations between Japan 
and the ROC are different from those of others. The ROC does not want to 
put a harsh treaty upon Japan at all…. The relationship of Japan and the 
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ROC is special and totally different from that of Japan and other members 
of the Allies. The Republic of China was not involved in, nor a signatory 
to, the San Francisco Treaty, but that makes it more meaningful to 
conclude such a bilateral treaty.27  
Chiang’s statements mask the true desperation he found himself in following 
defeat and retreat, and the constraints that both Japan and Taiwan were under during this 
critical period. In the case of Japan, Yoshida’s foresight regarding the necessity of 
recognizing the PRC is a key example of how Japanese perspectives can diverge from the 
U.S. because of historical issues and sheer geographical necessity. Indeed, Secretary 
Dulles had devoted much of 1951 to ensuring that Japan and Taiwan stepped in line with 
the principal policy of containment against Communism, just as the Cold War was 
turning hot in Asia. This immediate post-WWII period from 1945–1952 could be 
considered an anomaly in how nations relate, as the world order was polarized and in 
transformation at the same time. Japan–Taiwan relations during this period of time could 
serve as a case study of how weak states interact and conform to the policies of stronger 
states out of immediate necessity; but while both Taiwan and Japan made concessions to 
this aim, it certainly did not hurt that a strong Japan-Taiwan relationship was in both 
nations’ long-term strategic interests.28  
3. Reconciling with Two Chinas 
The mid-1960s, however, was a tumultuous time in the Japan–Taiwan–U.S. 
triangular relationship. Japan and Taiwan scholar Douglas Mendel put this timeframe into 
context, commenting in 1968:  
More than other nations, Japan needs and wants trade and peaceful 
relations with the two Chinas…. Most Japanese regard the mainland as the 
“real” China and, like Americans are far more interested in it than in 
Formosa. Unlike so many of their counterparts in the United States, 
however, Japanese intellectuals believe that satisfactory solution to the 
China problem will require prior settlement of the status of Formosa.29  
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In the midst of Japan’s formal acquiescence to U.S. leadership in this period, a 
subtext in Japan’s foreign relations was formed. Specifically, this subtle and largely 
unofficial policy was manifested as Japan’s pragmatic philosophy of separating 
economics from politics, which was extremely useful in relations with the PRC, and later 
with the ROC.  
Looking at the origins of this new pragmatism within the Japanese political 
structure, the separation of economics from international politics coalesced during Prime 
Minister Ikeda’s term and came to national prominence during Prime Minister Sato’s 
leadership, from 1964–1972. To this point, Prime Minister Sato commented in 1965: 
China is important, and the Nationalist government is also important. The 
Nationalist government is a permanent member of the United Nations 
even though it is small. For the sake of international good faith, we should 
not ignore that and must stand by this point. The exchange of goods and 
people with Japan and Mainland China is just an exchange.30 
By 1963, Japan-PRC trade totaled over $80 million as part of a larger five-year 
$400-million trade agreement. Within that agreement, the Japanese government approved 
the export and construction of a $20 million vinylon plant to China on deferred payment 
terms. Taipei protested on the grounds that the deferred terms of finance amounted to 
government-supported credit to Communist China.31 Prime Minister Ikeda furthered the 
perceived gaffe politically in 1963, when he was quoted in the Japanese press as saying 
the Nationalistic counterattack on the mainland was a “rumor…perhaps a dream.”32 Even 
more surprising were comments in 1963 from former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, 
who typically represented the conservative “Taiwan lobby” of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), but went off script in an interview with Douglas Mendel, saying: 
Both Chinese regimes insist there’s only one China, but this causes a 
constant war threat in the Taiwan Straits. Historically and racially, 
Taiwanese differ from mainland people and have no interest in the 
mainlanders’ urge to return…. Do you realize there are 80 percent natives 
on that island and only 2 million mainlanders? Imagine! We should ask 
                                                 
30 Chen, “Taiwan and...,” 80. 
31 Douglas Mendel, “Japan’s Taiwan Tangle,” Asian Survey, Vol 4, No 10 (Oct 1964), 1073–1075. 
32 Ibid, 1075. 
17 
those natives—they’d prefer their own regime and may rise up after 
Chiang dies. Taiwanese like us better than the Koreans do, but not just 
because our prewar rule was better on Taiwan: they have different 
personalities completely.33 
Foreign Minister Ohira was more diplomatic, but equally telling in choosing his 
words on the issue, saying, “we cannot say anything about Taiwan’s future pending 
world developments…Japan hasn’t the power to settle such an issue which only America 
and Russia can influence, so we must await the great powers’ actions and reduction of 
tensions.34  
Still unable to independently address the reality of the cross-Strait situation in the 
1960s, Japan forged ahead to pursue mutual interests through trade with Taiwan. For 
Japan, in fact, trade from 1952–1962 continued to be significantly more profitable with 
Taiwan than the PRC. In 1962, Japanese exports to Taiwan totaled $118 million, 
compared to $38 million to the mainland. During the 1950s–1960s, Japan was Taiwan’s 
most important trade partner by a significant margin, second only to the United States in 
FDI and aid to Taiwan during the same period. During these crucial decades, Japan 
imported vast amounts of agricultural products from Taiwan, including rice and sugar, of 
which Taiwan was a net producer. Japan, on the other hand, exported industrial items, 
which assisted in Taiwan’s overall industrialization as inputs to productions and as 
technology transferred. There was also a sense of mutual appreciation for the struggle to 
develop economically, as the “hard workers” of Asia. By 1966, Taiwan was generally 
touted as having the second-highest living standard in Asia, behind Japan. While the U.S. 
used this assertion as an element of an information campaign against China and the 
Nationalist regime used it as proof of effective land-reform and good governance, the 
Taiwanese generally pointed to the material and institutional contributions of Japan 
during the colonial period and the shared work ethic exemplified in post-WWII Japan.35  
Official Japan–ROC relations likely reached its peak during this period, as 
Taiwan admired Japan’s economic success and saw the benefit of a more assertive and 
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independent Japan as an ally. President Chiang even encouraged Prime Minister Sato to 
enhance Japan’s own defense capabilities as its security interests “were not always 
aligned with the U.S.,” but more importantly, Chiang wanted Japanese support for a 
reinvasion of the mainland.36 This course of action was neither appealing nor possible for 
the Japanese in the 1960s, but as was noted previously, the Japanese would not let a 
difficult political situation get in the way of trade, and thus, Taiwan–Japan relations 
continued in this manner until a series of events that would turn the relationship and 
region upside down.37  
4. Growing Disillusion with the KMT 
The various statements from Japanese political leadership during this period are 
significant as some veer beyond the typical tatemae (outside voice) statements expected 
in Japanese foreign relations, showing that Japan’s leadership continued to struggle with 
the cross-Strait situation, hoping that strong leadership from the United States would 
address the reality of the situation. The decidedly more independent tone also reflected 
the growing confidence enabled by the growth of the Japanese economy in this era, 
labeled the “golden sixties” by Japanese economists.38 The year 1964 also marked a 
significant national accomplishment and new international respect for the Japanese, with 
the successful hosting of the Tokyo Olympics and the general acknowledgement on the 
international stage of the progress Japan had made in two short decades. During this time, 
the United States was preoccupied first with the Cold War on the European front, and 
second, by the growing conflict in Vietnam. While the developing Japan–KMT row was 
not helpful, it was an acceptable annoyance as long as Japan continued full support of 
U.S. basing as America ramped up for another war in Asia. When Prime Minister Sato 
visited America in January 1965, only months after President John F. Kennedy’s death, 
his comments shed light on this growing rift, and suggest that Japan was attempting to 
pursue a policy of “two Chinas.” Sato reportedly told President Lyndon B. Johnson,  
                                                 
36 Chen, “Taiwan and…,” 86–7. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Johnson, MITI and…, 211. 
19 
Japan will maintain normal diplomatic relations with the Nationalist 
government of Taiwan. But, it is impossible for Japan to thoroughly refuse 
contact with Mainland China because of the historical, geographic, and 
ethnic relations. We can make unofficial contact based on the principle of 
“separating economics from politics.” Overall, it is in line with Japan’s 
interests as long as we can make contact freely in the future.39  
Sato was not alone in this sentiment. Looking at a wider swath of opinions within 
the Japanese government, a survey taken in December 1962 showed that most Diet 
members across party lines and demographic groups favored independence for Taiwan 
(33 percent) over allowing Beijing to take control of the island (6 percent) or maintain the 
status quo (20 percent); 41 percent were unsure. Likewise, a Japanese public-opinion 
survey conducted at the same time regarding diplomatic recognition of the PRC indicates 
that the Japanese public, across demographic groups, favored diplomatic recognition for 
the PRC (42 percent), over the status quo (18 percent); 40 percent were unsure. Both 
surveys indicate that the “two Chinas” position Sato implied was backed by broad 
political and public support at the time, but the reality remained that Japan wanted the 
U.S. to take the lead on the issue. 40 
In November 1969, President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Sato would issue 
a joint statement during Sato’s visit to Washington. The joint statement is an intriguing 
mechanism in international relations, as it is intended to communicate a shared interest 
between two countries, but has no bearing on policy development in either country. It is 
not a binding international agreement, and yet it is still somehow viewed as significant. In 
the case of Sato and Nixon, the focus of the statement was on the value of the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security, affirming their intention to maintain the treaty “on the 
basis of mutual trust and common evaluation of the international situation.”41 The 
timeframe was significant in that, in 1970, either nation could unilaterally abandon the 
security treaty, provided they gave advance notification. The focus on Taiwan in the joint 
statement was also interesting. Nixon stated that the U.S. would “uphold its treaty 
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obligations to Taiwan” and Sato responded that the “maintenance of peace and security in 
the Taiwan area was also important for the peace and security of Japan.”42 In hindsight, 
after the strategic sea change that was to take place shortly after the joint communiqué, 
this was a missed opportunity for true alignment between allies on a key policy shift. 
Also easier viewed in hindsight is the reality that Nixon had already signaled that he was 
open to rapprochement with the PRC before his election in 1968, and nearly a decade 
after the Sino–Soviet split, Mao was evaluating his options as well.43  
5. The Sino–Soviet Split 
By the late-1960s, the realization of the Sino–Soviet split was forcing the U.S. 
and its allies to begin to reevaluate their stance on the PRC within the Cold War context. 
For Japan, the Sino–Soviet split was less surprising than the manner in which the U.S. 
handled the split and rapprochement thereafter. The Japanese government, from Yoshida 
on, had evaluated Communist control of the mainland as a reality that must be 
acknowledged, regardless of ideology, and struggled with the U.S. interpretation of China 
in the Cold War paradigm. As such, Nixon’s unilateral negotiation with the PRC was 
especially painful for Japanese leaders to reconcile. In reading the declassified transcripts 
of Nixon and Kissinger’s secret negotiations with Chairman Mao and Prime Minister 
Zhou, two fundamental issues stand out. After collaboration against the Soviet Union, 
resolving the issue of Taiwan was the PRC’s primary interest. Second, the PRC’s concern 
over Japan’s regional ambitions was clear. Specifically, the PRC was concerned about 
Japan’s potential intervention in Taiwan or Korea. Both Kissinger and Nixon talked with 
ease to Mao and Premier Zhou about misunderstandings between Japan and the U.S., 
even mentioning that Prime Minster Sato wanted U.S. forces to leave Japan, and that the 
U.S. remained in Japan “not to defend her, but to prevent her from a return to militarism.” 
Though the Japanese did not have access to these discussions until much later, the 
manner in which the U.S. dealt with China sent clear signals of mistrust to the Japanese, 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Richard Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, October 1967, as accessed online at the 
Nixon Presidential Library, http://millercenter.org/president/nixon/essays/biography/5, 26 Mar 2013.  
21 
and would force the Japanese to reevaluate its own strategy with regard to China and 
Taiwan.44  
6. Conclusion (1945–1972)  
The post-WWII period and first decades of the Cold War made for a complex 
time in Asia. In addition to major strategic shifts, such as the Sino–Soviet split, and 
regional wars such as Korea and Vietnam, which involved the U.S. directly and Japan 
indirectly, crisis in the Taiwan Strait came to a head on multiple occasions. Despite 
having little room within this environment to develop truly independent relations, Japan 
and Taiwan managed to deal with post-war realities and move on to productive trade and 
exchange. In Taiwan, the repressive rule by KMT generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was 
generally perceived by Taiwan residents as worse than previous Japanese colonial 
leadership. Many Taiwanese scholars, in fact, continue to credit the residual functionality 
of Japanese colonial institutions and material infrastructure as the foundation for 
Taiwan’s economic growth. Though Japan was much further down the road towards a 
developmental state than Taiwan by the end of this period, the post-war trade relationship 
with Japan functioned as both stimulus and fuel for diversified development of Taiwan’s 
economy. All considered, the relationship was mutually beneficial to Japan and Taiwan 
throughout this period.  
In terms of national interests and foreign-policy objectives, Japan’s most 
immediate post-WWII national interests were to establish peace with the victors of 
WWII. The Chinese Civil War and the U.S. reaction to Communist control of China 
greatly complicated this effort, and restricted any development of an independent foreign 
policy towards China or Taiwan. Nonetheless, in 1952 separate peace treaties with the 
allies and the ROC were signed, with the ratification of the former being very much 
contingent on the latter.45 In recognition of these constraints, separating economics from 
politics in the post-WWII Cold War environment was the major foreign policy method 
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used by Japan. As such, economic interests in Taiwan remained primary throughout this 
period. Japan, which continues to import a majority of its food products, relied heavily on 
Taiwan for basic agricultural products during this period, while focusing its own 
economic development on higher technology/industrial outputs. Taiwan, in turn, 
imported Japanese industrial products and inputs to effectively stimulate its own 
industrialization. Though at various times in this period Taiwan sought more from Japan 
than a pragmatic trade relationship, Japan was simply not prepared to venture 
independently into the balance-of-power or crisis-management realm for Taiwan. 
Comparing Japan’s interests with U.S. interests in Taiwan during this period, 
more than converging, the U.S. and Japan’s interests complemented each other—with the 
U.S. taking the clear lead in balance-of-power politics and crisis management and Japan 
providing the engine for economic growth domestically and regionally to limit the spread 
of communism. By 1967, however, Japan’s exports to the United Sates exceeded imports 
for the first time, and to a certain extent, economic competition between the U.S. and 
Japan began to appear in Taiwan as well. The sudden realization of Japan’s relative 
economic strength engendered private and government concern in the U.S. as Nixon 
came to office in 1968. Thus, while Japan’s overall economic interests and specific 
interests in Taiwan converged with those of the U.S. at the beginning of this period, by 
the end of this period they were diverging. In the balance of power realm, as U.S. 
rapprochement with the PRC became apparent, it is telling that Chiang Kai-shek reached 
out to the Japanese for an impossible security guarantee shortly before the Nixon 
administration began its exit strategy from its alliance with the ROC on Taiwan, and in 
the process undermined the U.S.–Japan alliance to gain favor with the PRC for 
normalization.46 Just as the U.S. and Japan had almost totally reversed roles from the pre-
WWII period, when Japan was the power involved in a wide array of political and 
military action in the region and the U.S. was primarily concerned with trade, the 
potential for further paradigm shifts among Japanese and U.S. interests vis-à-vis Taiwan 
also remained. 
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C. POST- FORMAL TIES (1972–1996) 
Though Japan was indeed shocked by the manner of U.S. diplomatic reversal 
from the ROC to the PRC, and the floating of exchange rates that would greatly affect the 
value of the Yen—the “Nixon shocks”—unlike its stance in the immediate post-WWII 
environment, it would not sit idly and wait for U.S. leadership to determine key elements 
of its foreign policy. Newly elected Prime Minister Tanaka swiftly forged consensus 
among the primary LDP factions in the first months of his premiership and successfully 
normalized diplomatic relations with the PRC in September 1972, more than six years 
before the U.S. completed negotiations with the PRC for diplomatic recognition. During 
this period of general reevaluation of foreign policy in Japan, one significant discovery 
was that the crisis- management system, which was abruptly exposed as overly reliant on 
the U.S., would require major restructuring. While MOFA and its proxies had some 
initial success in reorienting Japan diplomatically to the PRC and salvaging a pragmatic 
unofficial relationship with Taiwan, this period highlighted how both internal and 
external pressures forced major structural changes in the crisis management system by 
the late 1990s.47  
1. What is Crisis Management? 
Before examining the extraordinary events of this period, it is helpful to have a 
working definition of what a foreign-policy crisis entails, and further, an understanding of 
who and what institutions have a stake in crisis management in Japan. For the purposes of 
this thesis, Jonathon Wilkenfeld’s definition will be used. He defines a foreign-policy 
crisis as, “a crisis for an individual state… deriving from a change in the state’s internal 
or external environment: (1) a threat to one or more basic values, (2) an awareness of 
finite time for response to the value threat, and (3) a heightened probability of 
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involvement in military hostilities.” Wilkenfeld adds that all three must be perceived at 
the highest levels of leadership.48  
In the case of Japan’s perception of the “Nixon shocks”, while U.S. 
rapprochement with the PRC was not specifically threatening Japan’s basic values, many 
Japanese felt that Japan’s primary interests as defined in Yoshida’s “1955 system” were 
directly threatened by the possibility of the dissolution of the U.S.–Japanese security 
treaty and potentially adversarial economic relations with the U.S. With regard to the 
second criterion, time was of the essence for diplomatic triage in the post- “Nixon-shock” 
era, and Japan responded surprisingly swiftly. Finally, the third criterion—military 
hostility as a direct result of the U.S.–PRC rapprochement—was not an immediate 
concern, but Japan’s relative weakness in East Asia would be punctuated in this era as the 
durability of the U.S.–Japanese security treaty was tested. Japanese historian Ogata 
Sadako puts this concern in perspective: 
No American action left a more profound impact on Japanese foreign 
policy in the postwar period than the unilateral decision by President 
Nixon to go to Beijing to seek rapprochement. The impact went far 
beyond the immediate reaction of sourness or of rushing to move ahead of 
the United States. It changed the meaning of the U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty and forthwith the alliance itself.49  
In essence, though this was not a crisis by strict definition, Japan’s foreign-policy 
actors went into crisis mode, and thus, this period (1972–1996), more so than others in 
this thesis, offers an opportunity to examine how Japan’s crisis-management actors had to 
compete for prominence within the larger mechanism of Japan’s foreign policy in the 
execution of Japanese national interests.50  
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is the primary ministry responsible for 
foreign policy, and explicitly responsible for foreign-policy crisis prevention, aversion, 
and management. Though the authorities for certain tools of crisis prevention often reside 
in other ministries, such as foreign aid, foreign direct investment, security assistance, 
defense engagements etc., MOFA is the executive agent, which coordinates the 
government of Japan’s overall response to a crisis. With specific regard to diplomatic 
crisis with Taiwan, MOFA established a non-governmental proxy—the Interchange 
Association Japan (IAJ)—to manage its interaction with Taiwan after 1972. In addition to 
the main players, other governmental subsidiary elements such as the Japan External 
Trade Organization (JETRO), established in 1958, and Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), established in 1974, played significant roles in crisis management and 
prevention through favorable trade agreements and incentives with external trade partners 
or as the distributors of foreign aid, respectively. Both have also had substantial, though 
largely unpublicized, interactions with Taiwan. Rounding out the range of crisis-
management actors, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), although the sole provider of any 
security assistance involving the Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF), was the least 
prominent actor, until certain external and domestic events towards the end of this period 
occurred, which began the JDA and SDF transformation, along with that of other 
national-level crisis management actors.  
Looking at MOFA’s primary reactions to the “Nixon shocks”, the first priority 
was to normalize relations with the PRC. Though Japan’s mainstream LDP leadership, 
even as far back as Prime Minister Yoshida, had advocated normalization of relations 
with the PRC after it was generally acknowledged that the PRC was in control and 
governing mainland China, a strong Taiwan lobby remained within conservative factions 
of the LDP. Though diplomatic relations with the PRC were established quickly, it was 
imperative that the Taiwan lobby within the Diet be placated to a certain extent, and this 
was reflected in the manner in which Japan conducted careful diplomacy with the PRC in 
the process of normalization.  
Japan’s initial diplomatic engagement of the PRC is often misinterpreted to 
simply mirror the language of the U.S.–PRC’s Shanghai Communiqué (1972) regarding 
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Taiwan. The PRC–Japanese Communiqué of 1972, however, uses significantly different 
diplomatic language from the U.S.–PRC Communiqué. In essence, Japan’s communiqué 
emphasizes that Japan respects and understands the PRC position on Taiwan as “an 
inalienable part of China,” but never acknowledges or agrees to that interpretation, saying 
instead, “Japan maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.”51 The 
Shanghai Communiqué, on the other hand, states that the U.S. “acknowledges that all 
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that 
Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that 
position.”52 Though the U.S. Congress counteracted the favorable language used in the 
Shanghai Communiqué by passing the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, essentially 
guaranteeing Taiwan’s security, it can be argued that Japan initially held a stronger 
diplomatic stance against the PRC with regards to Taiwan. While it was clear that both 
the Japanese government and public desired a normalization of diplomatic relations with 
the PRC mainly to facilitate stable trade relations, it was just as clear that Japan did not 
support Beijing’s claim to Taiwan.53  
It took an additional six years to complete terms for the actual peace treaty, which 
came into effect under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Prime Minister Fukuda, but, 
unlike the U.S.–PRC communiqués of 1979 and 1982, the Japan–PRC Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship makes no mention of Taiwan and includes no restrictive judgment on 
relations with other countries. The U.S. communiqués of 1979 and 1982, however, edge 
even closer towards complete adherence to the PRC’s position on Taiwan, and go as far 
to say outright that “The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the 
Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”54 In essence, 
after eight years of intensive diplomacy led by two of the U.S.’s most recognized 
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strategists and diplomats—Kissinger and Brzezinski—it was the skilled diplomats of 
Japan’s Foreign Ministry that would end up with more advantageous terms regarding its 
undefined stance on Taiwan.  
2. De Facto Arrangements 
Moving back to Japan and Taiwan’s effort to salvage an unofficial, yet functional 
relationship, the establishment of the IAJ was crucial. IAJ is roughly equivalent to the 
American Institute in Taipei (AIT), which has served as the de facto U.S. Embassy to 
Taiwan since 1979, but with certain distinctions. It is important to note that in some 
sense, the AIT was modeled after Japan’s IAJ, which was established in December 1972, 
more than six years before the AIT. In many references, “the Japanese model” of 
maintenance of unofficial relations with Taiwan was recommended for the U.S. as 
essentially the 80 percent solution. When founded, the IAJ was charted as a nonprofit 
organization with a legal precedent, but a “special character,” to maintain the substantial 
trade and cultural interaction between Japan and Taiwan, while supporting Japanese 
private citizens’ needs for consular services and the facilitation of private enterprise. 
Additionally, IAJ was tasked to maintain and promote a functional working relationship 
for technical exchange and developmental assistance. While national laws concerning the 
establishment and maintenance of IAJ as an NPO serving the public good are in effect 
and have been updated as recently as 2012, what is missing from the Japanese model is a 
legislative mandate like the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, passed by the U.S. Congress, 
which clearly goes beyond the realm of facilitating trade and exchange to implicitly 
guarantee the security of Taiwan. Clearly, any action by Japan to support Taiwan’s 
security in the 1970s, would have been a red line for the PRC. In Japan, any diplomatic, 
political, or security relationship with Taiwan beyond what the U.S. could undersign was 
seen as a bridge too far even. for the most conservative voices in the Taiwanese lobby.55  
Interestingly enough, the IAJ asserted in the mid-1970s that the economic 
relationship with Taiwan continued to grow significantly, but it was not given press 
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coverage due to PRC pressure. By 1974, the shift in attention away from Taiwan was 
already taking effect on public opinion. In comparison to 1970, when 54 percent of 
respondents across demographic lines supported non-Communist control of Taiwan 
(either Taiwanese independence or nationalist rule), in 1974 only 30 percent supported 
non-Communist control. However, most of the respondents shifted into the “don’t know” 
category, with only a 3 percent increase (from 5 percent to 8 percent) in support of 
Communist control of Taiwan. Remarkably, in the same survey, respondents were asked 
if they supported U.S. bases in Japan, and in all three categories (pro-Taiwanese 
independence, pro-KMT, pro-Communist) respondents displayed an anti-U.S. base 
majority (69 percent, 59 percent, and 79 percent, respectively), with the pro-KMT 
respondents showing the least “anti-U.S. basing” sentiment. The most notable result 
across all spectrums of all public-opinion surveys taken in 1974, however, was that the 
Japanese public still favored non-Communist control of Taiwan.56 
3. The Golden Age of U.S.–China–Japan Relations 
By the late 1970s, as Deng Xiaoping took the helm of the Chinese Communist 
Party and begin to push an “economic reform and opening” agenda, Japan was entering 
the height of its economic strength. The convergence of Japan’s maximized industrial 
capacity with China’s potential input to the supply chain and as a consumer market was 
suddenly the most important dynamic of the newly solidified bilateral relationship. 
Despite powerful Taiwan factions within the LDP and continued public support for a 
non-Communist solution for Taiwan, the Japanese economic juggernaut turned its 
attention away from Taiwan. While private enterprises would continue to forge lucrative 
and mutually beneficial relations with Taiwan during this period, the raw market of the 
PRC was the larger prize.  
The oil shock in 1973 had wide-ranging implications for Japan’s economy and 
coincided with a necessary shift in industrial policy, which had been overly reliant on 
energy imports. Increased trade with China was beneficial in this respect, as Japan 
typically exported construction material, industrial inputs, technology, and machine parts 
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in exchange for raw materials, especially coal and crude oil. By 1978, a significant long-
term trade deal with the PRC was signed, which aimed to increase trade to $20 billion by 
1985. Though that was an overly ambitious mark initially, by 1990 trade between the 
PRC and Taiwan was just over $18 billion, by 1995 trade was $57.9 billion, by 2000, 
$85.5 billion, and by 2005, $267 billion. Essentially, the volume of trade had increased 
fifteen-fold in fifteen years. Similarly, foreign direct investment (FDI) would grow from 
$1.8 billion in 1990 to $36.3 billion in 2005, more than a twenty-fold increase.57  
In the midst of this staggering level of growth in bilateral trade and investment 
with the PRC, it is understandable that the interaction with Taiwan would be very much 
out of public view and of little precedence to the mainstream power structure in Japan. 
Surprisingly, the Japan–Taiwan relationship persisted and even grew significantly under 
principles of mutual benefit, pragmatism, and continued cultural affinity. Taiwan 
remained one of Japan’s top three partners in overall trade in this period, and Japanese 
private enterprise continued to invest in Taiwan’s growth as a market and supplier of key 
industrial and technology production inputs. One initiative that sprang out of this period 
of great regional economic growth and increasing liberalization was the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). PECC was founded in 1980 by prime 
ministers Ohira of Japan and Peck of Australia, and became one of the first successful 
multilateral consultative bodies that combined academic, private-sector, and official 
government representation for the purpose of developing initiatives for maximizing 
competitive advantage and increasing free trade. Both Taiwan and the PRC became full 
members of what was one of the first attempts at a Pan-Asian–Pacific trade block. 
Though PECC has been overshadowed by other more prominent multilateral 
organizations in the Asian Pacific, it is one of the few that still incorporates Taiwan (now 
as “Chinese Taipei”), and remains an example of how Japan played a role in keeping 
Taiwan included in regional development and prosperity, even as the main focus became 
the lucrative trade with the PRC. Additionally, after the Plaza Accord in 1985, which 
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greatly appreciated the Yen and made extra-regional trade substantially less profitable, it 
was in Japan’s interests to examine prospects for growing Pan-Asian prosperity.58  
The golden age of U.S.–China–Japan relations that began in 1972 expired 
abruptly in 1989. While it was primarily Deng’s “economic reform and opening” policy 
that ushered in this anomalous period of shared strategic interests, mutual growth, and 
functional bilateral ties—U.S.–Chinese and Chinese–Japanese—the same policy soon 
proved unwieldy, as evidenced by the China-wide chaotic student demonstrations from 
April to June and the violent 4 June crackdown in Tiananmen Square. Beyond 
Tiananmen, another more significant area of strategic realignment was afoot in 1989, 
with the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union, which was the primary 
shared concern of the U.S., Japan, over more than two decades of cooperation. Suddenly, 
after the massacre at Tiananmen, the fundamental basis for cooperation seemed 
illusory.59  
Although Japan would eventually bandwagon with Western-sponsored economic 
sanctions of China, Japanese companies maintained a pragmatic approach post-
Tiananmen, and many took it as an opportunity to invest further where others would not 
go. The increasingly powerful Keidanren (The Japanese Federation of Business), in turn, 
continued to lobby the Diet for a reduction in sanction and an easing of restrictions in 
trade. By 1992, diplomatic momentum built from a deliberate effort by China towards 
diplomatic progress with Japan post-Tiananmen led to two key visits: President Jiang 
Zemin to Tokyo, and Emperor Akihito to Beijing. Though Japan had hopes of resolving 
the lingering hostilities of World War II, both visits would fall far short of that goal. 
Though economic relations with China would continue to grow at a breakneck pace, 
developments in the political and security realms in the mid-1990s would greatly 
complicate Japan’s foreign-policy objectives and propel Japan into a reinvigorated 
examination of its balance-of-power interests, especially related to Taiwan.  
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4. The End of the “1955 System” 
While the revision of the U.S.–Japan security treaty in 1960 and the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japan in 1972 should be noted as key achievements towards the resumption 
of Japan’s sovereignty in the security realm, Japan had not been forced to venture into the 
balance-of-power game in East Asia outside of the auspices of the U.S.–Japanese alliance 
in the post-WWII period. In 1986, noting the strategic shifts of the Sino-Soviet split, 
U.S.–Chinese rapprochement, the implausibility of the longevity of the “1955 system,” 
and the overall loss of equilibrium in Asia, Hisahiko Okazaki attempted re-defining 
Japan’s role in balance of power in his work, A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense. 
Okazaki’s thesis, though written before the Tiananmen Square incident and the end of the 
Cold War, essentially advocates an independent defense-minded Japan as a more equal 
partner of a stronger U.S.–Japanese alliance.60  
Additionally, Okazaki correctly noted that Japan’s attempts to regain trust in the 
region and the world, strictly through economic engagement, would fall short. His 
argument, based on a realist assessment of the balance of power in Asia and beyond, 
proved especially relevant after the Gulf War, when Japan, though the primary donor of 
financial support to the coalition ($13 billion), was heavily criticized for not being 
capable of providing troops to support even peacekeeping operations. By 1992, this 
discussion had forced a consensus for Japan’s supporting U.N. peacekeeping operations. 
By 1993–1994, tensions on the Korean Peninsula brought this argument even closer to 
home for Japanese lawmakers and public, though in discussions with U.S. defense 
officials, Japanese authorities within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) still cited legal 
and policy restrictions on “rear-area” support of a Korean contingency. In 1995, the 
domestic limitations of the self-defense force were brought to the fore during the slow 
and confused response to the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995. Japan’s net assessment 
of the strategic, regional, and domestic developments of the late 1980s and 1990s was 
that Japan had no strategy for its own defense, had an undefined and severely restricted 
role even within the U.S.–Japan alliance, and could not deal with crisis effectively. While 
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Taiwan had not factored prominently in these discussions, in 1995–1996, potential crisis 
in the Taiwan Strait would initiate a paradigm shift encouraging the Japanese to resolve 
systemic problems in their domestic and external crisis-management system and 
formulate a long-term strategy for protecting national interests in the regional balance of 
power, specifically with regard to Taiwan.61  
5. A Personal and Ideological Bridge with Taiwan 
Internal political dynamics in Taiwan during this period were significant as well. 
Due to loss of credibility and diplomatic isolation during the final years of Chiang Kai-
shek’s life, and the response to a rising middle class by President Chiang Ching-kuo, 
Taiwan was propelled on to the path of democratic development. Democracy was clearly 
in the interests of the people of Taiwan, and it also allowed for more meaningful 
interaction between Japan and Taiwan. The impact of Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui’s 
efforts during this era to usher in democracy in Taiwan and to deepen the de facto 
relationship with Japan cannot be over-stressed. Lee grew up in the era of Japanese 
colonial rule in Taiwan, attended Japanese schools, studied in Kyoto, speaks fluent 
Japanese, and volunteered for service in the Japanese Imperial Army during WWII. 
Despite his obvious respect for Japanese culture, learning, and institutionalism, Lee was 
unmistakably Taiwanese; more than establishing a stronger link between Japan and 
Taiwan, Lee’s legacy centers around Taiwan’s own identity.  
As his political career took shape, Lee made the decision to join the KMT, as he 
realistically assessed that the only way to make democratic progress was from the inside 
of the power structure. Lee’s charisma, political skill, and diligent effort gradually gained 
the trust of KMT leaders, including the generalissimo’s son and president, Chiang Ching-
kuo. As his vice president from 1984–1988, Lee convinced Chiang to lift martial law in 
1986 and allow the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to develop, and Lee was the first 
ROC official to address some tragic episodes of the KMT governance of Taiwan, such as 
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the “228 Incident.” Above all else, Lee’s most impressive feat was guiding the peaceful 
transformation of a Leninist party-state system into a full-fledged democracy by 1996.62  
Though the democratization of Taiwan was Lee’s central thrust, his reevaluation 
of the ROC’s foreign policy was important as well, as even de facto sovereignty would 
require the support of key foreign partners. Through the 1950s and 1960s, Taiwan’s 
foreign policy was based on three pillars: (1) friendship with the U.S., (2) friendship with 
Japan, and (3) a U.N. Security Council seat. Though it had lost representation on the U.N. 
and in most international organizations, Taiwan still sought to maximize its relationships 
with the U.S. and Japan.63 Lee’s foreign-policy strategy can be divided into three main 
categories: (1) crucial bilateral relations, (2) representation in multilateral non-
governmental organizations, and (3) cross-Strait relations. The typical narrative of Lee’s 
legacy is that the accomplishments in the first two categories were negated by the 
tensions in the last. 
Despite Lee’s clear respect for Japanese culture and a favorable view of the 
legacy of Japanese institutionalism and modernity in Taiwan, Lee’s initial public 
statements towards Japan as a partner in foreign affairs were surprisingly stale. In an 
interview with the Asahi Shimbun just before his inauguration in May of 1996, when 
asked about the future relationship between Japan and Taiwan, Lee said, “I understand 
Japan to a certain extent, whereas Japan lacks knowledge about Taiwan. Japan needs to 
carry out more cultural and personnel exchange programs like it conducts with the United 
States. High-level exchange programs also need to be promoted.”64 On the U.S.–Japanese 
security alliance, Lee was even more restrained, saying only, “it would be better not to 
comment on what I think about it, but it is contributing to the East Asian stability.”65 
These statements seem to reflect Lee’s intimate understanding of the tatemae (outside 
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feelings/expressions) and honne (inner feelings/expressions) of Japanese communication, 
as well as his unique political skill. What can be said definitively is that Lee endorsed a 
pragmatic approach to Taiwan’s interaction with Japan, seeking simple mechanisms for 
increased interaction and mutual gain. After his presidency, Lee, who was highly 
suspected by his KMT counterparts and mainland Chinese of being overly enamored with 
Japan, has continued to foster a legacy of close Japanese–Taiwanese relations that 
continues to this day.  
Taiwan’s relations with the United States during Lee’s presidency were less even-
keeled than with Japan, swinging to extremes of great accomplishments and surprising 
policy shifts away from Taiwan. In the case of the Taiwan Strait crisis, China had 
generally expected the U.S. to block President Lee’s visit to the U.S. in 1995, but 
underestimated the U.S. congressional lobby in support of Lee that would ultimately 
influence the executive branch. China deemed Lee’s visit and speech to reflect “creeping 
independence,” and after substantial internal debate, a range of actions through the DIME 
were set into motion, which included suspension of dialogue with Taiwan and the United 
States, propaganda attacks on Lee and President Clinton, and a measured military 
response. The military response included large-scale amphibious exercises in 1995 in the 
vicinity of the Taiwan Strait and follow-on missile exercises during Taiwan’s first 
democratic election in March 1996. Though the U.S initially responded strongly by 
sending two aircraft carriers (one of which was based in Yokosuka, Japan) into the 
Taiwan Strait, almost no dialogue took place between Japanese and U.S. officials as to 
whether U.S. forces operating from Japan triggered the requirement for “prior 
consultations,” as suggested in the 1960 provisions of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security. Similarly, the U.S.’s strategic partnership agreement with China occurred 
without special coordination with Japan, and Clinton’s trip to China would be another 
“Japan-passing” event that would unfortunately remind the Japanese of the “Nixon 
shocks” at the beginning of this period.66  
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6. Conclusion (1972–1996) 
The Japan–Taiwan interaction in the post- diplomatic-recognition period was a 
cycle of crisis, reevaluation, adaptation, and more crises. One main theme that can be 
extracted is that Japan’s relationship with Taiwan was deemed overly dependent and 
vulnerable to the U.S.’s shifting position. In reaction, Japan adapted rather quickly to 
reestablish relations with Taiwan on its own terms, developing a functional and 
pragmatic, though unofficial, mechanism for continued trade and cultural interaction as 
embodied in MOFA’s proxy, the Interchange Association of Japan. Though this 
facilitated functional ties initially, by the end of the period, both Japan and Taiwan’s 
leadership began to examine possibilities for a deeper exchange, beyond simple trade ties, 
to represent the shared culture and values brought to the fore during the Lee Teng-hui 
presidency.  
This period, more than the others examined in this study, highlights both the 
capabilities and deficiencies of Japan’s crisis-management system, and how the systems 
and the interests represented were accentuated by key events involving the PRC and 
Taiwan. Though Japan would acknowledge these deficiencies and salvage functional ties 
with Taiwan before the U.S. accomplished its similar diplomatic feat, Japan’s crisis 
management actors continued to push transformation through the end of this period.  
Japan’s basic formula for foreign policy based on the Yoshida doctrine and 
solidified in the “1955 system” was led by the powerful economic ministries—MOF and 
MITI—and influenced heavily by the keidanren, all of which grew to the height of their 
prominence in this period. As Deng came into power, China’s potential as a market and a 
supplier of cheap production inputs was realized, and Taiwan’s overall significance as a 
partner decreased significantly. Yet Japan and Taiwan’s trade relations, though not 
conducted in the spotlight, remained significant. As Taiwan’s economy began to reach 
the later stages of the developmental model, Japan continued to benefit greatly from high-
technology components that Taiwan could produce much more efficiently and reliably 
than its mainland competitor. However, by the later stages of this period, Japan realized 
that the “1955 system” would not survive the 1990s, and also struggled with the 
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international image of Japan as a strictly financial power that lacked clout in time of 
crisis.  
During this era, although the U.S.–Japan alliance (the basis of Japan’s balance-of-
power interests) experienced tension, specifically over Taiwan, it emerged stronger. The 
reality, as early as 1970, that either country could walk away unilaterally forced a mutual 
recognition that it was still in both parties’ interests to maintain the treaty. Though 
intermittent crisis and Japan-passing events highlighted the alliance’s shortfalls and lack 
of clarity, it continued to take precedence over the domestic political and protectionist 
concerns surrounding Japan. As both countries moved into the dynamic era of Taiwanese 
democracy, the question of how the U.S.–Japan alliance would factor in the security of 
Taiwan remained near the top of the agenda. The U.S. and Japan produced the first 
“Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation” in the late 1990s. 
In assessing Japanese and American policy convergence on Taiwan in this period, 
general convergence and complementarity was maintained. Though Japan felt betrayed 
and excluded from some of the U.S.’s most important foreign-policy decisions regarding 
the PRC in this period, there was no real disagreement over Taiwan. Japan followed the 
U.S. intent to reverse diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC, though the 
prominent Taiwan lobby in the Japanese Diet might have preferred to support a two-state 
solution, especially during Taiwan’s democratic transition. In the economic sphere, the 
U.S. and Japan were at odds, with U.S. concerns over Japan’s industrial output and 
market-share domination strategy. With regard to Taiwan, however, both continued to 
support Taiwan economically: the U.S. primarily through direct aid, and Japan through 
trade and investment. The most surprising conclusion from comparing U.S. and Japanese 
interests in Taiwan during this period is that, though there was a high level of convergent 
interests, there was a low level of coordination—as exemplified by the Taiwan Strait 
crisis. Moving into the late 1990s, both countries acknowledged that increased 
coordination over Taiwan was in their common interest.  
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D.  JAPAN’S “RELUCTANT REALISM” AND THE RISE OF 
BALANCE-OF-POWER POLITICS (1996–2008) 
Taiwan’s democratic development was a paradigm shift, and a somewhat 
inconvenient reality. Even after the Tiananmen Square crisis, which made the PRC a very 
unappealing partner, and a brief period after the Gulf War when the U.S. was the lone 
superpower, the U.S. has not always shown complete enthusiasm for democracy in 
Taiwan. The awareness that America’s de facto security guarantee for Taiwan was 
subject to the whim of Taiwanese public opinion was disconcerting; and this vulnerability 
was amplified in the face of an increasingly unbalanced cross-Strait military situation. 
Meanwhile, the Japan–Taiwan relationship during the Lee presidency and following 
Chen presidency had grown to its most mature interaction since 1972, with a shared 
vision as modern Asian democracies and a corresponding increase in trade, travel, and 
intertwined popular culture. In conjunction with Taiwan’s democratic transition came 
Japan’s concern that its pragmatic policy of economic interdependence with the PRC was 
not having the desired effects. Michael Green highlights this dynamic in his work on 
Japan’s foreign policy, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: “In the space of a few years, Japan’s 
fundamental thinking on China shifted from a faith in economic interdependence to a 
reluctant realism.”67 This shift was also reflected in the ruling LDP party’s foreign-policy 
statement in 1997:  
Ultimately, China’s future rests in its own hands—including how stably it 
will develop. Therefore, even as we seek to preserve and enhance our 
amicable relations with China, we must maintain a close watch on the 
direction China is headed and be prepared to cope with a variety of 
contingencies.68  
The American de facto security guarantee embedded in the strategic ambiguity of 
the Taiwan Relations Act was initially intended to give the ROC diplomatic space and a 
bargaining tool to use for negotiating peaceful settlement of the cross-Strait situation with 
the PRC. Instead, the loss of diplomatic recognition for the ROC was influential in  
igniting a democratic transformation, giving new precedence to Taiwanese public 
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opinion, which heavily favored (around 80 percent) maintenance of some form of the 
status quo rather than conciliatory unification with the mainland.69 Indefinitely sustaining 
the status quo, however, was definitely not acceptable to the PRC; and while this paradox 
was reticently absorbed into U.S. policymaking, pragmatic and generally less publicized 
relations between Japan and Taiwan soared in this transitional period. This section shows 
how from 1996–2008, Japan’s relationship with Taiwan entered a new phase, built on a 
foundation of solid business and cultural ties, strengthened through democratic ideology 
and an emerging pop-culture expansion, and advanced in new areas of politics and 
unofficial defense assurances. While Japan remained strategically and generally aligned 
with the U.S. concerning Taiwan, its interaction with Taiwan was more independent, 
consistent with the overall codification of Japan’s balance-of-power strategy towards 
China. 
1. Ideology, Pop Culture, and Business 
Despite a consistently pragmatic post-WWII philosophy in Japanese foreign 
affairs, an ideological bridge was established between Japan and Taiwan as Taiwan 
transitioned to democracy. In combination with general anxiety over China’s rise, the 
Tiananmen incident, external signs of Chinese aggression such as its nuclear test in 1996, 
the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996, China’s refusal to renounce the use of force 
against Taiwan, and continued demands for a deeper apology from Japan for wartime 
aggression—despite massive official developmental aid from Japan—Japanese public 
opinion and, correspondingly, official foreign policy towards China, began to sour.70 At 
the same time, Japan began to distance itself from shifting U.S. policy regarding China. 
One of the most poignant examples of this dual dynamic came in 1998, when Clinton 
altered the perceived status quo with his “Three No’s” (no to Taiwanese independence; 
no to one China, one Taiwan; and no to Taiwan’s participation in international 
organizations whose members are states). While some do not interpret Clinton’s “Three 
No’s” as a shift in policy, Japanese commentators noted that not supporting Taiwan 
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independence—which was viewed as the traditional U.S. policy—is different from 
opposing independence, which Clinton’s statement implied. Not only did Clinton fail to 
coordinate with Japan prior to the speech, he salted the wound by Japan-passing on the 
trip, possibly as a precondition that was set by the PRC. Japan’s consequent resistance to 
PRC pressure to make a similar endorsement was evident later that year, in its refusal to 
sign a joint statement during a visit by PRC president Jiang Zemin.71 
At the same time, the relationship with Taiwan was bolstered by their shared 
political ideology, complementing the mutually beneficial trade ties that had continued 
quietly even after the severing of official ties. By 2000, Taiwan was a shining example of 
a successful industrialized East Asian economy, sharing many traits of the developmental 
state, of which Japan was the vanguard. The pivotal democratic transition during the Lee-
Teng-hui presidency had solidified the link, and with democratic peace theory still very 
prominent in IR theory, it is natural that Japan began to reexamine the feasibility of 
expanding its relationship with Taiwan.72  
More tangible than ideological, the impact of Japanese pop-culture expansion in 
Taiwan from 1993–1998 was also immense. Lam Peng-er noted this dynamic in his 
important 2004 article “Between Affinity and Reality: Japan–Taiwan Relations:” 
 “Trends in J-Pop [Japanese popular music] music, fashion, fast food, 
television soap operas, movies, karaoke, computer games, books and 
manga [comic books] form the tastes and behavior of Taiwanese youth. In 
contrast, China does not excite the fashion sense and taste of young 
Taiwanese; the more belligerent China acts toward Taiwan, the less 
attractive mainland Chinese culture becomes to Taiwanese youths.”73  
 Japanese media during the mid-1990s picked up on this growing trend of young 
Taiwanese Japan-lovers (termed harizu in Taiwan) as well, highlighting the importance 
of Taiwanese political figures in encouraging this phenomenon. Furthermore the popular-
culture infatuation by a new Taiwanese generation led to a deeper appreciation of the 
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Japanese language and culture, with a corresponding increase in Japanese-language 
learners and tourism to Japan. The Asahi Evening News examined this trend in 2000:  
Hello Kitty and Doraemon Nihon junkies here are known by the special 
name harizu (Japan lovers) and they have been a conspicuous and growing 
phenomenon over the past few years…. In line with the new craze, 
Japanese-language study has also exploded in popularity. From 1993–
1998, the number of Taiwanese studying Japanese rose by 177 percent 
overall and by 287 percent at language schools and juku (cram schools)…. 
[T]he latest boom is the direct result of government deregulation of 
Japanese pop cultural imports…Lee Teng-hui… is widely credited with 
opening the island republic to Japanese culture by rescinding many anti-
Japanese laws that had been in the books since World War II.74 
While the generation of Taiwanese who maintained a favorable impression of colonial 
Japan, spoke Japanese, and preferred Japanese administration to former KMT-autocratic 
rule was beginning to pass away, a new vigorous section of the now-voting public was 
more than filling the void.75  
The expansion of popular-cultural ties also served to reinvigorate Japan’s 
economic interests in Taiwan. Though trade had remained relatively strong since 1972 
from the Japanese perspective, by the late 1990s, Taiwan had become increasingly 
concerned about its trade deficits with Japan. In dealing with these concerns, the IAJ and 
Taiwan’s East Asian Exchange Commission established annual trade talks to facilitate 
trade-dispute resolution. Additionally, a wide array of private Taiwan–Japan friendship 
clubs with ties to industry in Taiwan and the powerful keidanren in Japan began to 
emerge around the turn of the century. Though the IAJ would have some success in 
stimulating additional demand in Japan for Taiwanese products, Japanese exports to 
Taiwan would continue to outpace imports. In fact, exports from Japan to Taiwan 
increased 60 percent from 2002–2007. Imports to Japan from Taiwan also increased 
significantly (23 percent) during roughly the same period, and in contrast to trade 
between Japan and Taiwan prior to 1972, Taiwan’s exports to Japan were of increasing 
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sophistication and industrial value, such as high-technology inputs to electronics 
production. 76  
While trade with Taiwan increased substantially, it is important to note that trade 
with the PRC increased to an even greater extent from 2002–2007. Japanese exports to 
the PRC increased by 150 percent; imports from the PRC increased 110 percent. The 
powerful keidanren, which came under intense scrutiny with the prolonged stagnation of 
the Japanese economy following the bursting of the asset bubble in the early 1990s, was 
still focused on the growth of Chinese markets, even in the midst of serious concerns over 
the long-term stability of China. Thus, although an ideological and cultural bridge 
supported better business ties with Taiwan, it did not exclude continued pragmatic 
business ties with the PRC.77  
Juxtaposed with increased business and cultural ties between Japan and Taiwan, 
tourism also increased in both directions. In 1996, new air routes were established 
between Osaka and Taipei, shared by All Nippon Airways (ANA) and Taiwan EVA 
airways. Travel increased markedly, with 1.6 million visitors traveling between Japan and 
Taiwan the following year. To ease the travel process further, in 1998 Japan began to 
offer 72-hour transit visas for ROC nationals, and Taiwan reciprocated.78 By 2001, 
Japanese visitors accounted for 42 percent of all tourist travel to Taiwan, exceeding the 
second highest group of travelers to Taiwan—Americans —by more than 600,000. 
Taiwanese consistently ranked Japan and Tokyo as the best foreign country and city they 
had ever visited.79  
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2. Political Networks 
Though Lee-Teng-hui’s official comments on Taiwan during his tenure as 
president (1988–2000) were generally tempered by the PRC’s clear disdain for any 
acknowledgement of official political ties, his legacy as a charismatic proponent of 
greater political ties with Japan is well established. Under Lee’s auspices, non-official, 
private exchanges and meetings between Japan and Taiwan’s local and national party 
members, both ruling and opposition, became standard. In 1998, sixty-six Japanese 
politicians and bureaucrats traveled to Taiwan. Taiwan, in turn, sent high-ranking 
members of the legislative Yuan, presidential advisers, the head of the government 
information office, the secretary general of the KMT, and the mayor of Taipei—Chen 
Shui-ban. On Chen’s visit in 1999, only a year before his election as president, Chen met 
both the prime minister of Japan, Keizo Obuchi, and a powerful LDP faction leader, 
Yoshiro Mori, who would become prime minister after Obuchi. While Japan refrained 
from sending any cabinet-ranked officials to Taiwan to maintain nominal adherence to 
the One-China policy, functional political ties and unofficial mechanisms for dialog took 
root during this critical period of 1996–2000.80  
Though there had been unofficial Taiwan lobbies in various political factions and 
zoku (factional sub-elements or gangs) since the early post-WWII period in the Japanese 
Diet, the Taiwan lobby solidified in this period. In 1997, the LDP Diet Members’ 
Dialogue Group on Japan–China Relations (established in 1973) was expanded as a Diet-
wide group, which by 2004 had 320 members from all parties. The main opposition party 
(the Democratic Party at the time) also established the Japan–Taiwan Friendship 
Association, which had seventy-seven members, and arranged for political exchanges of 
the opposition party and the DPP, both in Taipei and Tokyo. Though there were various 
friendship and exchange groups in the Diet, including some promoting ties with the PRC, 
Japan’s need to maintain an veneer of informality in its relationship with Taiwan led to 
the Taiwan lobby’s becoming a prolific institution for strengthening relations between the 
countries while staying just below the official-foreign-policy radar. Lodged deep and 
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spread wide within the bureaucratic power center of the Diet, the Taiwan lobby’s power 
and influence would gradually expand to other key institutions—the MOF, MITI, MOFA, 
and JDA—through the rest of this period.81  
With functional political ties greatly enhanced through the Taiwan lobby and 
expanded exchanges throughout both governments, Taiwan became more vocal about the 
role it hoped Japan could play in regional affairs, especially in the cross-Strait 
relationship. By 2000, the idea that Japan could be a possible mediator between Taiwan 
and the PRC for negotiations, such as a cross-Strait nonaggression pact, began to gain 
momentum, receiving support from both opposition and leading parties in Taiwan. Vice 
President Annete Lu seemed to take on the leadership role for this initiative and others 
involving Japanese leadership in regional affairs. In 2000, she encouraged visiting 
Japanese politicians to consider starting a northeast Asian coalition of “modern, 
democratic, and developed” states that excluded Beijing. While this would likely have 
crossed a clear red line from the PRC perspective and seemed infeasible to Japan and the 
United States, Taiwan’s assessment that Japan could have a significant role in the process 
should be recognized.82  
As President, Lee Teng-hui greatly increased political exchanges with Japan, but 
his support for greater ties with Japan expanded significantly after his final term in 2000. 
In 2001, Lee urged Japan to “lay down its historical burden” and become more assertive 
in international and regional affairs.83 In Japan, Lee’s call to action was a welcome 
contrast from the treatment of the PRC president Jiang Zemin, who in a disastrous visit to 
Tokyo in 1998 publicly demanded that Japan “must never forget the past to avoid 
repeating the mistakes of history.”84 It did not hurt that Lee was also a greatly 
charismatic figure, equivalent in East Asia to Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. 
Lee’s books were bestsellers in Japan, and he capitalized on mass media as an emissary 
for Taiwan’s democracy, human rights, and right to international representation. Lee’s 
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legacy lives on in Japan, and one of these legacies—the Friends of Lee Teng-hui 
Association—continues to be one of the most important NGO lobby groups for Taiwan.85  
In 2001, the Taiwan lobby of Japan had reached the pinnacle of its power, with 
the factional leader of the lobby, Yoshiro Mori, ascending to the premiership. Lee Teng-
hui, who had applied for a visa to Japan in April of that year under the guise of medical 
treatment, was actually on a political mission. The Taiwan lobby, seeing a poignant 
opportunity to show support for Taiwan, pushed the case to approve Lee’s visa, despite 
the PRC insisting that if Lee were to visit Japan “in whatever name and whatever 
capacity” Sino–Japanese relations would be “fundamentally” damaged.86 Though the 
foreign minister, Yohei Kono, officially resisted the visa, he was overridden by Prime 
Minister Mori and other leaders within the LDP. Though Beijing retaliated with a slew of 
canceled visits, including a planned visit by Li Peng, then chairman of the National 
People’s Congress, the Taiwan lobby had held its ground for Lee in spite of PRC protests 
and potential economic and diplomatic fallout. Though this type of bold support for 
Taiwanese leadership has not remained consistent, it has reappeared at key junctures, 
especially at times when the Mori faction and Taiwan lobby have held prominent 
positions in the cabinet or premiership, as it does now.  
3. Balance of Power 
Building on the new framework of political engagement, the topic of security and 
defense relations between Japan and Taiwan began to be broached in the public view. 
The exceptional delicacy of the topic stems not only from Taiwan’s unresolved status, but 
also from Japan’s and the U.S.’s shifting interpretations of Japanese constitutional 
limitations regarding the very existence and further use of the self-defense forces. 
Significant shifts both in Taiwan’s status and Japan’s understanding of its ability to 
participate in collective self-defense, specifically concerning Taiwan, occurred in this 
period. 




1996 was a critical year in the evaluation of the security situation around Japan, 
and though North Korea was still the primary focus following the 1994 nuclear 
developments, Taiwan was rapidly coming to the fore. Hisahiko Okazaki harkened 
attention in Japan and beyond to the U.S. response to the Taiwan Strait crisis and 
implications for Japan, given that the U.S. had clearly shown a commitment to the 
defense of Taiwan.87 Okazaki made two prescient points: (1) Japan should take note of 
the U.S.’s commitment to Taiwan and accept the likelihood that Japan would be involved 
by default because of the American forces in Japan would most certainly be involved; (2) 
Japan’s government, and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto specifically, was not 
prepared to take the necessary steps to adequately address the issue.  
In the background, however, Washington was briefing Tokyo on Seventh Fleet 
operations in the Strait and providing information on Chinese missiles, while Tokyo was 
confirming that Taiwan would not be deliberately excluded from the geographic area of 
the Far East that had been discussed in U.S.–Japan Alliance redefinition talks. Though 
Hashimoto had taken preliminary steps to prepare a contingency plan for logistical 
support to potential U.S. combat operations in the Strait, he would not attain Diet support, 
and no joint U.S.–Japan action took place as a show of resolve in reaction to the Taiwan 
Strait crisis.88  
What would result, however, was the 1996 U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration. 
Although a truly significant development, the wording was intentionally ambiguous, 
essentially stating that the U.S. and Japan would work together to address “situations that 
may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence 
on the peace and security of Japan…[and] the Asia–Pacific region. 89 More importantly 
though, the declaration concluded the alliance redefinition process, which had been 
initiated in 1994, and at the same time began a review of the 1978 U.S.–Japan Defense 
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Guidelines. The 1996 Japan-Defense White Paper subsequently put the declaration into 
context by further detailing the expansion of the Chinese threat and its implications for 
Taiwan from the Japanese perspective. By 1997, though substantial consensus in Japan 
had been reached regarding the importance of Japanese support for Taiwan, it was not the 
main focus for the review of the defense guidelines. The longevity and durability of a 
clause with built-in strategic ambiguity on Japan’s commitment to Taiwan made more 
sense at the time. Thus, the completed review of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan–U.S. 
Defense Cooperation includes Article V, which provides analysis of the type of 
cooperation possible in “situations in areas surrounding Japan which will have an 
important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”90  
Chen Shui-bian’s election in 2000 continued to bring Japan–Taiwan relations to 
the fore. International media covered Chen’s election and presented a range of opinions, 
including the need for restraint in the relationship with Taiwan due to the importance and 
volatility of China, but most mainstream Japanese press presented Chen’s election as a 
further opportunity for strengthening relations with Taiwan, and noted Japan’s distinctive 
position from which to support Taiwan’s newfound democratic legitimacy.91 Exchanges 
between Japan’s Taiwan lobby and DPP politicians, many of whom favored Taiwanese 
independence, grew to their most mature level during the initial years of the Chen 
administration, with delegations of DPP politicians traveling to Japan and LDP and 
opposition party members traveling to Taipei shortly after Chen was elected in 2000. By 
2002, President Chen was making bold official statements, calling for a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with Japan, and “cooperation in the areas of politics, the military, and 
security.”92 Japan–Taiwan relations had truly entered a new era that ventured beyond the 
traditional framework of business and cultural exchange into reassessment of Japan’s role 
in the balance of power.  
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With the rise of Junichiro Koizumi, another member of the Mori faction and 
Taiwan lobby, the necessary leadership structure seemed in place to support substantial 
enhancement in Japanese–Taiwanese relations. One notable event that occurred early in 
the Chen–Koizumi years that swayed Japanese public opinion towards expanding support 
for Taiwan was the Shenyang Incident in May 2002, where Chinese police stormed the 
Japanese consulate in Shenyang to forcibly remove and arrest North Korean asylum 
seekers. Consequently, Japanese public support for Taiwanese independence grew 
beyond the 64 percent peak noted in the late 1990s.93 With leadership and public support 
in place, the next step was action in the Diet. With Mori’s faction and the Taiwan lobby 
leading the charge, the policy guidelines for official travel to Taiwan were amended, 
allowing for a wider swath of government officials and high ranking politicians to visit 
Taiwan in a semiofficial capacity. In December 2003, former prime minister and current 
leader of the Taiwan lobby Yoshiro Mori visited Taiwan and met with President Chen. 
After Mori’s visit, Japan’s official and unofficial positions on Taiwan advanced 
significantly.94  
In 2003, Japan made an important step in supporting Taiwan’s de facto 
sovereignty by backing the ROC’s acceptance into the World Health Organization, and in 
2004 followed up by voting for it. Moving into the defense realm, the Japan Defense 
Agency’s committee on defense capability continued to highlight the Chinese threat, and 
provided three scenarios where China might attack Japan, with war in the Taiwan Strait 
the most dangerous. At the same time, retired Japanese maritime self-defense force senior 
officers began visiting Taiwan in track-II dialogue events and contract advisory roles to 
the Taiwanese ministry of national defense and navy, which have continued in various 
forums to the present. In addition to the Taiwan–Japan “Mainland China Issues 
Symposium,” which was initiated in 1971 and continues, there are five other track-II 
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dialogues involving government officials form 1999–2001 that continue to facilitate an 
important information exchange mechanism between Tokyo and Taipei.95  
Domestically, Japan’s beleaguered defense industry was also lobbying through 
the keidanren to lift export bans, which many connected to potential arms sales to 
Taiwan. Even a very moderate Japanese commentator and expert on Japanese foreign 
policy, Yoshihide Soeya of Keio University, concluded in late 2004 that there was no 
question whether Japan would provide support to the U.S. in the event of aggressive PRC 
action in the Taiwan Strait. The main question that remained was, to what extent would 
Japan be confined within the parameters set by the U.S.–Japanese alliance? 96  
Indeed, it would appear that Japan’s trajectory for enhanced support of Taiwan, 
both through the U.S.–Japan security alliance and other semiofficial Japanese–Taiwanese 
mechanisms, was set; but in the background, important shifts in the strategic and regional 
situation were occurring. First, President Chen, while winning reelection in March of 
2004, lost the DPP majority in the December legislative Yuan elections. Some U.S. and 
Chinese commentators interpreted this as an indication that the Taiwan people were 
restraining Chen from going too far in pushing Taiwan independence at the risk of 
conflict with the PRC. 97 Most importantly, the U.S. was now embroiled in two wars, in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the thought of conflict in Asia, especially with China, was 
inconceivable, even if the cause was consistent with the ideological leanings of the 
administration. Indeed during this period, many hawkish Japanese (especially in the 
conservative Taiwan lobby) perceived that U.S. was lacking a clear strategy for Taiwan. 
To this point, Hisahiko Okazaki commented in 2003 on U.S. policy concessions to the 
PRC saying, “I cannot help but have the impression that recent American Taiwan policy 
has also been fossilized in ‘position papers,’ which do not provide us any clue to their 
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underlying philosophy or strategy.”98 While Japan under Koizumi raised the bar for 
functional support to U.S. commitments in other regions of the world and much was 
accomplished in terms of normalizing the defense relationship between Japan and the 
U.S., there was some sense of a temporary power vacuum in Asia, as it was well 
understood that the U.S. was simply not willing to pursue policies that had any associated 
risk of escalation.99  
Michael McDevitt, in his important piece, “Taiwan: The Tail that Wags the Dog,” 
embodied an increasingly significant voice in U.S. policy circles at the time, which 
acknowledged the concern over the new assertiveness of the PRC and growing power of 
the PLA, yet was equally concerned about the potential for Chen Shui-bian to unilaterally 
involve the U.S. in a potential cross-Strait crisis. President George W. Bush had been 
extremely supportive of Taiwan’s defense in the early years of his administration, 
especially following the EP-3 incident (in which U.S. reconnaissance aircraft were forced 
to land on Hainan island after aggressive collision with a PLAAF fighter) in April of 
2001 and would reinvigorate hope, in his inaugural address in January 2005, of an Asia–
Pacific democratic alliance by citing the spread of democracy as a primary policy goal. 
But firm limits for support of Taiwan’s sovereignty remained. The objective in the Strait 
shifted from facilitating resolution to maintaining the status quo, with an equivocal hope 
that resolution would come at a point much later, when the strategic situation had 
changed significantly. Nonetheless, the U.S. and Japan would continue to advance the 
alliance in terms of functionality, versatility, and specificity. In February 2005, the 
landmark 2+2 Joint Statement (SECDEF, SECSTATE + MOFA, JDA) included “the 
peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait” as a common regional 
strategic objective.100  
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Shortly after the 2+2 Joint Statement, the PRC reemphasized its stance by 
enacting the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which states,  
In the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces should act 
under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession 
from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from 
China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should 
be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and 
other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.101  
The Anti-Secession was in large part a response to the passage of the referendum 
law in Taipei in 2004, and the message to Taiwan was unambiguous. While U.S. support 
was generally assumed, Taiwan National Defense Committee members lobbied Japan for 
closer military cooperation, as indicated by an August 2005 visit to Tokyo, where they 
met with key members of the Diet and other Japan Defense Agency officials.102  
To keep this period in context, Yoshihide Soeya warned that:  
If one merely listens to the changing discourse on China and Taiwan by 
inspired pro-Taiwan Japanese , one would be tempted to conclude that 
Japanese policy in the coming years will be increasingly anti-China and 
pro-Taiwan (even to the extent of supporting Taiwan independence). 
Conventional wisdom even outside of China associates Japan’s pro-Taipei 
voices with Japan’s desire to become a normal state.103  
Indeed, despite widespread political and public support for Taiwan, Japanese 
business interests and crisis-management actors continued to focus on China during this 
period. And while Japan made definite progress in bilateral political and security ties with 
Taiwan, most commentators saw that this progress remained within the general 
parameters of the U.S–Japanese alliance. What should be recognized is that Japan was, as 
Soeya says, moving forward in its own desire to become a normal state, and that 
movement was clearly manifested in its relationship with Taiwan and its definition of its 
own security interests. The period was capped off in 2007, when Shinzo Abe, another 
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pro-Taiwan member of the Mori faction, became prime minister. Abe continued forward 
momentum towards normalization of Japan’s security by successfully transforming the 
Japan Defense Agency into a ministry, equivalent with other actors in foreign policy such 
as MOFA, METI, and MOF. Emblematic of this period, Abe wrote a book with Hisahiko 
Okazaki that can be interpreted as a grand strategy for Japan’s defense. Penned before 
Abe assumed the premiership, it is appropriately entitled, Kono Kuni wo Mamoru Ketsui 
(The Determination to Defend this Country).104  
4. Conclusion (1996–2008) 
It is telling that, at the pinnacle of Taiwan’s democratic and economic growth, 
Japan was Taiwan’s most favored nation, by far. Likewise, by the end of this period, 
public and political support for Taiwan had never been higher in Japan. It should also be 
recognized that for all Japan’s assertive foreign- and security-policy activism towards 
Taiwan during this period, economic interdependence with China and the U.S.–Japan 
alliance remained the limiting margins of Japan’s de facto relationship with Taiwan. 
Nonetheless, between the margins, an increasingly significant subtext of Japan’s foreign 
policy developed for Taiwan.105  
Economically, Japan–Taiwan trade increased in quantity and substance. The 
economic relationship was further bolstered by agreements and the opening of new 
TECRO and JETRO offices, which further facilitated trade and investment processes. 
Though Japan and Asia were deep in the throes of the Asian economic crisis by the end 
of this period, both Japan and Taiwan were weathering the storm, and business 
interaction between Japan and Taiwan remained steady and mutually beneficial. Another 
subtext in foreign affairs in the region, however, was a growing pan-Asian economic 
liberalization, involving ASEAN, South Korea, Japan, and most importantly, China, 
which by the end of this period, was the primary engine of growth in Asia. This trend, 
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though widely reported now, was not prominent in cross-Strait commentaries. As will be 
shown in the following chapter, it would become a driving factor for Taiwan in the 
coming years.   
Crisis-management actors were almost totally oriented towards the PRC during 
this period. In this respect, MOFA and other crisis-management actors attempted to limit 
and constrain Japan’s interests in Taiwan, so as not to unnecessarily antagonize the PRC 
or prevent growing business ties. One possible reflection of this effort was the ambiguity 
of the 1997 defense guidelines regarding Taiwan, though they were in accordance with 
American guiding principles of strategic ambiguity. Despite real boundaries maintained 
by Japan’s crisis-management actors with respect to Taiwan, Japan’s interests in Taiwan 
expanded most dramatically in the balance-of-power realm. The net result of these 
changes is that in its interaction with Taiwan, Japan started acting more like a “normal” 
nation, and less like a nation severely constrained by other regional and global powers. 
The basic reality remained that if crisis broke out in the Strait, it was still Washington and 
not Tokyo that would decide how the U.S.–Japan alliance would be applied; but Japan 
had a significantly larger stake in that decision by 2007 than in previous periods.106  
Just as Japan’s interests in broader relations with Taiwan were coalescing around 
security concerns regarding China, the Taiwanese public became more concerned about 
the real possibility of provoking an aggressive China, whose patience was wearing thin 
over Chen Shui-bian’s envelope-pushing public pronouncements on sovereignty. 
Similarly, the U.S. became wary of the potential for Taiwan to unilaterally provoke the 
PRC and involve America in a conflict, which it frankly could not afford in the midst of 
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and Iraq. Regarding overall alignment with U.S. 
objectives in Taiwan, Japan and the U.S. remained fundamentally aligned, and in fact, 
made significant progress in redefining and normalizing the U.S.–Japan security alliance 
in the context of potential conflict in the Strait. Though the U.S.–Japan alliance would 
come out of this period much more secure than it had started, the seeds of potential 
strategic divergence, specifically over Taiwan were also sown. Though timing and a 
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variety of factors would prevent Japan from moving too far down a unilateral path, 
nascent indications of this divergence lay just beneath the surface of what continues to be 
a very stable and mutually beneficial alliance.  
  
54 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
55 
II. CURRENT DYNAMICS OF JAPAN–TAIWAN RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The intent of the preceding historical survey was to extract the primary drivers of 
current Japan–Taiwan interaction through the lens of Japan’s national interests. The 
colonial period (1895–1945) set a baseline for cultural understanding, bureaucratic 
institutionalism, and a positive narrative of shared development, despite its violent and 
exploitative final chapter. The post-WWII era (1945–1972) was a period of initial 
uncertainty, which settled into a bipolar clarity during the Cold War that offered little 
room for independent ingenuity in Japan’s relationship with Taiwan, but also validated 
Yoshida’s formula for pragmatic ties through economic development. The post- formal-
ties period (1972–1996) was a period of reevaluation that showed Japan’s ability to 
rapidly adapt to a shifting strategic situation and successfully salvage a functional de 
facto relationship with Taiwan, while struggling to implement structural changes within 
foreign-policy bureaucracy. Finally, the last period of this survey (1996–2008) examined 
the formulation of Japan’s dual-track balance-of-power strategy towards China—one 
track based firmly on the U.S.–Japan security alliance, and the other, on a new 
independent development, in which an unofficial political exchange and defense 
commitment with Taiwan began to take root. One overarching observation that can be 
applied to an examination of the current dynamics of the Japan–Taiwan relationship is 
that Japan has a unique vantage point regarding Taiwan that should be incorporated into a 
holistic understanding of cross-Strait stability and the future of Taiwan.  
While the subtext of Japan–Taiwan relations has provided the main story of this 
thesis, the current dynamics of the Japan–Taiwan relationship cannot be fully examined 
without an assessment of the shifting strategic situation in the Taiwan Strait, including 
the actions by the U.S. and the PRC that have defined the margins within which Japan 
and Taiwan’s interaction must exist. This chapter will provide a summary of some of the 
relevant changes in the strategic situation of the Strait, from the perspectives of the PRC, 
U.S. and Taiwan, before examining Japan’s national interests in Taiwan in the current 
context.  
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B. STRATEGIC SITUATION OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT  
The fundamental change in the strategic situation in the Taiwan Strait since 2008 
is that tensions have decreased significantly. With the election of the mainland-oriented 
Kuomintang (KMT) president Ma Ying-jeou, substantial progress has been made towards 
cross-Strait rapprochement and reconciliation. Eighteen cross-Strait agreements and 
initiatives have been signed from 2008 to March of 2013, including the landmark 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Yet decreased tensions with the PRC 
have come at a cost to Taiwan and its political leadership, and fundamental 
incongruences remain in the objectives of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.  
 
1. Status Quo, Equilibrium, and Dynamic Equilibrium 
The notion of status quo in international relations is somewhat illusory. In the 
case of Taiwan, maintaining the status quo has been a unifying principle since most 
nations, including Japan, severed official ties after U.S. diplomatic rapprochement with 
the PRC. To the government of the PRC, status quo is clearly not acceptable, especially if 
it continues indefinitely. To the people of Taiwan, status quo has come to mean a range 
of answers, but includes ideas of de facto sovereignty, holding out for democratization to 
occur on mainland China, stability for cross-Strait business, a functional détente, and 
simply, making the best of a bad situation. Approximately 80% of the people of Taiwan, 
in fact, favor the maintenance of some form of status quo: status quo, indefinite; status 
quo, decision later; status quo, eventual re-unification; or status quo, eventual 
independence,107 as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Taiwanese Public Opinion 
The bottom line is that it really depends on who you ask, but the only tangible 
element of status quo in the Taiwan Strait, is that the situation is unresolved. Why it 
would be the strategy of the U.S. and other powerful nations to maintain a situation that is 
fundamentally unresolved despite periods of clear hegemony in the region and in the 
world is a mystery on which Japanese commentators have speculated widely, and, out of 
deference, have to a great extent accepted as reality.  
A related concept, perhaps more useful within the realm of international affairs, is 
equilibrium. Hans Morgenthau’s comments on equilibrium are particularly relevant to 
Taiwan’s status:  
Two assumptions are at the foundation of all such equilibriums: first, that 
the elements to be balanced are necessary to society or are entitled to exist 
and, second, that without a state of equilibrium among them one element 
will gain ascendancy over the others, encroach upon their interests and 
rights, and may ultimately destroy them.108  
 Taiwan’s status is that of a pseudo-state, whose international status has been 
determined by other powerful sovereign states that have concluded that it is not entitled 
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to exist within the international system as a sovereign state. Secondly, while a de jure 
status quo has been officially maintained for Taiwan since 1972, equilibrium has not.  
An interesting evolution of this concept that has been used of late in the cross-
Strait vernacular is “dynamic equilibrium.” Again, Morgenthau provides a conceptual 
basis for this evaluation; with reference to a dynamic equilibrium, he offers the example 
of a human body: 
While the human body changes in the process of growth, the equilibrium 
persists as long as the changes occurring in the different organs of the 
body do not disturb the body’s stability. This is especially so if the 
quantitative and qualitative changes in the different organs are 
proportionate to each other.109  
 President Ma has suggested that changes occurring in the cross-Strait situation 
since he took office are consistent with this concept of dynamic equilibrium.110 That is, 
though the situation is constantly changing, even being redefined, all relevant parties are 
adapting, and maintaining the overall system of equilibrium. This explanation would fit 
within Morgenthau’s explanation as long as all parties continue to adapt together. While 
this concept of a constantly evolving equilibrium may be helpful to a Taiwanese 
politician in justifying policies that would appear to violate specific voting 
constituencies’ notions of status quo, this thesis offers a contrary assessment, that without 
a true balance of power, equilibrium cannot exist. In the case of the Taiwan Strait, the 
balance has been steadily shifting in favor of the PRC in all realms of national power 
(diplomacy, information, military, and economy) and Taiwan has been forced to accept a 
new reality. What could be construed as a dynamic equilibrium established through 
peaceful reassurance mechanisms from an optimistic perspective could be considered 
coercion via unrestricted warfare through a realist interpretation. Richard Bush, in his 
recent analysis of the cross-Strait situation, Uncharted Strait: the Future of China–
Taiwan, describes this interpretational dilemma of the PRC’s methods as “mutual 
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persuasion” as opposed to “power asymmetry.”111 Qian Qichen, vice premier of the PRC 
at the time, made the following comments on the duality of the strategy in 2000: 
 Comrade Deng Xiaoping used to say that we should use “two hands” in 
settling the Taiwan issue and not rule out either of the two ways: Doing as 
much as we can with our right hand to settle the issue peacefully because 
the right arm is stronger. However, in case this does not work, we will also 
use the left hand, namely military force.112  
While Bush makes a convincing argument that neither Taiwan nor the PRC has 
totally abandoned an approach of mutual persuasion, this author would suggest that any 
persuasion that is based on an obvious power asymmetry is, by definition, coercion; and 
further, that there is no real separation between the terms—only a scalable range of 
persuasion, coercion, and blunt force, made possible by the existential recognition of the 
power asymmetry at the core of the issue.  
C. PRC POWER ASYMMETRY: “COMPREHENSIVE 
NATIONAL POWER” 
Dealing with a potential contingency in the Taiwan Strait remains the 
PLA’s primary mission despite decreasing tensions there—a trend which 
continued following the reelection of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in 
January 2012. In this context, should deterrence fail, the PLA could be 
called upon to compel Taiwan to abandon independence or to re-unify 
with the mainland by force of arms while defeating any third-party 
intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.113  
The PRC’s strategy for diplomatic isolation of Taiwan in the world is a clear and 
present concern. In 1969, seventy-one countries recognized the ROC, while only forty-
eight countries recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China. In 2013, 172 
countries recognize the PRC and only twenty-three nations officially recognize the ROC. 
For the twenty-three countries that continue to recognize Taiwan, the PRC and Taiwan 
were thought to have entered into an unwritten diplomatic truce since 2008 in 
conjunction with cross-Strait negotiations. In the past year, however, the PRC has 
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possibly resumed coercive diplomacy, including dangling economic incentives and 
diplomatic demarches, as was seen in March of 2013, when President Ma attended the 
inauguration of Pope Francis. After Ma had a brief audience with the new Pope, China’s 
foreign ministry responded by calling on the Vatican to “recognize the Chinese 
government as the sole legal representative of all China.” While the Vatican continues to 
recognize Taiwan, China continues to be the only country with a state-run Catholic 
church that does not recognize the Pope.114  
By 2008, the U.S. State Department’s international-security advisory board had 
officially recognized the manifestation of this strategy:  
It is essential that the United States better understand and effectively 
respond to China’s comprehensive approach to strategic rivalry, as 
reflected in its official concept of “Three Warfares.” If not actively 
countered, Beijing’s ongoing combination of psychological warfare 
(propaganda, deception, and coercion), media warfare (manipulation of 
public opinion domestically and internationally), and legal warfare (use of 
“legal regimes” to handicap the opponent in fields favorable to him) can 
precondition key areas of strategic competition in its favor.115  
Though examples of coercive bilateral diplomacy remain, the PRC has conducted 
a notable shift since 2008, from engaging in primarily bilateral international relations to 
establishing its leadership of multilateral regional forums, such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Similarly, the PRC 
has increasingly asserted the PRC’s foreign-policy agenda in global institutions, such as 
the World Trade Organization and the G20, and continues to affirm its fundamental non-
interventionist stance as a permanent member of the security council of the United 
Nations. Some of the primary events that influenced this shift include the election of 
mainland-oriented KMT President Ma in Taiwan, the reestablishment of cross-Strait 
talks, and the successful hosting of the Olympics in Beijing—all of which served as a 
springboard for a bold new international diplomatic platform.  
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Militarily, there is no question the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is in a better 
relative position to conduct assigned tasks to “compel reunification” with Taiwan than it 
was in 1996, and significantly more prepared than in 2008. While the PRC is likely intent 
on maintaining positive cross-Strait relations during its window of strategic opportunity 
for growth and development (projected to last until 2020), it will not take the military 
option off the table. Indeed, its military forces are primarily focused on improving 
capabilities specific to Taiwan-related operations, including a joint blockade, air- and 
missile-strike campaign, full-scale amphibious invasion, and a limited force or coercive 
option (i.e. a cyber-attack in conjunction with economic and political activities). The 
PLA’s military modernization program, based on an average of 13 percent growth in 
annual defense budget since 1989, has yielded an impressive array of forces, with 
capabilities similar to or better than Taiwan’s defense capabilities could withstand and 
the U.S. can keep forward deployed. General assessments by security experts at RAND-
sponsored PLA conferences before 2008 projected that by 2015, PLA Taiwan-related 
forces would have a quantitative advantage in the early stages of Taiwanese conflict, such 
that U.S. ability and willingness to intervene would be significantly diminished. A more 
troubling shift has occurred since 2008, both in the quantitative realm, and the qualitative 
realm, as training has progressively become more realistic, more functional, and more 
versatile, while staying focused on improving capabilities to bring to bear against specific 
U.S. weaknesses in terms of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Though the U.S. military has 
become battle hardened following a decade of low-intensity conflicts in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and other Global War on Terrorism engagements, the PLA has been meticulously 
drilling for high-intensity, major combat operations, with the U.S. military as the notional 
target.116  
Economically, the PRC continues to be the growth engine of the world, especially 
after the global financial crisis of 2008, where it has been the only major developed 
country to maintain growth near 10 percent. Since 1979, China’s annual real GDP has 
grown on average by 9.9 percent; in 2010 it surpassed Japan as the second-largest 
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economy in the world and is projected to surpass the U.S. as the largest economy in the 
world between 2016 and 2018. In terms of trade, the PRC continued to run a massive 
trade surplus of 157.9 billion dollars in 2011, and is the world’s top exporter of 
manufactured goods and second-largest importer of goods. As the world’s most prolific 
trader, the PRC has smartly entered into fifteen free-trade agreements (FTAs), with nine 
additional FTAs in various stages of negotiation or consideration by the PRC’s ministry 
of commerce. The most politically relevant FTA the PRC has undertaken, however, is not 
managed by the ministry of commerce, but by the Taiwanese-affairs office. The PRC–
Taiwan Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), signed in June 2010, 
could be considered the most important development in PRC–Taiwan relations since 
1949, because of the implications it has for interdependency leading to potential peaceful 
reunification. Indeed, there can be no status quo for Taiwan economically, as the trend in 
East Asia has most nations moving towards economic liberalization through China-led 
FTAs (especially the ASEAN Plus Three). Promoting the current status quo would put 
Taiwan in a negative position compared with other peer competitors such as Vietnam and 
South Korea, and thus, if only for its economic vitality, Taiwan had no other option but to 
sign an extensive economic agreement with the PRC. By 2020, economic benefits 
through ECFA for Taiwan could amount to more than 20 billion dollars in additional 
annual GDP. Interestingly enough, the PRC actually has more to gain economically from 
other FTAs, such as ASEAN Plus Three (APT), but has been upfront that the ECFA, 
while providing economic benefits for Taiwan, is more about providing a mechanism for 
increased cooperation and mutual trust, leading to peaceful reunification.117  
Clearly the increased relative power that new PRC president Xi Xinping has 
inherited from Hu Jintao will provide him with a more compelling platform to move the 
country down the path from a “harmonious society” toward the “China dream.” The 
darker side of Xi’s China dream, however, lies in the close tie between Chinese 
nationalism, military power, and the incontestable wisdom of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). How exactly the PRC’s growing power will manifest as asymmetry of 
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power in the Strait continues to grow, is the 64-million-dollar question. Professor Alice 
Miller and Paul Godwin, who recently completed an insightful examination of the PRC’s 
history of deterrence calculus and threat signaling, concluded that although China has 
sought a consistent policy of avoiding military confrontation with the U.S. through the 
systematic use of deterrence signaling, it does not necessarily apply to Taiwan, where 
“Chinese hold the view that whereas Taiwan involves a core interest for China, it is only 
of marginal strategic interest to the United States.”118 
D. REDEFINING THE U.S. POSITION 
The U.S. military position in Asia has been maintained during China’s 
ascendancy, with specific focus on integrating the operational capabilities of U.S. allies 
such as South Korea and Japan; but the degenerative impact of more than a decade of 
focused conflict in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) has 
been substantial. U.S. military capabilities deployed to East Asia have not advanced 
significantly during the PRC’s sustained modernization program initiated in the 1990s, 
with the vast majority of U.S. platforms being designed in the 1970s–1990s, and some 
key capabilities based on forty-year-old technologies. Though rapid modernization has 
occurred in the PLA, the focus has been on attaining the right type of capabilities to 
deploy in specific contingencies against its perceived enemies—primarily the U.S. Navy. 
The U.S. does have a clear advantage now and into the near future in some basic 
characteristics, such as acoustic sound quieting for submarines, and air-to-surface strike 
capabilities, but what is not appropriately recognized is the degradation in both quantity 
and quality of critical U.S. warfare capabilities relevant to conflict with the PRC, 
especially in a Taiwanese contingency.  
A prime example of this degradation was seen in the October 2006, when the 
PLAN was able to successfully penetrate the antisubmarine-warfare screen of the U.S. 
Navy’s most important task force in the region: the USS Kitty Hawk forward-deployed-
carrier strike group. The PLAN submarine was only discovered after it had surfaced 
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within torpedo range of the Seventh Fleet’s high value unit (HVU). Although the Kitty 
Hawk encounter was an isolated event, the PLAN’s efforts to field a modern, capable 
navy that can operate specifically against the U.S. Navy have increased dramatically 
since 2006.119  
1. The Question of Arms Sales to Taiwan 
The former Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Lieutenant General 
(Ret.) Wallace Gregson, commented in 2009 that Taiwan’s military “will never again 
have quantitative advantages over the PLA.”120 Gregson, a respected and experienced 
Vietnam combat veteran, went on to advocate an innovative asymmetrical approach to 
Taiwanese defense, and though this concept has started to gain traction both within 
Taiwanese defense-related think tanks and the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense 
(MND), Taiwan continues to request high-visibility, high-priority equipment such as 
Arleigh Burke-class Aegis-equipped destroyers, advanced fighter aircraft (F-16 C/Ds), 
and diesel submarines. The Taiwan arms-sales debate continues to be the most hotly 
contested issue covered in the TRA, and from the PRC’s perspective runs counter to the 
1982 communiqué, which indicates arms sales will gradually decrease as the security 
situation in the Strait improves. The TRA states:  
The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of 
such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the 
needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such 
determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United 
States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the 
President and the Congress. 121  
The PRC has possibly recalculated the utility of the provocative fire-power 
demonstrations it conducted in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, but has not renounced the use 
of force; and the potency of PLA power in the Strait continues to grow. The PRC would 
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have near-complete control of the operating environment in the Strait as it stands 
currently, with more than a thousand advanced short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), its 
most capable strike aircraft, long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and coastal-
defense cruise missiles (CDCMs) at deployment sites providing complete coverage of the 
Strait. So while additional arms sales would be justified under the terms of the TRA, as 
former-secretary Gregson noted, the calculus for Taiwan is already so far off balance that 
many question the rationale of continued sales of U.S. military equipment to Taiwan, 
which would likely not survive the first week of combat with the PLA—or if it did 
survive, would eventually fall into the hands of the PLA.122  
2. Important American Assessments of the Situation in the Taiwan 
Strait 
Richard Bush argues in his most recent examination of the cross-Strait situation 
that current U.S. policy is basically adequate, but this determination seems to be based on 
the assumption that if the U.S. ever had the power to determine the resolution of the 
Taiwan issue, it does not anymore. Bush concludes the analysis by writing, 
…there are too many factors constraining the United States to permit a 
major intermediation role. A central premise of U.S. policy remains 
sound: any agreements between Taiwan and China will be more enduring 
if they themselves create the agreements and are responsible for their 
implementation.123  
Shelly Rigger, the foremost Taiwan expert in the U.S. makes a more sentimental 
case than Bush, saying,  
To understand why Taiwan matters we must consider not only what it 
does, but what it is. Making sure Taiwan has a voice in deciding its own 
future is important to the United States and other democratic countries 
because democracy in Taiwan is an indicator and inspiration for 
democracy everywhere.124  
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She also highlights the opinions of Americans who remember WWII and the early 
years of the Cold War, most notably Admiral Eric McVadon, who said,  
Taiwan is like a blood brother, it need not do any more to warrant loyalty. 
The PRC is, in contrast a stranger….I have gone to great lengths to listen 
to and understand the Chinese position on Taiwan—even with its 
inordinate share of people who believe that the party of Mao Zedong, the 
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution have all the answers—
including the future of Taiwan.125  
Rigger eloquently concludes that,  
Taiwan offers proof that development—both political and economic—is 
possible, but its experience shows how fragile states’ independence really 
is. It reveals that the autonomy most nations take for granted ultimately 
rests on the forbearance of the strong or on wobbly balances of power, that 
when they shift, leave nations defenseless.126  
Other important commentaries of the regional strategic situation include Joseph 
Nye, whose ideas of soft power and smart power have heavily influenced the Obama 
administrations, especially during the years when Hillary Clinton was secretary of state. 
Nye, has in fact, been asked to accompany delegations of bipartisan politicians to hear the 
concerns of China and Japan, while giving the U.S. perspective of tensions in the region, 
including the East China Sea issue and Taiwan. In a recent piece for The American 
Interest, Nye succinctly lays out the major strategic shifts in East Asia over the past sixty 
years, examines the possible trajectories of Japan and China in competitive and 
cooperative scenarios, and evaluates the evolution of the dual-track diplomacy that the 
U.S. has endorsed and Japan has followed with regards to China, known as “engage and 
hedge” and later termed “challenges and opportunities.” Nye argues that a guiding 
principle of engage and hedge is that the U.S. has deliberately chosen to accept the rise of 
China as a responsible stakeholder instead of applying a rigid containment policy that 
could force conflict. One of his most important points, however, comes in addressing the 
fear of a rising China: 
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The fear is not necessary, however, if we remember that Asia is not one 
entity. It has its own internal balance of power. Japan, India, Vietnam and 
other countries do not want to be dominated by China, and thus welcome 
an American presence in the region. Unless China proves able to better 
develop its soft power of attraction, the rise in its hard military and 
economic power is likely to frighten its neighbors into seeking coalitions 
to balance against it.127  
While Japanese commentators have made similar assessments of Asia’s 
longstanding equilibrium based on the historical dominance of China, Nye’s prescription 
seems to counteract the desired outcome. In Nye’s balance-of-power calculus, the PRC’s 
soft power rise could actually be the biggest threat to U.S. long-term interests in the 
region. Though Nye acknowledges the organic regional balance of power, he seems to 
neglect the fundamental reality that the severity of the consequences of the rise of China 
depends, literally, on where you live. Living in Tokyo, or, much closer to the PRC, in 
Taipei, would fundamentally change the comfort with the shift in equilibrium Nye 
describes.128 
Another significant interpreter of the strategic situation in East Asia is Francis 
Fukuyama. In January of 2013, Fukuyama wrote a blog entry entitled “Life in a G-0 
World,” in which, after making the case that although the U.S. remains the most powerful 
country in the world, he points out that it is less willing to use its power; and further, that 
this reluctance will have an increasingly significant effect on allies of the U.S., especially 
Japan. For the purpose of this thesis, one of Fukuyama’s relevant assessments is that, in a 
G-0 world, “The issue is most acute for Japan and other countries that have been close 
U.S. allies that will face critical choices as American power retreats.”129 
Correspondingly, the dynamic of the relevant decline of U.S. power has manifested 
clearly in the narrative of the perceived abandonment of Taiwan, and Japan’s reaction to 
it. In his conclusion, he argues that while Japan has an increasing role to play in the 
                                                 
127 Joseph Nye, “Our Pacific Predicament.” Mar/Apr 2013, accessed online at http://www.the-
american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1388, on May 2, 2013, 10. 
128 Ibid.  
129 Francis Fukuyama, “Life in a G-0 World,”American Interest Online Blog Democracy, 
Develoment, and the Rule of Law, accessed online at http://blogs.the-american-
interest.com/fukuyama/2013/01/28/life-in-a-g-zero-world/, on 2 May 2013, 1.  
68 
region as the U.S. retracts, it should not attempt to emerge unilaterally. Rather, Fukuyama 
says, 
The appropriate response to these changing circumstances should not be 
greater unilateralism on the part of Japan, Korea, or any of the states of 
ASEAN. In particular, the new Abe administration risks alienating the 
very friends it will need, including the US, if it insists on defending a 
certain nationalist narrative of the 20th century. Individually China’s 
neighbors are too weak to face this rising power on their own. A new kind 
of multilateral structure is required, not to isolate and “contain” China, but 
rather to build bargaining leverage so that the territorial issues can be 
settled peacefully with China’s cooperation. In the end, everyone is going 
to have to deal with the reality of growing Chinese power, and find ways 
of accommodating it even as they defend their core interests.130 
Clearly the “rebalance” strategy outlined in the current National Security Strategy 
(NSS), and National Defense Strategy (“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 
21st Century Defense, 2012”) and the development of the Joint-Operational-Access 
Concept (JOAC) in 2012 indicates the U.S. has no immediate intention of being forced 
out of the region. The current U.S. administration has also likely recognized, however, 
that it must provide space for China to grow. Though the U.S. is intent on maintaining a 
presence in the region, the current interaction between Taiwan and the PRC has likely 
fallen to a lower priority—below concerns over rebalancing the global economy, working 
with the PRC as a permanent member of the UNSC on more pressing security issues 
(such as Iran and North Korea), and other global issues, such as climate change. At least 
in the near term, the U.S. will be focused on influencing conditions for the process of 
reconciliation, instead of the more ambitious goal of shaping the outcome. Thus, while 
more conservative groups in the U.S., and specifically the Taiwan lobby within Congress, 
may be increasingly concerned about the growing dependency of Taiwan on the PRC, the 
official line in the current administration can be summed up in the last U.S.–PRC joint 
statement, which states, “The United States applauded the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and welcomed the 
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new lines of communications between them.”131 From the perspective of national 
interests, though the U.S. has been very involved in the economic vitality and security of 
Taiwan through the application of multiple tools along a spectrum of economic and 
balance-of-power mechanisms over the past sixty years, U.S. interests in Taiwan in this 
new era are dominated by crisis management and economic interests in the PRC.  
E. TAIWAN’S POSITION: CROSS-STRAIT RAPPROCHEMENT 
AND DIPLOMATIC SPACE  
With KMT president Ma Ying-jeou coming to power in a landslide election in 
2008, following eight years of somewhat turbulent democratic rule by the independence-
leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), many observers in the PRC, the U.S., and 
in the region were relieved. There would be no show of force in the waters surrounding 
the island or stirring speeches of “state-to-state” relations, at least in the foreseeable 
future. While the power asymmetry of the PRC described in previous sections should not 
be completely disconnected from this result, the democratic reality is that in 2008, the 
people of Taiwan voted for Ma’s platform of “cross-Strait rapprochement: minimizing 
risk, maximizing opportunities,”132 and though with a less formidable margin, validated 
this general platform again in 2012.  
In his inaugural address in 2008, Ma began on an optimistic note, saying:  
Taiwan's democracy has been treading down a rocky road, but now it has 
finally won the chance to enter a smoother path. During that difficult time, 
political trust was low, political maneuvering was high, and economic 
security was gone. Support for Taiwan from abroad had suffered an all-
time low. Fortunately, the growing pains of Taiwan's democracy did not 
last long compared to those of other young democracies. Through these 
growing pains, Taiwan's democracy matured as one can see by the clear 
choice the people made at this critical moment. The people have chosen 
clean politics, an open economy, ethnic harmony, and peaceful cross-strait 
relations to open their arms to the future.133  
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Indeed, the first four years were full of accomplishments, most notably in the 
realm of cross-Strait relations. By April of 2009, cross-Strait negotiations were reinitiated 
under the “1992 consensus,” and eighteen cross-Strait agreements were signed, including 
the landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010. Though 
many observers saw ECFA as a simple normalization of the PRC–Taiwan economic 
relationship, in reality it has proved to be much more.  
1. What is ECFA? 
ECFA is both more and less than a “gold-standard” free-trade agreement such as 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership: less in that it does not comply with WTO standards for 
complete eradication of all tariffs on goods and services, and more in that it is an 
advantageous economic agreement for Taiwan, tailored specifically for the cross-Strait 
economic relationship. First and foremost, it is a structural mechanism for coordination 
between the PRC and Taiwan that could develop into a comprehensive FTA. Second, and 
more important to the PRC, it is a vehicle to build mutual trust and increase positive 
cross-Strait interactions, with implications for eventual political progress. President Ma 
and PRC Taiwan Affairs Office interlocutors have typically referred to this in a general 
sense of dealing with “economics before politics,” and “easy issues before hard ones,” 
but all in the context of eventual unification under the One-China principle.134  
Clearly, what Taiwan stands to achieve in the near term from ECFA is sheer 
economic gain. The “early harvest” benefits include more than 520 items from Taiwan on 
which tariffs have been removed for sale in mainland markets. In comparison, less than 
half that number of mainland goods has had any tariff reduction at this point. Tariff cuts 
under ECFA from March 2011 to March 2012 saved Taiwanese businesses 225 million 
U.S. dollars, and contributed to a 6–8 percent increase in annual exports to the PRC. In 
addition to selling its goods at more competitive prices in the mainland, the increased 
availability of mainland goods at cheaper prices will generally be beneficial to Taiwanese 
consumers. In general, Taiwanese business competitiveness has been stifled by 
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protectionist measures, primarily in areas of manufacturing inputs for light and heavy 
industries. Allowing more PRC goods into the product-manufacturing line will, in the 
end, allow Taiwan to produce more competitive, high-value-added products. In addition 
to increased trade at reduced prices on both sides, ECFA has the potential to increase 
mainland investment in Taiwan and allow Taiwan businesses, especially in the service 
sector, to break into the lucrative and previously restricted mainland market. Finally, the 
potential capital flight from Taiwan out of sheer concern for continued tensions in the 
Strait with the region’s most important economy is significantly allayed by ECFA and by 
the subsequent Investment Protection Agreement, which was initiated through ECFA 
negotiations.135  
While the early-harvest benefits have been substantial, potential benefits from full 
liberalization are profound. Based on Peterson Institute modeling using Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) formulas, Taiwan is projected to increase its 2020 GDP by 4.5 
percent ($21 billion) from the current trend line, strictly due to ECFA benefits. 
Considering other FTAs that would take effect in the region and the perception of 
economic stability that the ECFA would bring, the actual economic gain by 2020 for 
Taiwan under ECFA conditions could be significantly higher (Rosen and Wang project 
5.3 percent). Another important figure is that if Taiwan did not sign the ECFA and China 
goes forward with the ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, and South Korea), Taiwan would stand 
to lose at least 3 billion dollars off the current projected 2020 GDP.136  
In promoting ECFA to the Legislative Yuan (LY) and Taiwanese public, 
President Ma has focused on the potential ECFA has to open a pathway for Taiwan to 
other bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements in the region and beyond. While the 
PRC has not stated clearly where it stands and how this potentiality could be 
accomplished under the auspices of ECFA, Taiwan is willing to test the waters. The 
PRC’s highest political adviser, Jia Qianlin, recently commented that in addition to all of 
the specific economic benefits ECFA provides to Taiwan, “Taiwanese businesses are 
welcome to join hands with their mainland counterparts in exploring the global 
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market.”137 In essence, Taiwan might be welcome to seek FTAs with other countries, so 
long as the FTA goes through the PRC. One of the first tests of this policy will come 
sooner rather than later, as according to President Ma in April 2013, Taiwan may sign 
economic and trade pacts with Singapore and New Zealand by the end of 2013, and hope 
to negotiate with Japan in 2014.138 While additional diversification of economic 
liberalization for Taiwan would bring a certain sense of autonomy and potential leverage 
in future negotiations, it might not add much economic benefit. Petersen institute 
modeling for Taiwan’s participation in a regional free-trade block, such as APT, shows 
only modest gains, especially when compared to the initial boost provided through 
ECFA. In essence, Taiwan’s best option economically is to hone in on mainland markets 
and increase opening of domestic markets to cheap mainland goods.139  
ECFA may indeed be necessary for Taiwan’s economic viability, but the 
associated vulnerability to mainland coercion through increased interdependency has 
been a significant driver of public opinion. In May 2013, a Taipei Times article 
highlighted the limited impact of ECFA, noting only modest increases in Taiwan exports, 
a limited increase in investment in Taiwan, and an increase of capital outflow. Earlier 
criticisms by primarily DPP commentators were much more outspoken. Chen Shui-bian’s 
vice president, Lu Hsu-lien, commented recently that the “historic meaning” of ECFA 
was simply that it has laid the foundation for China’s attempt to use economic integration 
to reach its ultimate goal of political unification.”140  
Though the debate on ECFA continues, the impact of U.S. $160 billion in cross-
Strait trade in 2012—more than double that of the year prior to ECFA (U.S. $86 billion in 
2009)—is undeniable. Similarly, staggering statistics of the increase in overall interaction 
in the past five years cannot be overlooked. In 2008 there were no direct cross-Strait 
flights; as of April 2013, there were 620 flights per week. In 2008, there were just over 
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250,000 PRC visitors to Taiwan; in 2012, there were more than 2.5 million. The number 
of PRC students in Taiwan, currently 17,000, is projected to more than triple in the next 
three years. Correspondingly, seven new official offices in both the PRC and Taiwan 
have been opened in the past five years to manage increased cross-Strait interaction. In 
the short-term, ECFA has been the mechanism for increased cross-Strait coordination 
leading to an unprecedented period of peace and stability. While stability in the Strait is 
ultimately favorable for the region, ECFA presents a multi-tiered concern for Japan. Most 
directly, Japan’s economic interests in Taiwan are now at risk of being overtaken by PRC 
interests, which have incentives for increased involvement in Taiwan. Secondly, the 
implications for ultimate political reconciliation with the PRC run counter to Japan’s 
balance of power interests in Taiwan. 141 
2. Taiwan’s Security and Diplomatic Space 
Taiwan under Ma has pursued a tripartite security strategy, with cross-Strait 
rapprochement as the primary tenet, maintaining diplomatic space as the second, and a 
strong defense as the third. Though the second and third tenets have unilateral elements, 
they are also tied to the first, in that the ultimate objective is to maintain conditions for 
more equitable terms in negotiations with the PRC and to increase its de facto 
sovereignty in the international arena. In a recent live video-teleconference with Stanford 
University’s Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI), Ma spoke about the second tenet most 
prominently. Setting the scene, Ma spoke of how amid the backdrop of the global 
financial crisis, regional economic integration, and cross-Strait cooperation, Taiwan 
remains a shining example of democracy in the Chinese-speaking world. While tensions 
on the Korean peninsula are high, tension in the Strait are at a sixty-year low, but other 
regional challenges to stability remain, including increased competition between the U.S. 
and China and disputes by regional claimants of both the East China Sea (ECS), and 
South China Sea (SCS). Contributing to this period of potential transformation in East 
Asia, there have been changes of leadership in China, South Korea, and Japan in 2013. 
Ma eloquently centered on Taiwan’s role in the region and the world “as responsible 
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stakeholder, facilitator of peace, provider of humanitarian aid, promoter of cultural 
exchanges, creator of new technologies and opportunities, and standard bearer of Chinese 
culture.”142  
Ma continued to convey that, although the first two tenets of the national security 
strategy were preferable for diplomatic action, the third tenet is absolutely necessary for 
the survival of Taiwan and the protection of Taiwan under the obligations of its 
constitution. Specifically, Ma emphasized that Taiwan’s defense capabilities during his 
tenure have been augmented by more than USD $18 billion in new approvals of U.S. 
armed sales, as well as a commitment to transition to an all-volunteer professional force. 
Looking ahead Ma continues to advocate the maintenance of Taiwan’s defense 
capabilities: 
Over the next four years, we shall continue to purchase weapons of a 
defensive nature that we cannot manufacture ourselves, and shall complete 
the transition to a volunteer armed force. Necessary supporting measures 
will also be taken. And, with a “rock solid defense and effective 
deterrence” military strategy and “innovative and asymmetrical” thinking, 
we shall establish a streamlined yet professional and sturdy national 
defense force.143 
Though Ma covers the right talking points, it has been widely acknowledged that 
Taiwan’s defense, which remains heavily reliant on U.S. support, is in decline and will 
need to move forward more unilaterally. A prominent Taiwanese defense commentator 
summed up this critique in 2012, saying:  
Under the stable relations that currently prevail across the Taiwan Strait, 
Taiwan’s national defense capability is being continually reduced in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms. If this process goes on without 
instituting the major changes that are needed to make our armed forces 
proficient, strong and skillful, then making them small can only go on 
making them weaker.144 
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3.  “A Special Partnership” with Japan 
Notably missing from most of the preceding discussion on the updated cross-
Strait situation was the Japanese factor, and how Japanese commitment to Taiwan could 
be a game changer, though not fully acknowledged or accepted by the PRC or the U.S. in 
predominant narratives. Taiwan, however, seems to recognize that a “special partnership” 
with Japan, which was established in 2009, is one of the central pillars of its efforts to 
maintain international space. This special partnership is backed by widespread public 
support and made functional through expanding business, cultural and political exchange.  
From 2006–2009, public-opinion polls conducted by independent polling 
agencies hired by Japan’s de facto embassy, the Interchange Association Japan (IAJ), 
provided some intriguing results. In 2006, polls in Taiwan showed that the country 
Taiwanese people wanted to travel to for vacation most was Japan (52.7 percent), 
followed by the U.S. (28.2 percent), and China (17.2 percent). In the same poll, 
Taiwanese people said they would most want to move to Japan (32.3 percent), the U.S. 
(29.7 percent) and then Canada (26.5 percent). Similarly, when asked what country they 
most respected, Taiwanese people responded that they most respected Japan (47.5 
percent), the U.S. (40.3 percent), and then China (15.8 percent).145 In a public opinion 
poll conducted in Taiwan in 2009, when asked “What is your favorite country (other than 
Taiwan)?” 52 percent answered Japan (increased from 38 percent the previous year), 
compared to 8 percent for the United States, and only 5 percent for the PRC.146 This 
friendly sentiment expressed by the Taiwanese public was shown as Japan was dealing 
with the massive Eastern Japan disaster in March 2011. The Taiwanese government 
donated 260 million USD to the relief effort—the largest monetary contribution by any 
one nation, by far. Economically, Japan is Taiwan’s second-largest trade partner, 
following only the PRC. In the political realm, when Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeoh 
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gave his inaugural speech in 2012, he cited Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts with specific 
emphasis on Japan, saying, “Our ‘special partnership’ with Japan represents the 
friendliest state of bilateral ties in forty years.” This appraisal was furthered in Taiwan’s 
latest foreign-policy report (October 2012), when, in outlining Taiwan’s strategy for 
coping with continuing change in the strategic environment, a “deeper friendship with 
Japan” was the second-most-important tenet listed, even before “closer relations with the 
United States.” It was also interesting to note that, in contrast to his inaugural address in 
2008 when Japan was not mentioned, Japan was mentioned in five distinct points by Ma 
in 2012.147  
Despite this trend of closer ties and public sentiment, rough seas would appear to 
dominate the headlines of the current relationship. A Google search of “Japan and 
Taiwan” in March of 2013 produced pages of developments on the East China Sea 
dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, claimed by Japan, the PRC, and Taiwan. 
Though Taiwan has indicated it will not coordinate with the PRC on the issue and has 
committed to resolving the issue peacefully, Taiwan and the PRC are ephemerally 
aligned against Japan’s claims over the islands. As the Taiwanese government and the 
PRC focus on actively seeking areas of convergence, however, Japan has found that it 
can be an increasingly important role-player for Taiwan. Indeed, Taiwan seems to use its 
relationship with Japan to prove to its own citizenry that it is actively maintaining 
diplomatic space. In the case of the East China Sea dispute, amid the highest tensions 
between the PRC and Japan, Japan and Taiwan reached a functional agreement for 
resource sharing in the disputed areas in April 2013, and have followed up with multiple 
coordination events to ensure the agreement is effectively implemented. This reality is 
captured in Okazaki’s optimistic piece, “Fighting Peace for Taiwan” following Ma’s re-
election in 2012, which notes how Ma has begun to balance increasingly unpopular cross-
Strait initiatives with popular functional private and cultural appreciation agreements 
with Japan.148  
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In essence, despite a serious shift in equilibrium, embodied in Ma’s 
rapprochement agenda towards cross-Strait reconciliation, a deeper relationship with 
Japan offers important diplomatic space for Taiwan, even as its reliance on the United 
Sates potentially decreases and dependency on the PRC increases. Despite undeniable 
political skill and creativity in achieving cross-Strait stability, while seeking improved 
functional bilateral and multilateral ties around the region and beyond, Ma’s public 
approval has sunk to below 20 percent, likely due to a sluggish economy and public 
perception that Ma is not asserting Taiwan’s sovereignty in the cross-Strait negotiations 
and in relations with other nations. Progress with Japan, in many ways, can be seen as a 
bright spot that serves the interests of the people of Taiwan and provides political capital 
for progress in other potentially controversial issues. Yet if the progress Ma has achieved 
in cross-Strait relations is not as popular as he may have anticipated, what will the 
Taiwanese public feel about continued rapprochement in 2016, when Ma is ending his 
final term? The reality remains that the 24-million people of Taiwan are not ready to be 
under the control of Communist China. While agreement with Japan on fishing rights in 
disputed waters was a brilliant diplomatic achievement providing proof of diplomatic 
space for Taiwan in the near term, looking ahead, it is important to understand that 
sentiment in Taiwan might support significantly enhanced ties with nations other than the 
PRC. As we will see in the following section, Japan is especially poised to be a nation 
that provides other options for Taiwan outside of its negotiations with the PRC—mainly 
because it is in Japan’s national interests to do so.  
F. JAPAN’S GRAND STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT  
The time has come for Japan to develop a sense of purpose for 
contributing to a peaceful world on a scope commensurate with its 
enormous economic and technological strength. Japan needs a grand 
strategy consonant with its self-image as a humanistic, democratic and 
peaceful nation, and a strategy able to win broad support among the 
Japanese people. To this end, the geographic horizon of Japan’s defense 
policy must expand beyond the region of the Japanese islands.….  
–Terumasa Nakanishi, Foreign Affairs, 1990 
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Building on the preceding discussion of the shifting strategic situation in the 
Taiwan Strait, it is important to understand Japan’s current position in terms of its 
strategic environment, grand strategy, and political situation, so that its relationship with 
Taiwan can be placed in proper context. The following sections outline the predominant 
interpretations of Japan’s place in modern East Asia, Japan’s grand strategy (including its 
relationship with China and Taiwan) and the debate in Japan over China and Taiwan and 
how it relates to the current political environment.  
Following several years of domestic and foreign-policy stagnation during the DPJ 
administrations, Japan is now primed to advance its balance-of-power interests in Taiwan 
under a newly codified grand strategy, as a normal nation in national security affairs with 
a platform of fostering deeper relationships with “likeminded” nations. This assertion is 
due to several convergent factors. First, the domestic debate on Japan’s role in balance-
of-power politics in the region has coalesced in widespread public and political support 
for an assertive stance against the growing threat of Chinese encroachment. This has 
occurred while public sentiment and political activism towards Taiwan is at an all-time 
high, potentially allowing more substantial economic, diplomatic, and even defense 
exchanges with Taiwan. Second, with the perceived retraction of U.S. commitment, 
however slightly, from Taiwan, and the Ma administration’s thrust towards cross-Strait 
rapprochement, Japan has become an increasingly important role player for the 
government of Taiwan by providing diplomatic space from the PRC in its “special 
partnership” with Taiwan. Third, the re-emergence of Prime Minister Abe, who has a 
history of pro-Taiwan action both as prime minister and as a leader of LDP and Diet-
wide pro-Taiwan factions and associations, could yield surprisingly bold initiatives in the 
political and security realms.  
1. Japan’s Assessments of the Regional and International Security 
Environment 
Tied closely to the evolution of Japan’s grand strategy is Japan’s interpretation of 
the regional and international security environment. Consistent with a fundamentally 
realist outlook, it should also be recognized that Japan’s ability to express viable 
preferences in its foreign policy has been largely because the U.S. has provided an 
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umbrella of peace and stability for democracy in East Asia since the Cold War. In line 
with this reality, Okazaki, in a forum supporting Taiwanese democracy in 2007 told the 
audience bluntly, “I’m sorry to say… you cannot depend on Japan. Without the support 
of the U.S., Taiwan’s sovereignty will not be protected.”149 Japan recognizes the 
complexity of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and the international 
community at large, and the lack of a clear grand strategy for the past three decades is 
most likely due to the undetermined nature of the strategic environment. The rise of 
China has driven a shift in regional power, and the uncertainty of how China’s power will 
manifest in the future is of the utmost consequence for Japan. More than any other nation, 
having entrusted the majority stake of its security to the U.S., Japan must watch if, when, 
and how, relative U.S. decline and disengagement in the region occurs. The future of 
Taiwan, although representing only a minute portion of the U.S.’s overall presence and 
engagement in the region, carries extra weight in the eyes of many Japanese observers 
who evaluate long-term U.S. intentions. Not only defense hawks, but even center-left 
Japanese analysts would conclude that any U.S. retraction from supporting Taiwan is 
indicative of a larger regional retraction, with direct implications for Japan.150 
Japanese analysts have remained very attentive to developments in the cross-Strait 
situation. Though peace and stability in the Strait is in everyone’s interests, Japanese 
observers quickly called attention to the potentially negative effects ECFA could bring 
Taiwan after its signing in 2010, and showed alarm and concern over the perceived 
creeping dependency of Taiwan in the Ma years. Likewise, Japanese MOD and MOFA 
analysts have increasingly cited the “Three Warfares” (psychological, media, and legal) 
as tangible elements of coercion that manifest consistently in Japan’s and Taiwan’s 
relationships with China. While many Japanese observers were fearful Ma would not be 
sincerely interested in maintaining good relations with Japan as it could run counter to his 
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primary goal of cross-Strait rapprochement, it is evident of late that Ma has realized he 
has to show balance, even while proceeding with a cross-Strait agenda.151    
2. Japanese Public Opinion of China and Taiwan 
The role of public opinion in influencing Japan’s foreign policy decisions towards 
China and Taiwan should not be ignored. As evidenced by Figure 4, there has been a 
dramatic shift in Japanese public perception of China.  
 
Figure 4.  Japanese Public Opinion of China (Japan Cabinet Office, Public Release Oct 
2012) 
In 1980, 78.6 percent of Japanese respondents stated that they “feel affinity with 
China,” whereas only 14.7 percent of respondents stated they “do not feel affinity with 
China.” In 2012, 80.6 percent stated that they “do not feel affinity with China,” whereas 
only 18 percent stated that they “feel affinity with China.” In contrast, though Japanese 
opinions of Taiwan have generally remained stable, with no dramatic shifts as observed 
in the case of China, favorable opinions of Taiwan have increased significantly in recent 
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years. In 2011, 66.9 percent of Japanese survey respondents stated that they “feel 
affinity” to Taiwan” (increased from 56.1% in 2009). Similarly, in 2011 Japanese 
respondents answering that they “think Japan’s relations with Taiwan today are good” 
was at an all-time high at 91.2 percent (increased from 76 percent in 2009). Given this 
high degree of polarization of public opinion on China and Taiwan, several basic 
conclusions can be drawn. Conciliatory policies towards Taiwan would likely be received 
favorably in Japanese public opinion. Conciliatory policies towards China would likely 
not be received favorably, especially if they came as a result of pressure or intimidation 
on China’s part. A telling factor is that negative public opinion of China increased 
significantly during the period of cross-Strait rapprochement (2008–2012), so that even 
with the perception of increased stability in the Strait, Japanese public opinion of China 
has not improved. While this is likely due to increased tensions between Japan and China 
over the Senkaku Islands in this period, it could also reflect a perception of increasing 
Taiwanese dependency on the PRC. While public opinion has not always played a large 
role in foreign policy, it does play an important role in building domestic consensus—and 
any Japanese policy development related to Taiwan would require significant domestic 
consensus. Current data appears to show that this is possible.152  
3. Neo-Conservatism with Japanese Characteristics: the “Bounty of the 
Open Seas” 
Within the framework of the “1955 system,” the Yoshida doctrine served as 
Japan’s grand strategy admirably for more than thirty years, carrying Japan from post-
war reconstruction to the height of its economic strength as the number-two economy in 
the world and the vanguard of the East Asian economic model. After 1985, however, 
Japan drifted into a transitional phase where its strategy for foreign policy lacked clarity. 
While the pillars of the system—economic strength and the U.S.–Japan alliance—remain 
intact, they proved insufficient to support Japan as a truly global power in the post-Cold 
War environment. Richard Samuels described the situation as a “cheap-riding realism” 
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that was not appropriate to the status it desired and seemed destined to possess in the 
international arena. 
Hisahiko Okazaki’s work, A Grand Strategy for Japan’s Defense, recognized that 
the “1955 system” was insufficient, yet the strategic situation and timing were not 
conducive to implementation of his strategy. The Cold War had not ended, the Soviet 
Union was still the primary security threat, and China’s opening to reform and investment 
was the most important driver for the economic interest power centers of MITI and 
Keidanren. Yet, many of Okazaki’s recommendations for the building of Japan’s 
indigenous defense capabilities and increased combined effectiveness of the U.S.–Japan 
alliance remain valid decades later—having been, perhaps, too far ahead of their time. 
Specifically, Okazaki’s understanding of the connection and interplay between strategy, 
domestic consensus, and a realistic assessment of the strategic environment are absolutely 
relevant today:  
The Japanese people, while standing firmly with the Free World, would 
certainly prefer to be the last nation to become involved in actual war. 
This strategy however, should not necessarily hamper a military build-up. 
Theoretically, Japan must possess a military capability that is large enough 
to influence the military balance in order to avoid war. An aggressor must 
be discouraged from attacking Japanese territory by the disadvantage of 
provoking Japanese forces to war, as opposed to the advantage of 
disabling U.S. bases or seizing strategic points in and around Japan.153  
Later, Ichiro Ozawa, a stalwart LDP politician whose rise through the ranks 
exemplified the strength of the bureaucracy over the individual, became suddenly very 
outspoken as Japan’s participation in the Gulf War came into question, and ultimately 
divided the LDP. Sensing the necessity of an expanded international role for Japan, 
Ozawa became the most vocal proponent of a “normal” Japan, releasing his grand 
strategy in A Blueprint for a New Japan (1993) and advocating better economic 
efficiency through deregulation, more risk, and responsibility in foreign affairs.154 
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While Ozawa’s ideas gained some traction in conservative factions in the LDP, he 
was countered by a left-leaning LDP member, Masayoshi Takemura, who was rooted in 
local politics and had a very different vision for post-bubble Japan. He released his grand 
strategy in 1994 as Japan: A Small but Shining Country, which advocated less 
involvement in international affairs and a focus on comfort and daily life in Japan. At the 
time, Takemura’s ideas seemed to have won out, though it is hard to characterize resting 
on laurels as a true win, especially in foreign strategy. Ozawa, in frustration, broke away 
from his party, which remained resistant to change and continued to uphold the basic 
pillars of Yoshida doctrine until the turn of the century. Yet the question of what Japan’s 
strategy was for foreign policy had not been answered. Ironically, Ozawa, while 
maintaining control of the breakaway DPJ coalition for its three forgettable years in 
foreign policy, formed his own party in 2012, based on the platform (at least in title) of 
his formal rival — fittingly named, Kokumin no seikatsu ga daiichi (The People’s Daily-
Life-Comes-First Party).155  
Michael Green covered the evolution of Japanese grand strategy during the 
1990s–2000 in his work, Reluctant Realism, which identified the emergence of a more 
realistic interpretation of foreign policy based on material calculations of the external 
environment, with specific emphasis on the rise of China. Though Japan’s strategy 
continued to rest on the two main pillars of economic strength and reliance on U.S. 
security, there would be an evolutionary change in both of these primary areas. Green’s 
conclusions and his identification of three trends— continued economic decline, 
acceptance of normalcy for national-security affairs, and increased regional 
dependency—have proven ultimately correct over the past decade, and seem especially 
prescient now with the reemergence of the conservative faction of the LDP. Furthermore, 
Green recognizes Japan’s predominant perception, both public and political, that the rise 
of China as a Communist autocratic state will continue to be a zero-sum game. Both the 
trends and the context Green identifies lend creditability to the longevity of an enhanced 
relationship with Taiwan.156 
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Richard Samuels formulated the widely cited “Goldilocks consensus” several 
years after Green’s reevaluation of Japan’s foreign policy. Samuels proposed that Japan’s 
foreign policy strategy would follow a middle-of-the-road approach that neither embraces 
nor rejects China and neither latches on to U.S. leadership nor rejects it. It is 
fundamentally a pragmatic strategy that “normal” nations similar to Japan, such as 
Canada, Germany, and France, use to a great extent; yet it does not completely reject 
sentimental principles to guide strategy when it is beneficial to do so. In the past five 
years since Samuels highlighted the “Goldilocks consensus” within Japan’s grand 
strategy, Japan’s strategic trajectory has not appeared linear, but has indeed shifted from 
conservative factions in the LDP to center-left, to the anti-LDP party (the DPJ), and back 
to center-right. Amid this disunity, Samuels was somewhat dismissive of Prime Minister 
Abe’s sentimental platform for a national strategy during his first premiership (2006-
2007), saying:  
Abe Shinzo argued that Japan must be ‘trusted, respected, and loved in the 
world.’ Because these values are ubiquitous, their proponents are 
preaching to the choir. Prestige – compromising wealth and strength – has 
long been essential to security planners.”157  
Similarly, Samuels dismissed Abe’s calls for equality within the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, saying “Calls for a new grand strategy ‘based on respect’ (sonkei ni yoru 
hoshou) are ubiquitous.” Samuels draws contrasts with Green’s premise and concludes 
that “Japan’s leaders, whether mainstream or anti-mainstream, have been persistent rather 
than ‘reluctant’ realists.”158 
As of the last general election in December 2012, however, there appears to be a 
significant dynamic missing from the “Goldilocks consensus,” embodied in the 
reemergence of sentimental realism. Primarily, this thesis would argue, Japan’s grand 
strategy has remained on more of a linear trajectory since the early 1990 than Samuels 
assesses, and while slight deviations and stagnations from the trend line have occurred, 
Japan has possibly broken through the clouds of domestic reluctance and revisionism to 
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continue to advance to normal-nation status. This includes many of the tenets of Abe’s 
platform, which called for a broader grand-strategy basis for its foreign affairs, 
specifically in the area of security.  
After Abe’s first term as prime minister from 2006–2007, many observers 
understandably dismissed him as a force within the LDP. Likewise, his two primary 
manifestos, “Kono Kuni wo Mamoru Ketsui (The Determination to Defend this Country), 
written in 2004 in conjunction with Okazaki, and Utskushii Kuni E, (Towards a Beautiful 
Country), were temporarily shelved. Michael Hoffman, a special correspondent to the 
Japan Times, in a recent lengthy expose on Abe, brought attention to Abe’s ideological 
roots:  
Toward a Beautiful Country is above all a celebration of the conservative 
and patriotic ideals Abe has long championed. In one revealing episode, 
the official prime minister’s residence is surrounded by some 300,000 
angry demonstrators. The year is 1960. Abe’s maternal grandfather, Prime 
Minister Nobusuke Kishi, is under attack for having renewed the 
unpopular Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In the besieged residence, Kishi 
and Abe’s great-uncle, Finance Minister (and future prime minister) 
Eisaku Sato, are sipping wine, and Kishi says, “I am not wrong. If I am 
killed, that is my dearest wish.” Abe, looking on, was 6. The scene made a 
deep impression on him. Imagine a 6-year-old child suddenly confronting 
his beloved grandfather’s readiness to die. Perhaps the two men had 
forgotten the boy was in the room. How aware would he have been, at that 
stage in his life, of old, supposedly discredited samurai ideals, whose 
classic summation, contained in the 1882 “Imperial Rescript to Soldiers 
and Sailors,” is: “Duty is heavier than a mountain, death is lighter than a 
feather?”159 
To be sure, Abe has deep-seated ideals, having been raised with high expectations 
and pressures as the grandson of one of the most significant post-WWII prime ministers 
and the son of an unfaltering conservative LDP politician. Though this idealism was 
apparent from the onset of his first term and remains present now, he has added a more 
functional and versatile set of political skills, realizing that idealism alone will not win 
the day in the fundamentally bureaucratic institutions that remain the power base of 
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Japan’s policy-making enterprise. What separates Abe from many is his party is a more 
cogent national ideology, and a deeply realist interpretation of foreign affairs. With the 
recent release of Abe’s “The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese 
Diplomacy,” both his national ideology and realistic interpretation are evident.  
Abe leads off this new strategy by saying, “Japan's national interest lies eternally 
in keeping Asia's seas unequivocally open, free, and peaceful—in maintaining them as 
the commons for all the people of the world, where the rule of law is fully realized.”160 
To accomplish this overarching national interest Abe formulates five guiding principles, 
as follows: 
The first is protecting freedom of thought, expression, and speech in this 
region where two oceans meet. These are universal values that humanity 
has gained and they must be allowed to flower to the fullest.  
The second is ensuring that the seas, which are the most vital commons to 
us all, are governed by laws and rules, not by might. In connection with 
these two goals, I wholeheartedly welcome the American rebalancing to 
the Asia-Pacific region. 
The third principle is pursuing free, open, interconnected economies as 
part of Japan's diplomacy. We must secure the power of networking by 
bringing our national economies closer together through flows of trade and 
investment, people, and goods. The efforts and contributions Japan has 
made to enhance connectivity in Asia, such as through construction of the 
Southern Economic Corridor in the Mekong region, are now beginning to 
bear real fruit for the region. Maritime Asia has since ancient times been a 
place where civilizations blend with one another. Indonesia is a prime 
example of Maritime Asia's calm, open nature, which brings about not 
conflict among different religions and culture, but coexistence. This is 
something that continues to impress a great many Japanese to this day. It 
is also what inspires specialists from Japan to dedicate themselves 
diligently to tasks like the restoration of Angkor Wat, a priceless treasure 
for all humankind.  
The fourth principle, in connection with this, is bringing about ever more 
fruitful intercultural ties among the peoples of Japan and this region, 
something that I will continue to work for.  
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The fifth and final principle is promoting exchange among the younger 
generations who will carry our nations into the future. I will return to this 
later in my remarks.161 
In his speech, the U.S.–Japan alliance is mentioned five times. Although it is to be 
expected that Abe would not mention Taiwan specifically in an official foreign-policy 
speech, it is also telling that he does not mention China in the guiding precepts and 
priorities for his foreign policy.  
4. China–Japan Relations and Taiwan: The Debate  
Consistent with most interpretations of Japan’s foreign policy towards China over 
the past two decades, Japan’s emphasis has shifted from faith in the primacy of economic 
engagement and interdependency to a realist, balance-of-power recognition of the 
potential danger of China’s rise— forming a basic security dilemma. While a conflicted 
history (and the current handling of specific issues such as Yasukuni Shrine visits, 
airbrushing of the past in textbooks for primary education, and engagement-initiatives) 
factor in, the fundamental reality is that China’s increasing assertiveness, especially in the 
maritime realm, has resulted in a steady rise in mistrust between China and Japan. The 
Japanese government continues to stress that “we as the government of Japan do not 
regard China as a threat,”162 and the balanced engage-and-hedge policy presently in place 
is meant to ameliorate the uncertainty associated with China’s rise. Japan continues to 
invest in its relationship with Taiwan, which shows resiliency and increasing autonomy 
in its own bilateral relationship, even as Japan works out its dealings with China. 163  
In the attempt to target the uncertainty of China’s rise, there is healthy debate 
within Japan, with a deep and wide pool of penetrating analysis that influences Japan’s 
official and unofficial stances on China and Taiwan. Any portrayal of Japanese 
assessments of China as monolithic should be viewed skeptically; consensus in Japan, as 
in all healthy democracies, is won through debate and compromise. Japanese scholars 
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focusing on China come from a wide variety of backgrounds, including economics, 
political science, history, anthropology, social science, and natural science; most China 
scholars have extensive Chinese-language research experience and maintain significant 
interaction with academic, private-enterprise, and even government contacts in China and 
Taiwan. As in the U.S. debate, Japan’s contention over China includes heated 
disagreements on the nature and implications of China’s rise, and policy prescriptions for 
how to address it. And, of course, in Japan, the debate on China is very much connected 
to Taiwan.  
Ignoring the fringe elements on both sides of the spectrum, it is helpful to focus 
on the analytical factions that actually affect policy formation in Japan. This section 
excludes ultra-nationalists on the right and communists on the left. Within these general 
bounds, far-right-wing analysis of China focuses on a nationalistic narrative and an 
assertive, unapologetic Japan that can say no to China, and to the U.S. as well. This is 
generally an ethnocentric camp that extolls the unique cultural characteristics of the 
Japanese race and is very much in denial regarding the aggression of World War II. 
Shintaro Ishihara is currently the most outspoken and visible mouthpiece of this 
contingent. Ishihara is the former governor of Tokyo, who many blame for starting the 
row over the Senkaku Islands by threatening to purchase them from a private Japanese 
owner. In a May 2013 article in the Asahi Shinbun, Ishihara was quoted as saying,  
[The war Japan fought] was not aggression. General Douglas MacArthur 
told a congressional testimony that it was for self-defense… Deprived of 
resources, [Japan] had no choice but to expand into Southeast Asia. White 
people could not allow Japanese, a colored people, to build a modern 
state.164  
Ishihara’s stance on China, while playing on widespread unease and a general 
lack of affinity for China in Japan, should not be considered mainstream His 
demagoguery has, however gained the national stage through shrewd manipulation of the 
media, and by his charismatic and confrontational style, which contrasts the stale and 
sometimes powerless impression many have of Japanese political figures. Though 
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Ishihara has become a nationalistic caricature of sorts, it should be noted that he strongly 
supports Taiwan’s sovereignty, and has had significant interaction with Taiwan’s 
political leaders. Ishihara has visited Taiwan on multiple occasions and met then-
president Chen in 2006. Chen struck a chord with Ishihara, saying that he disagreed with 
China threatening Japan over then-prime minister Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine visit.165 
While Ishihara’s influence on current foreign policy is doubtful, it is important to 
recognize that even independence-minded Taiwanese accept a more nationalistic 
perspective from Japanese hardliners, in great contrast to China. If the nationalistic 
movement that Ishihara embodies continues to grow, it will be an important bifurcating 
issue among Japan, China, and Taiwan.166 
Moving further towards the center, with a significant degree of separation from 
the far right, are the defense hawks, who advocate a realist interpretation of China’s rise, 
support the strengthening of Japanese defense (both in the U.S.–Japan alliance and 
independently), and affirm Taiwan’s efforts to maintain distance from the PRC. The 
Okazaki Institute, one of the two most influential nongovernmental think-tanks for 
foreign policy and national-security analysis, sits unapologetically in this category (the 
institute’s slogan is “Hawks do not flock”). Ambassador Okazaki remains at the vanguard 
of the institute and consults for the ministries of defense and foreign affairs, as well as the 
kantei (cabinet) and office of the prime minister.  
The institute is particularly influential within the conservative Mori faction in 
which Koizumi, Aso, and Abe were raised, and where the power center of the Taiwanese 
lobby resides. One of Okazaki’s fundamental views is that Chinese Communist control of 
Taiwan would infringe on the human rights of the Taiwanese and be strategically bad for 
Japan. Okazaki showed great concern over what he believed to be inadequate U.S. 
strategy for Taiwan, and was also highly critical of President Clinton’s trip to China in 
1998 when he delivered his “Three-No’s” speech. In 2008, Okazaki released a 
compilation of nearly forty years of work on the Taiwanese issue entitled, Taiwan 
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Mondai wa Nihon no Mondai (The Taiwanese Problem is Japan’s problem) making the 
specific case that Japan’s interests, more than other countries are connected to Taiwan’s 
future. With the return of LDP and prime minister Abe in 2012, Okazaki countered 
international media that he saw as exaggerating concerns over the return of right-wing 
nationalists by averring that he saw, instead, “a return to normalcy,” citing Japan’s 
chronic inability to defend its interests and support its allies as a normal nation. In 
addition to its policy analysis, the Okazaki Institute plays an active role in track-II 
dialogues, which have included significant bilateral and trilateral efforts with India, 
Taiwan, and others. The Okazaki institute employs a cadre of retired SDF senior officers, 
who have become an integral link to the active defense-policy realm for the Institute. 
These senior officers also chair track-II dialogues and trilateral forums with the U.S., 
India, and Taiwan. 167  
Another rising analyst in the China debate is Tetsuo Kotani, who has been 
associated with both the Okazaki Institute and the Japan Institute of International Affairs 
(JIIA). The JIIA is a major source of foreign-policy analysis as a nonpartisan foundation 
associated with MOFA, and has been a center for nuanced and balanced 
recommendations on China and Taiwan. Kotani has become one of the preeminent 
experts on the tensions with China over maritime issues in the East- and South China seas 
for MOFA and MOD. Concerning China and the East China Sea dispute, Kotani 
advocates for clarified U.S. support for Japan’s sovereignty over the islands, as a 
necessary part of a more effective hedge, supporting the basic rationale that an equal-load 
sharing, more empowered U.S.–Japan alliance is vital. Kotani also argues that prime 
minister Abe, while strengthening the alliance and attempting to address Japan’s 
responsibilities under the concept of collective self-defense, will also make a deliberate 
effort not to exacerbate tensions with the PRC.168  
Moving towards the center of the debate, one of the most prominent mainstream 
voices in the China–Taiwan debate is Yasuhiro Matsuda of Tokyo University. Matsuda’s 
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work covers Japan’s policy towards China, China’s internal stability, power-transition 
issues, and includes one of the most cited primers on the Japan–Taiwan relationship. 
Matsuda, a former fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS)—the 
official think-tank of the Ministry of Defense—represents a balanced, moderate 
perspective, promoting both a legitimate hedge and an engagement strategy vis-à-vis 
China. Matsuda’s analysis of China generally focuses on the uncertainty of China’s rise, 
while recognizing the unique nature of Japan’s unofficial relationship with Taiwan. 
Matsuda, though rooted in balance-of-power realism from his NIDS experience, also 
draws from Joseph Nye’s neoliberal school and argues that Japan must develop its own 
“smart power” by “building an attractive and respected country, in terms of both 
institutions and technology and human resources.” Matsuda is also a well-known 
international collaborator with U.S. academic institutions such as CSIS and the East–
West Center on China and Taiwan. Finally, his overall position on Taiwan focuses on 
maximizing pragmatic unofficial ties with Taiwan that support the longevity of the status 
quo, rather than increasing controversial initiatives that would disrupt it.169  
A distinct subsection of the mainstream debate focuses on Japanese economic 
interests in China and Taiwan. At the center of the analysis in this section lies the $345 
billion in bilateral trade between Japan and China. In comparison, trade with Taiwan 
totals about one-seventh of that, at approximately $50 billion. One important economic 
analysts and business consultants active in Japan today is Toshiya Tsugami, head of a 
consulting company concentrating on the Chinese economy, a previous counselor at the 
Japanese Embassy in China, and a director of the Northeast-Asia Division of the Ministry 
of Economy, Trade, and Industry’s trade-policy bureau.170 While Tsugami continues to 
promote the massive Japanese interests in China, he tells a cautionary tale of slowing 
investment-based growth and overall unreliability in official reports of Chinese economic 
statistics. In essence, though Tsugami does not deny the superior importance of the 
Chinese market to Japanese business interests, he has become wary of continued 
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Japanese investment and manufacturing in China. A recent Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) report confirms his analysis that manufacturing costs for Japanese 
companies operating in China increased by 60 percent over the last three years, forcing 
many companies to seek cheaper labor and production options in Southeast Asia. That 
this sharp rise occurred along with increased tensions between Japan and China has not 
gone unnoticed.171 Another prominent economic analyst and strategist in this contingent 
over the past two decades has been Kenichi Ohmae. Ohmae, primarily a globalist, 
highlights strategies for success within the increased interconnectivity of global markets, 
in a similar vein to U.S. commentator Thomas Friedman. While Ohmae has traditionally 
focused on the abundant economic opportunities China’s growth represents, he had 
changed his tone slightly with regards to China as of 2010, when he began to advise 
Taiwan president Ma’s cabinet that it should not base its economic future solely on the 
growth of China. In the context of final ECFA negotiations in 2010, many DPP 
commentators used Ohmae’s recommendations to warn against being lulled into 
dependency by the PRC.172  
Moving left of the center, crisis management-oriented analysts typically support 
careful diplomacy with China, and even more careful management or minimization of 
unofficial relations with Taiwan. Uichiro Niwa, the Japanese ambassador to China from 
2010–2012, embodied the fragile and disjointed voice of crisis management during the 
escalating Senkaku Island issue. Niwa’s assignment as the first ambassador to China 
from the private sector represents the crux of the issue: the interconnected nature of 
Japanese business interests and crisis management interests within Japan’s China policy. 
The lack of unity displayed by the Japanese government response during the Senkaku 
issue was obvious and exemplifies how Japan’s crisis management system is still 
severely underdeveloped. During the crisis in early 2012, Niwa made comments about 
having “grave concern” over Ishihara’s plan to purchase the Senkaku Islands. His 
comments came under heavy criticism and he was essentially censured by the Japanese 
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government from that point. In fairness, Niwa and the country team were under 
significant stress and even attacked by angry mobs in China at the height of the tensions. 
Following his tumultuous stint as ambassador, Niwa has pushed for a unified approach to 
crisis management, and calm, balanced diplomacy with China. When asked in a recent 
interview about his time as ambassador to China and his role in this critical period, he 
said simply, “I began the job with the DPJ and ended it with the DPJ. My tenure also 
began with the Senkakus issue and ended with that issue.” He also added his 
recommendations to the new leaders of Japan and China saying, “I want to say to the 
leaders of both nations, such as Xi Jinping, Noda, and Shinzo Abe, your responsibility is 
to make your people happy, and at times there is a need to bear the unbearable and 
conduct diplomacy in a cool and collected manner.” To be sure, there are many serious 
analysts within MOFA and JIIA who focus on the development of truly functional crisis 
management mechanisms between Japan and China, but their efforts are likely based on 
the simple guiding ethos of Niwa’s view that Japan and China are neighbors; and unlike 
some other powerful countries, Japan and China must find a way to create a pleasant 
environment, “regardless of whether they like each other or not.”173 It should also be 
noted that this crisis-prevention viewpoint is currently almost completely dismissive of 
Japan’s relationship with Taiwan.174 
Further to the left in the Japanese debate lies a contingent of pan-Asian 
commentators, who typically favor stronger relations with China, minimal relations with 
the U.S., and negligible relations with Taiwan. This view is understandable given the 
long dominance of China in the region and the relative peace and stability that Japan 
enjoyed under a China-centric balance of power. Correspondingly, Japanese Asianists see 
China, not the U.S., as the future of regional power, and therefore recommend a shift 
away from the U.S.–Japan alliance towards more favorable policies towards China, 
including non-intervention in Taiwan and conciliation towards China on maritime 
disputes. Though a minority within the pan-Asian school of thought argues for support of 
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Taiwan by emphasizing enhanced regional ties through multilateral institutions, pan-
Asianists downplay Taiwan as a sovereign entity, seeing it as a relic of failed U.S. policy 
during the Cold War. Asianists are also ideologically associated with both “middle power 
internationalists” and pacifists, who have dominated the left end of the spectrum in the 
post-WWII system.175 One prominent expert and commentator in this realm is Susumu 
Yabuki, a professor at Yokohama City University. In a recent interview, Yabuki provided 
his basic position: 
 The fundamental problem of Japan’s diplomacy since the end of the Cold 
War lies in that it kept relying too much on the Japan–U.S. security 
alliance by setting up China as a hypothetical enemy. This has prevented 
Japan from rededicating itself to active diplomacy toward China, despite 
the two countries' increasing economic interdependency. Beijing has also 
used Japan–U.S. security relations as a justification for increasing military 
spending, which has already created strong vested interests in the hands of 
the PLA. It, in turn, pushes China to seek a more hard line, hawkish 
diplomatic policy.176  
Yabuki’s hard line on the U.S.–Japan alliance boils down to a chicken-vs.-egg 
security dilemma with China, yet Yabuki fails to acknowledge that Japan has had the 
ability to terminate the U.S.–Japan security alliance since 1970. On Taiwan, Yabuki’s 
analysis has proved inaccurate. For example, he wrote in 2000 that the election of Chen 
Shui-bian was “a boon” for cross-Strait stability and that Chen had signaled his intention 
for cross-Strait rapprochement. Since then, Yabuki has not written significantly on 
Taiwan, and indeed, for most Japanese Asianists, Taiwan has remained an enigma, 
largely subject to the PRC’s pre-eminent push for “One-China” policy acquiescence.177 
Moving from the security dimension of pan-Asian thought, another possible basis 
for this movement lies in a fundamental shift of trade. By 1995, Asia surpassed North 
America and Western Europe as Japan’s major trading zone. Currently, Japan is facing a 
key juncture in determining whether its economic vitality will be best served in trade with 
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the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), or the China-led ASEAN Plus Three 
(China, Japan, Korea) APT. Under the DPJ administration, which embraced a more pan-
Asian scenario, APT appeared to be the frontrunner, but with the reemergence of Abe and 
the LDP, the negotiations for TPP now appear to have more traction. The direction of 
trade negotiations with both the U.S. and China may in the end help Japan’s negotiations 
in whichever trade pact it decides to embrace. If Japan were making a strictly rational 
decision based on potential economic gain, estimations through 2030 would appear to 
favor APT by a significant margin; but as discussed, Japan has moved away from sheer 
pragmatic relations through economic interdependence to something more substantial. It 
remains to be seen which in direction Japan will turn, but the debate will very much be 
influenced by those who see China as the inevitable leader of Asia, and the core of 
Japan’s desired equilibrium.178  
In the preceding survey, it was nearly impossible to disconnect China from the 
Japanese debate over Taiwan. Looking over the range of ideas, several conclusions can 
be made to provide context for examining Japan’s specific interests in Taiwan. First, the 
mainstream portion of the debate parallels the China–Taiwan debate in the U.S. to a great 
extent. At the margins, however, there is great divergence of thought, and it is especially 
telling that the extremes (far-right nationalists and far-left Asianists) are generally united  
 
 
by their rejection of the U.S.–Japan alliance. The far right wants a strong, independent 
Japan, and the far-left advocates a weak, conciliatory Japan, with restoration of China’s 
dominance in the region. The real movement and potential for divergence will, thus, be 
found in how far the margins are able to creep into the mainstream. Interestingly, the 
debate over Taiwan does not parallel the convergence over the rejection of the alliance on 
both ends of the spectrum, as the far-right nationalists support Taiwan, and the pan-
Asianists dismiss Taiwan, primarily due to their acceptance of PRC thought. In the new 
era of cross-Strait rapprochement, the possibility for great alignment over continued 
support for Taiwan is clear. Merging these two generalities, although there is mainstream 
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support for the U.S.–Japan alliance, there is also potential for Japan’s divergence from 
U.S.-led policy that is either perceived as abandoning Taiwan, or as unnecessarily risking 
Japan’s security to hedge against China. 
5. Japan’s Domestic Political Situation 
Reconnecting the range of debate and public opinion to the political realm, as 
illustrated in the range of Japanese debate over China and Taiwan, the potential for 
divergence with the U.S. over China–Taiwan issues is of key concern, especially in the 
context of the U.S.–Japan alliance. The two mainstream factions of the debate (center-
right and center-left) are hedging against the potential decline of the U.S. and the rise of 
China. The center-right camp, currently led by current prime-minister Abe, is hedging 
against China’s aggressive rise by advocating a stronger, independent Japan in the 
alliance. The center-left is promoting a more conciliatory or submissive posture, with 
China as the dominant power in Asia. If the relative power of the U.S. vis-à-vis China 
and Taiwan changes such that Japan believes its investment in the alliance is diminishing, 
a pan-Asian solution for either balancing China’s power or accepting its dominance could 






would be dire. If, however, Abe’s neoconservative platform is a broader indication that a 
true grand strategy is forming (as this thesis suggests), Japan will continue to see the 
alliance as advantageous in protecting its interests in relation to China and Taiwan. If 
managed correctly, Japan, as a “normal” ally, could offer a range of previously 
impossible solutions for maintaining the delicate power balance in the Taiwan Strait.  
One possible label that encompasses both the codification of a grand strategy and 
the sea change in Japanese domestic politics is neo-conservatism, with Japanese 
characteristics. The best definition this author has been given of neo-conservatism is… a 
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political philosophy based in a realist interpretation of foreign affairs, which advocates 
the assertive exportation of the liberal values of democracy and free trade.179 This label 
may be appropriate for the sentimental realism that Abe represents; yet in contrast with 
the U.S. variant, it is apparent less in the exportation of Japanese values than in the 
confidence gained through cooperating with countries that share the same basic strategic 
values, in which democracy and liberal economic development are central. Thus, this 
thesis proceeds with the assumption that the present era may be the “neoconservative 
age” of Japan’s grand strategy and foreign policy, which one could argue has been in a 
nascent stage for twenty years.  
Embodied in this nuanced shift, is an increase in risk and complexity for Japan’s 
foreign-policy actors. The longstanding pragmatism embodied in the Yoshida doctrine 
did not require the conviction and courage that a values-based platform would require. 
Certainly Japan was adept at separating business from politics during the first thirty years 
of post-WWII development and economic expansion, and, given the variety of actors in 
the region, a basis in pragmatism remains necessary for regional stability. This thesis 
argues that Japan has reached a point where political conditions and the guiding ethos of 
other countries’ grand strategies matter more than they had previously. If that is the case, 
Japan’s interests in, and relationship with, Taiwan will continue to gain greater 
significance. 
G. JAPAN’S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN TAIWAN: 
OBJECTIVES, METHODS, OUTCOMES 
Japan's national interest lies eternally in keeping Asia's seas unequivocally 
open, free, and peaceful - in maintaining them as the commons for all the 
people of the world, where the rule of law is fully realized. To achieve 
these goals, from the second half of the twentieth century through the 
present day Japan has consistently devoted its energy in two objectives. In 
light of our geographic circumstances, the two objectives are natural and 
fundamental imperatives for Japan, a nation surrounded by ocean and 
deriving its sustenance from those oceans - a nation that views the safety 
of the seas as its own safety. Though times may change, these objectives 
remain immutable. 
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 – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Jan 2013 
The preceding analysis of the strategic situation in the Taiwan Strait provided 
context for an evaluation of Japan’s assessment of the strategic environment, the 
evolution of Japan’s grand strategy, and the current political situation. Based on that 
analysis, this thesis argues that Japan and Taiwan are postured to maintain vibrant ties in 
the cultural and economic sectors and may experience growth and enhancement in the 
political and security spheres. Given the likelihood of enhanced ties, examining Japan’s 
major interests in Taiwan will further facilitate analysis of how a strengthened 
relationship might manifest itself in specific ways, most notably in the realm of regional 
balance of power.  
The final examination of this chapter will, thus, detail Japan’s current interests in 
Taiwan in terms of objectives and methods and conclude by providing a basic assessment 
of the outcomes of the methods employed. Objectives will continue to be evaluated in the 
framework of economic interests, crisis management, and balance of power and will cite 
analysts who influence the realm of ideas, as well as governmental and nongovernmental 
actors that work within the basic bounds of that interest. Methods of foreign-policy 
development will be examined by outlining internal and external pressures on foreign-
policy formation. Specific policies, initiatives, and actions underway that achieve or 
maintain those interests will be also examined. Finally, this chapter will judge the 
outcomes of Japan’s foreign policy towards Taiwan in terms of success and failure, and 
convergence, divergence, or complement to U.S. foreign-policy goals with regard to 
Taiwan. Specifically, this thesis finds that Japan’s current interests in Taiwan center on 
its role in the balance-of-power realm as a hedge against the PRC. Balance of power 
objectives are augmented by a fruitful economic exchange, and the overall relationship is 
managed indirectly by crisis management actors to keep it within the general bounds of 
Japan’s relationship with the PRC.  
1. Economic Interests  
Japan’s crisis management efforts and economic interests in the PRC and Taiwan 
go hand in hand, and certainly peace in the Strait is an interest shared by all parties 
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involved. While Japan’s economic interests and crisis management efforts are largely 
focused on the PRC, Japan’s efforts in both of these areas with Taiwan have yielded 
substantial results in recent years. Figures 5, 6 and 7 illustrate this trend. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Japan's Trade with Taiwan 1180 
 
 
Figure 6.  Japan's Investment in Taiwan 1181 
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Figure 7.  Japan's Trade by Region 1182 
Japan’s trade with Taiwan remains significant and produces a trade surplus of 
more than $20 billion annually. Proponents of Taiwan-focused trade argue that the 
exchange of goods that should be looked at in terms of quality over quantity, and cite the 
rising cost of business and unpredictability of total-factor productivity conditions in 
China. It should also be noted that Japan’s surplus with China, although large at more 
than $40 billion, is only twice as large as the surplus with Taiwan. Thus on a comparative 
scale, trade with Taiwan could be seen as more profitable. In terms of economic trends 
long-term data provided by IAJ (see figures 5 and 6 above) shows that Japan’s trade with 
Taiwan steadily increased until 2009 when it dropped suddenly. This is an interesting 
data-point and can be attributed to basic developments in the global financial situation. 
Primarily, as seen from Figure 7 (trade by region) Japan’s trade in every region was down 
in the 2008-2009 timeframe, most likely due to the “Lehman’s shock” and the global 
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financial crisis of 2008.” What is harder to tell is whether the new era of cross-Strait 
rapprochement beginning in 2008 had any notable effect on Japan’s trade with either 
Taiwan or China. Although both trade with the PRC and Taiwan dropped sharply during 
this period of time, trade with Taiwan experienced the least dramatic decline. Trade with 
the PRC on the other hand, though dropping sharply, rebounded quickly. The most 
notable decline was in Japan’s trade with the U.S., which dropped sharply and has not 
recovered to pre-2008 levels. Thus, in relative terms, Japan’s economic interests in 
Taiwan have been more stable than with the PRC and the U.S. from 2008–2012. 183  
In terms of objectives, Japan’s economic interests in Taiwan are based on profit 
and market share. Japan’s profits in Taiwan remain high, but as mentioned are 
substantially less than profits in China. For market share, Japan is Taiwan’s second 
largest trade partner, but is increasingly being outcompeted by China since ECFA was 
initiated in 2010. Growth of PRC trade with Taiwan remains in double digits (10 percent 
from 2011–2012)184 compared to 1 percent growth in trade for Japan. For methods of 
accomplishing economic interests, the Interchange Association of Japan (IAJ) functions 
as the central executor of Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI), Ministry 
of Finance (MOF), and Keidanren objectives in Taiwan. IAJ as a facilitator of Japanese 
business, assists private enterprise in establishing and growing business in Taiwan, 
providing legal assistance, trade promotion events, and most importantly has chartered 
several critical bilateral agreements between Taiwan and Japan to encourage and protect 
Japanese business in Taiwan, such as the “Japan-Taiwan Mutual Cooperation on the 
Liberalization Promotion and Protection of Investment” signed in 2011; “The 
Memorandum on Mutual Cooperation of Patent Procedures between Association of East 
Asian Relations and Interchange Association (the Memorandum on Japan-Taiwan Patent 
Prosecution Highway)” and “The Memorandum Relating to Exchange of Financial 
Information on Money laundering and the Financing of Terrorism between Association 
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of East Asian Relations and Interchange Association” both signed in 2012.185 In terms of 
objectives, Japan continues to maintain a beneficial and profitable economic relationship 
with Taiwan, but looking ahead, Japanese economic interests could be negatively 
affected by continued increases in trade between China and Taiwan as agreements under 
ECFA are completed. By 2020, Japan’s trade with Taiwan could be substantially less 
than it is currently, but that would depend heavily on the outcome of other regional 
factors, such as Japan’s own economic liberalization efforts with China—primarily the 
results of negotiations for ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, Korea).  
2. Crisis Management 
Similar to its economic interests, Japan’s crisis-management actors, namely 
MOFA, devote much more effort to the turbulent relationship with China than to Taiwan, 
and are involved in the interaction with Taiwan mainly to define the general boundaries 
of the interaction to conform to politically and internationally acceptable norms. 
Particularly as observed between 2010 and 2013, Japan’s crisis-management efforts 
towards China were considerable, yet had limited success in navigating through the 
troubled waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute. The most notable 
achievement to relax tensions during this period of time, however, was not achieved 
between the PRC and Japan, but rather between Japan and Taiwan. In April of 2013, after 
sixteen years of negotiations, Japan and Taiwan signed a fishery agreement outlining how 
to share fishing areas in the vicinity of disputed islands in the East China Sea. To 
accomplish this agreement, President Ma played a significant role, in agreeing to shelve 
the sovereignty dispute, which is Japan’s main position (that there is no sovereignty 
dispute) so that Taiwan and Japan could look at the root of the issue (resources sharing) 
in a pragmatic and non-confrontational way. The fact that this occurred while the PRC 
and Japan were at odds over the same issue should not be ignored, and the PRC 
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responded with firm diplomatic statements. 186 Nonetheless, Japan and Taiwan, by 
undertaking this act, seemed to throw a pail of cold water on a small fire, and showed that 
crisis management is much easier when nations act rationally and pragmatically. Above 
that, however, Japan and Taiwan proved that their relationship is currently much more 
functional than Japan’s relationship with China. Another general conclusion that can be 
drawn from the fishery agreement is that it was a bilateral agreement between two 
sovereign entities. This diverges from historical precedence where the U.S. has played 
the primary role in crisis management both with Taiwan and the PRC, as well as running 
counter to the One-China principle that exists at the core of cross-Strait tensions. In 
effect, Japan’s recent crisis-management efforts with Taiwan shows Japan’s increased 
independence in this realm, which has been complemented greatly by the U.S.’s main 
emphasis of cross-Strait crisis management that centers on engagement with the PRC. 187  
3. Balance of Power: Objectives 
From Japan’s perspective, the current strategic value of Taiwan lies in both basic, 
enduring realities and ongoing developmental factors. The geography of Taiwan relative 
to critical Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCS) is crucial and inexorable for a country 
forced to import most of its basic resources, including its energy and food. As any 
conflict in the vicinity of Taiwan would greatly disrupt key SLOCs, peace in the Taiwan 
Strait is of utmost importance to Japan. Second, Taiwan’s presence as a physical buffer 
from the PRC remains a fundamental consideration; thus, while peace in the Strait is 
good, a peace attained through coercion, resulting in PRC control of the island of Taiwan, 
runs directly counter to Japan’s balance-of-power objectives. The PRC military 
capabilities that could be fielded from, or even temporary use of Taiwan’s bases after 
PRC control, are a serious planning problem in the defense of Japan, whose closest island 
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is less than 60nm from Taiwan’s east coast. Some argue, based on its latest proposal for 
unification with Taiwan, that the PRC would not station forces on the island; but it is 
illogical that any nation would hesitate to take advantage of Taiwan’s geography, 
especially in a conflict. For comparison, one might ask how many U.S. Navy nuclear 
attack submarines are stationed in Yokosuka naval base, Japan. The answer, of course, is 
zero, though nuclear attack submarines frequently visit Yokosuka.188 The PRC could 
hold a similar nominal standard for forces on Taiwan or they could simply change the 
rules, but it would certainly not restrict itself from using Taiwan’s geography for 
maximum gain.  
Beyond geography, the political and economic ramifications of Chinese 
Communist domination of Taiwan are far reaching. As described previously, Japan’s 
belief in the superiority of liberal democratic systems and free trade is reflected in a 
preference for strong relations with like-minded nations. In terms of guiding ideologies 
and other more specific congruencies, no country in East Asia is more aligned with Japan 
than is Taiwan. Japan and other regional nations would be forced to address the PRC’s 
emboldened position in Asia and would likely abandon certain foreign-policy preferences 
if it came down to their own survival. Certainly, there are many possibilities within these 
primary scenarios for Taiwan, but these are the basic fears that fuel Japan’s balance-of-
power interests. Japan’s primary balance of power objective regarding Taiwan is, thus, to 
maintain and enhance productive de facto state-to-state relations between the two like-
minded democratic and liberal economic powers, who are both fearful of domination by 
the PRC. Any effort Japan conducts with the intent of deterring, denying, or disrupting 
PRC control of Taiwan, and thereby prolonging Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty should be 
categorized as part of Japan’s balance-of-power strategy against the PRC.  
4. Balance of Power: Methods 
There are no official security arrangements between Japan and Taiwan. Balance-
of-power calculations, of course, encompass more than armaments; and though Japan and 
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Taiwan are severely limited by how they could engage in any security arrangement, 
Japan uses other aspects of its national power, as well as indirect commitment through 
the U.S–Japan security alliance, to balance China’s influence over Taiwan. Concerning 
Japan’s official policy on balance-of-power interests in Taiwan, three primary documents 
should be referenced. First, the 1969 Nixon–Sato joint communiqué, though occurring 
before the “Nixon shocks” and diplomatic reversals of both the U.S. and Japan, stated 
clearly that Japan views “peace and security in the Taiwan area” as “important for the 
peace and stability of Japan.”189 It is important to distinguish that Prime Minister Sato 
did not specify any commitments to the ROC in the communiqué, unlike President 
Nixon, but instead referred to the “Taiwan area.” Thus, regardless of the political and 
diplomatic situation in the Taiwan Strait, Sato identified an enduring interest in peace and 
stability in the geographic area of Taiwan.190 After 1979, Japan’s treatment of Taiwan as 
a security issue was kept almost completely in the context of Japan’s role in the U.S.–
Japan alliance. Yet what exactly Japan’s role would be in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait 
was kept ambiguous. The 1997 defense guidelines state: 
Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on 
Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in areas surrounding 
Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make 
every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from 
occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the 
state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In 
responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on 
circumstances.191  
It is absolutely logical to assess that with the 1969 communiqué and the 1997 
guidelines for Japan–U.S. Cooperation, Japan has essentially committed its self-defense 
forces (SDF) to the peace and stability of the Taiwan area. The spirit of this accord over 
“peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait” was reemphasized as a 
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common strategic objective in the February 2005 2+2 joint statement.192 Yet even with 
the consensus formed by these guiding documents, Japan’s true balance-of-power 
objectives in Taiwan remain officially ambiguous. Indeed, as Okazaki said, “To discuss 
the strategic importance of Taiwan is a delicate task. It is in itself delicate to discuss any 
strategy openly. Strategy is based on calculation of naked national interests.”193  
Though the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) (formerly the Japan Defense 
Agency) would be the logical executive agent for Japan in security issues with Taiwan, 
the nuanced problem that the Taiwan Strait presents forces variation and creativity. The 
real power center for balance-of-power interests in Taiwan lies, not in MOD, MOFA, 
METI, or even the Interchange Association of Japan (IAJ), but instead in the Taiwan 
lobby of the Diet. In many respects, this is similar to U.S. balance-of-power interests in 
Taiwan, which also reside in the legislative branch under the mandate of the TRA. This 
placement serves at least two functions: it keeps an extremely sensitive international issue 
in the scales of domestic consensus and it allows the executive branch to focus on 
pragmatic solutions with China. The primary functions of the Taiwan lobby in the 
balance-of-power schematic are building consensus, effective coordination, and 
implementation of Japan’s policy which, although it does not always name Taiwan 
directly, is supportive of Taiwan by hedging against China and seeking to strengthen 
Japan’s defense capability. 
The Taiwan lobby in the Japanese Diet likely originated with Prime Minister 
Abe’s grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, and his uncle, Eisaku Sato—both part of the “anti-
mainstream revisionist” faction of the LDP, which was in opposition to the “mainstream 
mercantile realists” that prime ministers Yoshida and Ikeda represented.194 The Shintai-
ha (Taiwan lobby) was inherited by Yoshiro Mori—the faction that Abe rose through and 
in which the power center for the Taiwan lobby still resides. In addition to heading the 
Mori faction, Abe is the president of the legislator’s alliance for the Attoshinzenkyoukai 
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(East Asian Friendship Association), which is more politically benign than the Nikka Giin 
kodankai (Legislators Alliance for Japan and Taiwan), and has widespread support within 
the Diet and is just as influential in advocating for policies beneficial to Taiwan. 195  
 As documented previously, the robust political exchange between Japan and 
Taiwan will likely grow under Abe’s administration. As an opposition Diet member 
during the DPJ years, Abe was integral in updating the memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) between Taiwan and Japan in April 2010. The MOU sought increased 
cooperation in fifteen areas, including economic exchange, international law 
enforcement, a rules-based approach to maintaining safety on the high seas, and natural-
disaster relief.196 In testimony to the functionality of the MOU, less than a year later, 
when Japan suffered the worst natural disaster in its history, Taiwan was one of the first 
foreign nations that dispatched a team of experts to Japan, and provided more financial 
assistance to relief efforts than any other nation, by far. Abe led visits to Taiwan and met 
President Ma in 2010 and in 2011. On his visit in 2010, Abe and other members of the 
Taiwan lobby from the Diet flew on the inaugural flight of the Tokyo Haneda–Taipei 
Songshan route, the creation of which Abe had promoted as prime minister in 2006. After 
his visit in 2010, several official bilateral initiatives were signed by the IAJ (Japan’s de 
facto embassy) and the East Asian Exchange Commission (Taiwan’s de facto embassy), 
including an investment-protection protocol, agreements on support for private airliners, 
the Kizuna initiative for reconstruction assistance and tourism promotion in the aftermath 
of the Great East Asia Earthquake, and agreements on patent registrations. In this respect, 
IAJ serves as the executor of policy that typically originates in the Taiwan lobby in 
coordination with MOFA and METI. As far as a clear concept of the process for policy 
development, even Japanese government insiders, such as Yasuhiro Matsuda, remark that 
the actual policy-making process remains unclear. What is clear, regardless of the 
process, is that the Taiwan lobby is durable, adaptable, and regaining prominence. Even 
                                                 
195 Chen Fenglin, “Taiwan and the Sino-Japanese Relationship,” China-Taiwan Relations in a Global 
Context, ed. George Wei, (New York: Routledge, 2012.), 80-83; Samuels, Securing…, 14. 
196 Taiwan and Japan's Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the Enhancement of Exchanges 
and Cooperation to Further Bilateral Collaboration, 30 Apr 2010 Accessed online at http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPTW/20100430.O1J.html. 
108 
after a charismatic leader such as Abe retires his post, the lobby will continue to affect 
policy.197 
 Additional legislation relevant to balance of power concerns supported by the 
conservative Taiwan lobby includes a significant defense budget increase and the 
decision to eliminate restrictions on arms sales abroad. Although the Keidanren was the 
primary lobbyist for the 2011 legislation to lift the export ban on armaments, members of 
the Taiwan lobby supported the legislation, primarily for the vitality of Japan’s domestic 
defense industry, but likely also to open up possible arms or dual-use technologies sales 
to Taiwan.198 Although Japanese arms sales to any country, much less Taiwan, remains 
extremely controversial and would come at a diplomatic cost with the PRC, an interesting 
development indicates it may be a real possibility. After potential sales of U.S. 
submarines to Taiwan lost momentum, a recent media report in Taiwan indicated that 
Taiwan’s ministry of national defense (MND) has been coordinating with Japan’s 
defense industry on the possibility of obtaining retired Japanese diesel submarines or 
acquiring new submarines through a three-way technology-transfer deal with the U.S. 
and Japan. While Taiwan’s MND has denied the report, China naval expert Michael 
Cole, also cited an unnamed Japanese defense official who confirmed that preliminary 
talks between Taiwan and Japanese-defense-industry representatives had indeed 
occurred.199 Political conditions in Japan and Taiwan for arms sales to take place would 
have to be exactly right, and while it is unlikely to be on Abe’s near-term agenda, it is 
plausible that negotiation between Japan, the U.S., and Taiwan for a new three-way 
defense-procurement system for Taiwan is in the works. As with other facets of the 
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Japan–Taiwan relationship, the Taiwan lobby is likely sensitive to the domestic 
legislation that would need to precede arms sales. 200 
Another recent development in this category came early in 2013, when Abe 
approved the first significant defense spending increase in eleven years. Looking ahead, 
one of Abe’s main goals for security is to address what he and many others in Japan and 
the U.S. believe to be flawed interpretations of Article 9 of the constitution by the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau in 1972, which prohibits Japan’s collective self-defense. 
Though Abe is resolute on changing the laws that govern Japan’s constitutional 
amendments, as well as on amending the constitution directly, one practicable step would 
be simply to update the interpretation of the SDF’s authority to conduct collective self-
defense.201 In his most recent summit meeting with President Obama in February 2013, 
Abe told U.S. officials he was committed to this crucial advancement for the U.S-Japan 
alliance.202 While none of these developments can be tied directly to Taiwan, they are all 
initial steps that ultimately could provide the basis for more direct armament balancing 
against the PRC.203  
Though the Taiwan lobby continues to be the nerve center of Taiwan support, 
other areas of the Japanese government typically support Taiwan in indirect ways. The 
MOD for instance, in its white papers and other official publications, regularly refers to 
the situation in the Taiwan Strait and military balance. MOD intelligence analysts and 
associated research analysts at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) are 
world class, and conduct careful and penetrating analysis of Taiwan and the PRC. One 
area that can be explored with respect to the MOD and NIDS is information exchange. 
The U.S. has maintained various track-II and unofficial dialogues with Taiwan since 
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1979 that provide important opportunities for gaining mutual understanding of the 
changing threat to Taiwan and regional stability. While there has undoubtedly been some 
direct participation by MOD and SDF in information exchanges with Taiwan’s MND and 
military personnel through track-II dialogues or other less official events, this is an area 
of possible expansion under a favorable administration.204  
 U.S.–Japan liaison mechanisms within the MOD have historically been most 
relevant for Japan’s potential security involvement in Taiwan. While Japan has spent 
considerable effort in developing its own unofficial exchange with Taiwan, engaging in a 
trilateral forum under the auspices of the U.S.–Japan alliance would carry much political 
weight. It would also offer welcome top cover and domestic and international legitimacy 
to the exchange with Taiwan. Before gaining traction for specific combined defense 
elements that would be directly tied to Taiwan, Japan’s ability to conduct collective self-
defense must be addressed. As in other areas, creativity is required and widely employed, 
even within the intricate bureaucracy of the MOD. One example of how Japan’s 
balancing interests can be advanced without mentioning the defense of Taiwan is found 
in the Senkaku Island issue—a dual-use security issue, so to speak. Although the U.S. 
does not acknowledge Japan’s sovereignty over the territory within the context of a 
territorial dispute with China and Taiwan, the U.S. reemphasized in 2010 that the 
Senkaku Islands are covered under the U.S.–Japan alliance as an area under the 
administration of Japan. As tensions have risen steadily since 2010, the MOD and SDF at 
all levels and their U.S. counterparts have participated in joint planning and exercises that 
would be relevant for a combined Senkaku islands operation. Although the defense of 
Taiwan would be of a totally different scope, many of the time–space–force (TSF) 
considerations would be similar to a combined operation for the defense of Taiwan. 
Especially in the realm of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (C4ISR), coordination mechanisms for combined operations to 
defend or reclaim the Senkaku islands, from the command to the tactical level, would be 
very similar to what would be required for Taiwan. While the Senkaku Island issue is of a 
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finite magnitude, the broader issues at the core—the U.S.–Japan alliance, Japan–China 
tensions, and even Japan–China–Taiwan relations—have great pertinence to Japan’s 
potential cooperation for the defense of Taiwan.205  
In conjunction with the combined efforts of the U.S.–Japan alliance for specific 
contingencies, the promotion of “dynamic defense cooperation” under the alliance 
encompasses the important conceptual framework and functional requirements for 
operating as a truly combined force. Dynamic defense cooperation is meant to address a 
variety of security issues in and around Japan. The three pillars for this cooperation are 
(1) timely and effective joint training; (2) joint surveillance and reconnaissance 
operations; and (3) joint use of facilities. Since 2011, Japan and the U.S. have conducted 
multiple exercises under these pillars, together with its regional allies, South Korea and 
Australia. The most substantial was the joint exercise conducted in the South China Sea 
in July 2011 by the U.S., Australia, and Japan, including the U.S. aircraft carrier George 
Washington strike group and Aegis destroyers from the JMSDF and Australian navy. 
While the focus of the exercises is interoperability and C4ISR, they are not large-scale 
and do not proceed through stages of complex operations designed for a specific 
contingency. The ultimate point, however, is in increasing alliance functionality, 
versatility, and proficiency in a variety of settings. A general goal of a more functional, 
versatile, and proficient alliance could obviously be applied to specific balance-of-power 
interests related to Taiwan, but a multi-function alliance is more valuable because it does 
not cross any specific red lines painted by the PRC. These examples are only a small 
sample of how the U.S.–Japan alliance is directly and indirectly supportive of Japan’s 
balance-of-power interests in Taiwan, and will be examined more thoroughly in the final 
chapter, but it is important to accurately depict the relevance of the alliance, as the central 
and most prominent method of maintaining Japan’s balance-of-power interests. 206 
It goes without saying that any direct, official, and public commitment by Japan 
to defend Taiwan would be crossing a perceived red line. The PRC’s perspective has 
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been clear and consistent: “Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned 
to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other 
country has the right to interfere.”207 Yet it has not kept other nations, most prominently, 
the United States, from doing just that. Nonetheless, Japan is very aware of China’s One-
China principle and has stated that it “understands and respects it.”208 Japan has no 
intention of provoking ire by challenging China’s core interests for no practical gain. 
Indeed, Taiwan represents one of those issues in international affairs that must be handled 
on multiple levels, with tact, gradation, and in many cases, great secrecy. For the time 
being, Japan has taken preliminary steps in pursuit of its own security interests, beginning 
with revising its legal interpretation of its defense capabilities and responsibilities. The 
MOD will not be placed in a position that risks slowing down progress towards those 
more immediate concerns, especially as the Strait is assumed to be stable now and into 
the immediate future. This thesis argues, however, that, the MOD will undoubtedly 
continue to support that goal in a range of unofficial and increasingly official ways. 
Moving to the unofficial realm, several key non-governmental institutions serve 
to quietly and competently forward Japan’s balance-of-power interests. One such 
organization is the Okazaki Institute. The Okazaki Institute advocates strong national 
defense capabilities, a stronger and more equal U.S.–Japan security alliance, and the 
formulation of other strategic partnerships (India and Taiwan primarily) to effectively 
balance the rise of China. As in the U.S., nongovernmental institutions play a critical role 
in accomplishing elements of foreign policy that are simply unfeasible for the 
government. While NGOs such as the Okazaki institute do not play a direct role in policy 
formation, they can be even more persuasive in a country like Japan, where retired 
diplomats and SDF officers (senpai) can pull strings from outside, sometimes in more 
effective ways than when they were inside the bureaucracies.  
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Another example of an unofficial lobby for Japan’s power interests is the lesser-
known Friends of Lee Teng-hui Association. Although its mission is to promote cultural 
appreciation and friendship events between the people of Japan and Taiwan, it has also 
been involved in policy advocacy. Most notably, in March 2013, the association 
announced a policy proposal for enacting the “Basic Act for Japan–Taiwan Relations,” 
which cited Abe’s five principles for Japanese diplomacy: 
 “…the [Abe’s] five new principles, though failing to directly touch on 
Taiwan, are difficult for Japan to realize while neglecting Taiwan’s 
presence. Therefore, the government should urgently enact the basic 
law….”209  
The proposal laid out five points that provide a framework for defining Taiwan’s 
status in Japan, promote Japan’s interests under mutual benefits and “common values,” 
denounce the use of force against Taiwan, and support the U.S.–Taiwan relationship 
defined in the TRA under the auspices of the U.S.–Japan alliance.210 Indeed, the mere 
notion of a Japanese TRA is highly controversial, and would not likely gain much 
national traction unless widespread domestic consensus is achieved. To a certain degree, 
a TRA for Japan would only exist to ensure baseline consistency in Taiwan policy. In 
defense of the basic law for Japan–Taiwan relations on a defense-focused TV program, 
Sumihiko Kawamura, a retired admiral of the JMSDF and director of the Okazaki 
Institute, argued that the relationship with Taiwan was too important for Japan not to 
have some kind of mandate to standardize and legitimize their interactions.211 Kawamura 
stressed that Japan should not be deterred by the PRC from enacting a similar law; after 
all, Japan is a democracy and must respond to the interests of its people. While an official 
TRA for Japan may ultimately be out of reach, Japan’s defense-focused interests in 
Taiwan will persist, and NGOs such as the Okazaki Institute and other Taiwan-focused 
                                                 
209 Sumihiko Kawamura , “Enact Japan-Taiwan Relations Act Urgently,” 27 Mar 2013, accessed 
online at http://en.jinf.jp/weekly/archives/1988. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Sumihiko Kawamura Interview, SakuraSoTv Bunka Channel, 24 Mar 2013, “Nittai Kankei…” 
accessed online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BXY29UuZ33Q, on 10 May 2013. 
114 
associations will continue to provide platforms for pursuing politically sensitive 
arrangements with Taiwan.212 
Other institutions that are important actors within the official foreign-policy 
establishment are MOFA and the proxy for diplomatic and economic representation for 
Japan in Taiwan, the IAJ. MOFA’s relationship with the PRC carries obvious precedence 
over the unofficial relationship with Taiwan, yet there have been circumstances where 
MOFA has played a crucial role in balance of power and thereby supported Taiwan. 
Some recent examples are its official statements regarding President Ma’s reelection in 
2012 and the inclusion of the chief Taiwan TECRO representative (Taiwan’s de facto 
ambassador) in the commemoration ceremony for foreign-relief efforts in the Great 
Eastern Japan Disaster, held in March 2013. MOFA’s statement following Ma’s 
reelection in January of 2012 was important; such a statement had not been made in 
twelve years, and because it focused on the special relationship with Taiwan, making no 
mention of the PRC and the One-China policy, as it had in previous statements. It stated:  
As Taiwan is an important region that Japan has close economic relations 
with and frequent mutual visits of people, the Government of Japan 
expects the continued and steady development of cooperative working 
relations between Japan and Taiwan, in accordance with Japan's position 
of maintaining the relations with Taiwan as working relations on a non-
governmental basis.213 
 In contrast, Prime Minister Yohei Kono’s statement on the election of Chen Shu-
bian in 2000 was explicit with regard to Beijing’s One-China principle. It stated: 
 Japan, based on the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and 
the Government of the People's Republic of China of 1972, will maintain 
its exchanges of private and regional nature with Taiwan as non-
governmental working relations, whereas furthering stable and cooperative 
relations with China.214  
At the ceremony commemorating the second anniversary of the Great Eastern 
Japan Disaster in March 2013, MOFA arranged for the Taiwan delegation to sit in the 
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official diplomatic section, as a gesture of appreciation for the overwhelming support 
Taiwan provided to Japan in relief and monetary aid. Beijing démarched Tokyo shortly 
thereafter, citing a violation of the One-China principle, but this is possibly an early 
example of the tone that has been set by Abe with regard to Taiwan, namely, that Japan 
should be willing to risk angering the PRC when it comes to supporting Taiwan.215 While 
MOFA’s role remains primarily in the crisis management sector, a confident Abe 
administration with empowered diplomats might keep MOFA officials more focused on 
advancements with Taiwan, and other more like-minded nations—such as India, 
Australia, and South Korea—and less on crisis aversion with the PRC, as they have been 
accustomed.216  
While the Interchange Association Japan (IAJ), MOFA’s proxy for diplomatic 
engagement with Taiwan, is less an advocate for national interests and more a functional 
organization for facilitating business, cultural, and tourism connections, it also plays an 
intermediary role in solidifying and advancing ties with Taiwan at the behest of MOFA 
and the Taiwan lobby. The most telling example of this is the recent East China Sea 
fishery agreement, which was brokered by IAJ and the East Asian Exchange Committee 
on behalf of the governments of Taiwan and Japan in May of 2013. After sixteen years of 
negotiations, Japan and Taiwan reached a functional agreement on sharing the natural 
resources in the area of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, and did so amidst the 
highest levels of tension between Japan and China. In this respect, the current state of 
Japan–Taiwan relations represented by IAJ is a crucial dynamic that is rarely factored 
into the overall scheme of U.S.–PRC–Taiwan–Japan relations. What is most impressive 
is that while Japan and China were posturing with coast guard and naval ships in the 
vicinity of the disputed islands, and the U.S. was caught in the middle—attempting to 
avoid mediation, while upholding its alliance obligations to Japan and at the same time 
conducting crisis management with the PRC; it was the functional and pragmatic 
diplomacy between the IAJ and EAC that scored the real diplomatic coup by coming to a 
peaceful and pragmatic agreement. As expected, the PRC démarched Japan again, citing 
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a violation of the One-China principle, and the U.S. made no official statement about the 
agreement.217 
Whereas the Taiwan lobby is the power center for balancing interests, the IAJ is 
the primary executor of those interests, and has been quietly advancing pragmatic ties 
with Taiwan, especially since 2009. See Appendix A for relevant documents on Japan–
Taiwan relations conducted by the IAJ. In addition to wide-ranging bilateral agreements 
that the IAJ has managed since the special partnership between Japan and Taiwan was 
initiated in 2009, the organization is also responsible for the promotion of business, trade, 
investment, and tourism. While most of the IAJ’s activities falls into the economic-
interest category by facilitating private business ties with Taiwan, to a certain degree 
Japan’s economic relationship with Taiwan does factor into balance-of-power 
calculations by reducing Taiwan’s dependency on the PRC for its economic vitality. Any 
economic interest advanced with Taiwan for purposes other than profit should, thus, be 
placed in this category. Certainly some economic interests in Taiwan could fall into both 
of these categories: for example, a free-trade agreement (FTA) between Japan and 
Taiwan. Taiwan, since signing ECFA in 2010 with the PRC, has sought out FTA with 
other partner nations (Singapore and New Zealand) to diversify its trade relationships and 
prove to a citizenry that has become very wary of ECFA’s implications for Taiwanese 
sovereignty that it is not totally dependent on the PRC. Thus, Japan’s effort to create a 
formal free-trade network with Taiwan has great implications for the economic 
sovereignty of Taiwan, even as free trade carries obvious economic benefits under the 
principle of competitive advantage.218 
5. Conclusion: Assessing Outcomes 
While Japan’s relationship with Taiwan should still be seen as existing largely 
within the boundaries set by economic interests and crisis management actors focused on 
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the PRC, the real shift in Japan’s foreign policy in the past two decades has been a 
subtext of balance-of-power interests hedging against China in support of Taiwan. The 
complexity in distinguishing into which category foreign-policy interests fall is subjective 
to the method of attribution. For instance, the Fishery agreement signed in April 2013 
between Japan and Taiwan could be seen as both crisis management with Taiwan and 
balance of power against China, and there is not a good method of quantification. The 
primary thrust of this thesis is that, even in the era of cross-Strait rapprochement, Japan 
has made significant strides in advancing balance-of-power interests involving Taiwan. 
While the typical de facto bureaucratic mechanisms between Japan and Taiwan may have 
atrophied during the DPJ administrations (2009–2012), the Taiwan lobby, led by 
conservative LDP factions, was in many ways empowered by its oppositional status 
during this period, and the “special partnership” between Japan and Taiwan initiated in 
those years is finally taking shape and impacting relations with tangible diplomatic 
actions. Combined with the codification of a new Japanese strategy for diplomacy, 
which, while not naming Taiwan specifically, is directly relevant to Japan’s interests in 
Taiwan, the Japan–Taiwan relationship is now primed for a more formidable position in 
Japan’s balance-of-power priorities. Though under the Ma administrations, Taiwan’s 
primary objective has been stable relations with the PRC and rapprochement, Taiwan has 
also seen its relationship with Japan as a useful and popular way to maintain diplomatic 
space from the PRC—which coincides directly with Japan’s primary balance-of-power 
interest – to provide continued diplomatic space and de facto sovereignty for Taiwan to 
prevent domination by communist China. In this primary goal Japan has had considerable 
success in recent years. Yet, the trend of overall closer Taiwan – PRC ties is of great 
concern to Japan, even while appreciating the increased stability it has brought to the 
region. 219 
In terms of the convergence of the U.S. and Japan’s national interests with respect 
to Taiwan, this thesis finds that the near- to medium-term interests of the U.S. and Japan 
are most accurately viewed as a countervailing balance, with both centrifugal and 
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centripetal forces that maintain a highly stable and functional equilibrium.220 Though the 
U.S. may be reevaluating its balance-of-power stance to gain more flexibility in dealing 
with the PRC, Japan, sensing this nuanced retraction, has balanced with a nuanced 
protraction, by expanding its balancing interests in Taiwan. Furthermore, this thesis 
argues that Japan could feasibly play a more assertive role in triangular relations between 
Japan, the United States, and Taiwan, not just as a passive balancer, but as a proactive 
counter to Taiwan’s increasing dependency on China. In terms of economic interests in 
Taiwan, Japan and America’s interests in Taiwan diverge only in that the former’s 
interests are significantly more profitable for Japan ($20+billion trade surplus) than for 
the United States ($14.5 billion deficit) with Taiwan of the total of $62 billion in U.S.-
Taiwan trade in goods in 2012.221 In this respect, while U.S. business interests may 
encounter competition with Japan in Taiwanese markets, basic economic interests 
between Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S. achieve a symbiosis of sorts, with top-brand 
Japanese products, supported by high quality Taiwanese labor and high-technology 
production inputs reaching lucrative consumer markets in the United States.  
In the crisis management realm, Japan has historically been able to rely heavily on 
the U.S. to manage crisis with the PRC. As recent cross-Strait tensions have been 
reduced, Japan and the U.S.’s crisis management actors –the U.S. State Department and 
MOFA respectively – are able to devote more attention to facilitating business relations 
with the PRC. With tensions between Japan and China peaking over the East China Sea 
dispute from 2010-2012, however, U.S. crisis management actors sit awkwardly in 
between its most important ally—Japan—and its most important non-ally—the PRC. 
U.S. and Japanese crisis management actors, thus, converge over the appreciation for 
stability in the cross-Strait situation, yet diverge over the overall management of relations 
with the PRC and Taiwan. Regarding Taiwan, this thesis has presented evidence that the 
preliminary signs of divergence between the U.S. and Japan’s interests in Taiwan are 
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present. Specifically, this divergence is found in the U.S. policy emphasizing the process 
of reconciliation to support conditions for peaceful negotiations between both sides of the 
Strait, whereas Japanese interests in Taiwan are largely enduring, and thus, rest more 
heavily on the outcome of reconciliation.222  
Positing that PRC–Taiwan unification continues to appear more likely, Japan’s 
fundamental interests may continue to diverge significantly from U.S. interests in 
Taiwan. Japan’s potentially greater interest in continued political separation between 
Taiwan and the PRC, could either complicate U.S. policies towards China and Taiwan or 
augment U.S. strategic interests in the region, depending on numerous variables. 
Significant coordination would, thus, be required to manage these differences within the 
framework of the alliance; and this specific issue could greatly factor in to the 
determination of the long-term alignment and utility of the U.S.–Japan alliance for both 
countries. The following chapter will examine the implications for this potential 
divergence over Taiwan for the U.S.–Japan alliance.  
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III. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.–JAPAN 
ALLIANCE 
America is the world's greatest naval power and preeminent economic 
superpower; Japan is Asia's largest maritime democracy and a liberal 
capitalist state second only to the United States. It stands to reason that our 
two nations should be partners. Today the United States is shifting its 
focus to the confluence of the two oceans, the Indian and the Pacific - this 
very region where we stand today. At such a time, the Japan-US alliance 
takes on a more vital significance than ever before. I believe that to ensure 
that these two great oceans can meet in calm conjunction, bringing benefit 
to all the people of the world, now is the time for us to dedicate even more 
energy to the bilateral alliance, giving it still greater roles to play. Toward 
this end, Japan must make greater efforts than before, bringing new ideas 
and creativity to bear. From now on the Japan-US alliance must affect a 
network, broad enough to ensure safety and prosperity encompassing the 
two oceans. The ties between Japan and America's other allies and 
partners will become more important than ever before for Japan.  
–Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, January 2013 
A. THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE 
In 1972, in talks with Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai, President Nixon laid out five 
principles for negotiating normalizations with the PRC. The third principle focused on 
Japan’s relationship with Taiwan: 
 [W]e will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan 
from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also 
discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement. I 
will only say here I cannot say what Japan will do, but so long as the U.S. 
has influence with Japan—we have in this respect the same interests as the 
Prime Minister’s government [the PRC]—we do not want Japan moving 
in on Taiwan and will discourage Japan from doing so.223  
The alliance has endured many challenges since 1972 and it continues to be the 
foundation of the U.S.-led security structure in East Asia. Within the parameters of this 
alliance, the unresolved status of Taiwan still presents one of the most precarious security 
situations in the region, one that could lead to major war with China. Within the larger 
scope of U.S.–China–Japan–Taiwan relations, Japan and Taiwan’s relationship would 
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generally be considered the least prominent of all possible combinations. Despite this 
reality, when pulling back the veneer from this seemingly tertiary regional relationship, 
there is a depth of interaction that is difficult to categorize, yet that has potential to 
greatly influence security and stability in the region. This chapter seeks to answer these 
final questions: What are the implications of Japan’s enduring and current interests in 
Taiwan for the U.S.–Japan alliance, and how can the unique relationship between Japan 
and Taiwan be leveraged most effectively for the benefit of the alliance and stability of 
the region? 
 Although the U.S. has more formal responsibilities to Taiwan outlined in the 
TRA, based on Japan’s long and rich interaction with Taiwan, the likely codification of 
Japan’s own grand strategy favoring interactions with like-minded nations, a favorable 
domestic political situation featuring an empowered Taiwan lobby, and public support for 
Taiwan. In the case that PRC–Taiwan unification grows more likely or even comes to 
fruition, Japan’s fundamental interests in Taiwan might diverge significantly from U.S. 
interests, and significant coordination would be required to manage these differences 
within the framework of the alliance. Specifically, the reality that Japan has a greater 
interest than the U.S. in Taiwan maintaining some form of political separation from the 
PRC, regardless of the process used in reconciliation, could either complicate U.S. 
policies towards China and Taiwan, or augment U.S. strategic interests in the region, 
depending on a wide variety of variables and the methods utilized by the alliance. 
Furthermore, Japan could feasibly play a more assertive role in the triangular relationship 
with the United States and Taiwan, not just as a passive balancer, but as a proactive 
balance to Taiwan’s increasing dependency on China. Specifically, as the U.S. edges 
away from more controversial cross-Strait issues, such as arms sales, Japan could provide 
diplomatic space for Taiwan in other ways. While any official defense-oriented 
arrangement between Japan and Taiwan would be highly problematic and a greater risk 
to Japan’s interests in China, recent developments show it is not entirely outside the 
realm of possibility. To a certain extent, Japan could also provide a non-military balance 
to the PRC that functionally accomplishes the intent of the traditional U.S. role, providing 
diplomatic space that Taiwan can leverage for an acceptable outcome in negotiations with 
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the PRC. Furthermore, Japan providing Taiwan a more assertive balance against the PRC 
could allow the U.S. to advance the alliance in other more problematic areas, such as 
basing and functional arrangements for collective self-defense in areas surrounding Japan 
and beyond. In essence, the U.S. need not spend any diplomatic effort to convince Japan 
of the importance of hedging against China by supporting Taiwan, but the U.S might 
need to convince Japan that supporting Taiwan continues to be in the U.S.’s interests. As 
the strategic situation continues to change, it might end up being Japan, which convinces 
the U.S. that supporting Taiwan is in the enduring interests of both countries. 
1. Important U.S. Perspectives of the Alliance 
In a recent press conference (April 29, 2013) between Japan’s Minister of 
Defense Onodera and the U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel, the U.S.-Japan alliance was 
reaffirmed as the “cornerstone of regional security and prosperity.”224 Amid changes in 
the strategic situation and U.S.–China–Taiwan–Japan relationships, fundamental 
alignment issues of the U.S.–Japan alliance are also being reexamined, including the U.S. 
“rebalance,” U.S. basing issues in Japan, Japan’s re-interpretation of collective self-
defense (and potentially the revision of its pacifist constitution), and the 1997 U.S.–Japan 
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. In 2005, many on the U.S. side recommended 
clarity in the form of a Taiwan clause. In the effort to revise the guidelines, it was 
initially expected that clarity regarding the Senkaku Islands, Taiwan, and other areas 
surrounding Japan would be included, but given the current environment of cross-Strait 
rapprochement and the positive steps taken between China and Taiwan, calls for this type 
of strategic specificity from the U.S. and Japan have generally been muted.  
To get a sense of the current status of some of the baseline U.S.–Japan alliance 
issues, it is helpful to examine recent statements by U.S. DOD official Mark Lippert, 
formerly the assistant secretary of defense for East Asia and now chief of staff for the 
secretary of defense. In a recent (May 2013) interview by the Wall Street Journal, the 
following questions and answers were exchanged:  
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WSJ: How does the United States intend to make use of the Japan–U.S. 
alliance to deal with these A2/AD challenges from China? What’s the role 
of Japan in implementing the Air-Sea battle concept? 
Lippert: Well, the U.S.-Japan alliance is a multi-faceted, decades-old, 
incredibly strong alliance that is not aimed at China. What the U.S.-Japan 
alliance is about, first and foremost, is protecting the Japanese homeland, 
and promoting peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and, more broadly, 
in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. 
WSJ: In revising the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between Japan 
and the United States, which is now ongoing, how will this issue of 
China’s challenges be addressed? 
Lippert: What we have to do with the Guidelines review is about updating 
our alliance capabilities to meet the challenges of the Asia-Pacific 
environment in the 21st century. So, I think what you’ve got to do is not to 
look at a specific third country, but the region more broadly and, quite 
frankly, globally, what Japan wants to do globally. I mean, you’ve seen 
the Japanese play productive roles in many other places around the world 
now. So, I think that’s what you have to--the focus has got to be. Second 
of all, what are we doing to ensure that the regional security challenges of 
the 21st century are properly addressed? And third, how does all of this 
overlay with the global environment that we find ourselves in today? 
WSJ: What could be Japan’s most significant contribution to the U.S. 
rebalance? 
Lippert: That’s a really good question. I mean, there are a number of 
things that Japan could do. I think the TPP is important, in that, as one of 
your other questions gets at--you know, ultimately, the rebalance is a 
political and economic strategy--and that makes, and there has been a lot 
of focus on, the security angles. But I think that, ultimately, it’s a political 
and economic strategy and that’s why the TPP is so important. And that’s 
also why foreign assistance is so important. Japanese foreign assistance 
and engagement in and around Asia, be it partnering with Australia or 
more engagement in Southeast Asia or, quite frankly, its very strong 
bilateral relationship with India, that is very important. I think where 
Japan has the most to offer is on the economic, political sides. But the 
Guidelines review fits nicely into our rebalancing strategy, so there is a 
smaller but important security component as well.225 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is also important to evaluate Lippert’s comments 
in terms of how Japan and Taiwan might interpret these comments. It is possible that 
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China was reassured by his comments, which was the likely intent ahead of the Xi–
Obama summit in May of 2013, though the PRC arguably understands the U.S.–Japan 
alliance for what it is: the most powerful deterrent it faces. Taipei would feel utterly 
ignored, which it has become accustomed to, especially in the public arena, and it is fair 
to say Taiwan, too, is primarily focused on its relationship with the PRC. Japan alliance 
representatives, however, have the most legitimate cause for concern and frustration. 
Though Lippert extols the overall value and far-reaching impact of the alliance, when 
asked about the intent of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation and rebalance, Lippert 
answers by advocating for a trans-regional economic trade pact—the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP)—instead of outlining specific steps that could make the security 
alliance more functional. With negotiations in progress between Japan and U.S. defense 
officials, this statement could compel the Japanese to question the American commitment 
to achieve any substantial progress for alliance functionality. It can also be interpreted as 
reaffirming that, at least on the surface of foreign affairs, even in the context of the U.S.–
Japan alliance, U.S. interests have shifted heavily towards economic interests and crisis 
management with China, away from long-standing balance of power interests that 
inherently supported Taiwan. This also could be a simple case, where the objectives for 
defense cooperation do not belong in the public domain.  
A significant portion of the critical work for alliance representatives must occur 
behind closed doors.  James Auer, a former special assistant for Japan in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense in the 1980s, was integral in alliance negotiations through difficult 
and controversial issues such as Japan’s cancellation of the development of the FSX 
fighter and Okinawa basing issues, which bolstered both U.S. interests and the overall 
strength of the alliance. Auer, who has been directly and indirectly involved with many of 
the incremental evolutions of the alliance through the end of the Cold War to the present 
day, predicts that the U.S.–Japan alliance will continue to adapt and become more 
purposeful as Japan reconciles its defense authorities and realistically evaluates mission 
capabilities. Auer’s perspective was highlighted in a May 2013 article in the Sankei 
Shimbun:  
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If Japan makes it clear that it has an armed force with ample capability to 
deal with multiple threats, that the prime minister is the supreme 
commander of this army, and that this supreme civilian commander 
elected by the Diet can order individual or collective defense measures if 
he determines that this is in Japan’s national interest, it will greatly 
discourage China from taking such actions against Japan. The U.S. cannot 
issue orders to the Japanese army. However, with the above-mentioned 
steps, it will be much easier for the civilian and military officials of both 
countries to talk realistically about mutually enhancing deterrence.226 
Auer remains optimistic that the combined U.S.–Japan effort to develop a joint 
strategy for deterring China’s aggression will continue to maintain peace and stability in 
the region. He argues that, although the rise of China is undeniable and its current and 
future behavior is suspect, increased U.S.–Japan cooperation will evolve to meet the 
challenge. Particularly, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) need to become more 
operationally functional and freed from prohibitions against the right to exercise 
collective self-defense, especially in Japan’s southwest territories. All indications are that 
either a constitutional revision of Article 9 or a clarification of the restrictive and 
outdated 1947 and 1972 interpretations of collective self-defense, or both, will occur 
during the Abe premiership, which continues to have political credibility and public 
support heading into the upper-house elections of the Diet in the summer of 2013.  
While many in Japan and the U.S. are confounded by the duality of the hedge-
and-engage strategy towards China, and many others are focused on the tactical concept 
of “air–sea battle (ASB),” Auer argues that the emergence of the “Offshore Control” 
strategy put forward by T.X. Hammes of the National Defense University provides a 
realistic and pragmatic strategy for deterring the PRC. Most importantly, it is a strategy 
that provides a desired end state for favorable conflict resolution, and it could actually be 
implemented under the auspices of an updated U.S.–Japan alliance enabled through 
functional collective self-defense.227 While still in a preliminary stage of development, 
the “Offshore Control” strategy also appears to be gaining traction among Japanese 
defense analysts and has been examined by a panel of experts at the Okazaki Institute, 
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most of whom are official U.S.–Japan strategic dialogue participants (sponsored by the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency).  
Having a strategy is not equivalent to having an operational plan, but a strategy in 
many ways is more important than having a shelved plan for a given situation. 
Correspondingly, the current effort to review the defense guidelines, while an important 
step in updating and standardizing the concept of combined operations for situations that 
Japan and the U.S. might be involved in, is not a realistic planning effort for specific 
contingencies such as Taiwan. In the end, any strategy in a bilateral alliance must first be 
practical and acceptable to both partners. In Japan’s case, there are preliminary advances 
to be made in normalizing security issues before it could commit to a truly combined 
strategy for the deterrence of China or defense of Taiwan. Second, Auer might argue that 
ongoing, daily coordination and joint operations between allies is the most important 
aspect of dealing with a strategic challenge—more so than a conceptual guideline or even 
an operational plan. Working shoulder to shoulder on a regular basis towards a mutually 
beneficial objective forms the true strength of any alliance.228 
Other commentators of the U.S.–Japan alliance have less faith in the benefit of 
Japan’s involvement in a combined strategy designed to deter China. Michael Swayne, a 
highly cited China analyst, reflected this concern saying, “Japanese involvement in a 
Sino–American crisis over Taiwan could significantly complicate or destabilize the 
situation.”229 It is telling that Swayne’s concern also extends to the citizens of Taiwan as 
another “third party,” whose involvement “could produce significant instabilities and 
misperceptions, possibly resulting in unwanted escalation.”230 Though dated, Swayne’s 
concerns have valid origins, as seen in the U.S. negotiations with the PRC in the early 
1970s, where, after the status of Taiwan, concern over Japanese involvement in Taiwan 
was the second-most contentious issue. Though many China-focused analysts have 
revised their assessments of the value of Japan as a normal and proactive member of the 
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alliance, a recent net-assessment conducted by the Carnegie Endowment, China’s 
Military and the U.S.–Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment, to which 
Swayne was a contributor, produced provocative results.231 Most notably, the study 
concludes that:  
The status quo is likely to prove unsustainable. Despite the potential 
complications, Washington and Tokyo must seriously evaluate these 
possible responses. Current economic and military trends in China, Japan, 
and the United States suggest that existing policies and strategies might 
fail to ensure a stable security environment conducive to U.S. and 
Japanese interests over the long term.232 
Swayne and his coauthors argue that the most likely challenge to the alliance is 
not a major war. They predict rather that “the likeliest challenge instead stems from 
Beijing’s growing coercive power—increasing Chinese military capabilities could enable 
Beijing to influence or attempt to resolve disputes with Tokyo in its favor short of 
military attack.”233 The report also provides a summary judgment on potentially 
diverging Japanese assessments of the impact of cross-Strait reconciliation on Japan, 
regardless of the process used: 
Although improvement of China–Taiwan relations may be reducing the 
prospect of war, Japanese defense analysts emphasize that the cross-strait 
military balance is shifting in favor of the People’s Republic of China. 
Some are also concerned that a resolution of the Taiwan conflict in favor 
of China (that is, Taiwan acquiesces to China’s notions of reconciliation 
and ultimately reunification) could yield a strategic situation unfavorable 
for Japan with respect to China.234  
Finally, the report provides three goals for the alliance in facing the China 
challenge over the long-term:  
1. Reduce fears that future U.S. political-security policies toward China 
might either expose Tokyo to unwanted pressures and threats from Beijing 
or, alternatively, reduce the credibility of U.S. security assurances to 
Japan;  
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2. Facilitate the peaceful handling of possibly intensifying Sino–Japanese 
territorial disputes and encourage the development of a more cooperative 
overall Sino–Japanese relationship; and 
3. Maximize the likelihood that Tokyo will acquire the kinds of capabilities 
and policies that are deemed necessary by Washington to defend U.S. and 
allied interests in the face of a more assertive, rising China.235 
Though Taiwan was not the focus of the report, the Japanese assessments 
regarding Taiwan that were highlighted bolster the hypothesis of this thesis. Especially 
the conclusion that Japanese enduring interests in Taiwan could produce a long-term 
divergence from U.S. interests, regardless of the process of reconciliation are in accord 
with the findings of this thesis.236 Nonetheless, Japan will not be able to make any 
substantial shift in policy towards supporting the security of Taiwan, such as 
implementation of a TRA or weapons sales, before it has addressed issues critical to its 
own security apparatus. Current developments indicate that Abe is willing to move 
forward with security issues, despite tensions with China. He has already made his first 
move in submitting legislation to establish a cabinet-level national security council as of 
June 2013.237 It is significant to note that the likelihood of North Korean provocations is 
cited as the primary justification, and China’s assertive stance in the East China Sea is a 
secondary motivation. There is of course no mention of Taiwan in public statements. 
While Japan’s support of Taiwan’s security typically remains too sensitive to broach in 
official circles, its balance-of-power interests in Taiwan are undoubtedly a serious 
consideration in the current thrust towards normalization in defense matters. Furthermore, 
in the current process of reviewing the defense guidelines, the evidence suggests that 
within the context of the U.S.–Japan alliance, Japan would be totally committed to 
Taiwan’s defense.238  
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2. Important Japanese Perspectives of the Alliance 
 This thesis’ discussion is admittedly biased, in that some areas of the debate 
surrounding Japan’s interests in Taiwan were represented more prominently than others. 
The areas that are covered, however, are deemed to have the greatest potential for 
change. Hisahiko Okazaki’s work obviously carries extra weight in this regard, as he has 
been the primary champion for Japan’s balance-of-power interests in Taiwan as a 
bureaucrat, diplomat, ambassador, and strategist in the realm of ideas for forty years. His 
stance is unequivocal and his vision for Japan’s grand strategy in the delicate balance of 
power in East Asia is distinct among Japanese and foreign commentators. Most 
importantly, he has maintained influence with the real power center of Japan’s policy 
development—the Taiwan lobby—and is particularly influential with the current prime 
minister and cabinet. On the U.S.–Japan alliance, Okazaki is resolute in his support and 
advocacy, though he does not hesitate to criticize its inefficiencies and shortcomings. 
Okazaki’s perspective was heavily shaped by the “Nixon shocks” of 1972. As a senior 
bureaucrat in the information-analysis division of MOFA (equivalent to State INR), he 
was tasked with finding the evidence that an American diplomatic reversal was 
imminent, such as Nixon’s Foreign Affairs article in 1968 and his speech in Kansas City 
in 1971, as there was no prior consultation with Japan.239 Okazaki, as a realist, 
recognizes the uncompromising demands of protecting national interests and sees great 
alignment in the long-term security interests of the U.S. and Japan; but he has wondered 
publicly whether a second “Nixon shock” could occur ahead of the June 2013 Xi–Obama 
summit in Sunnyvale, California. Okazaki has also frequently voiced his frustration with 
the U.S.’s Taiwan policies, which he sees as counterproductive and obtuse at times. 
Though not many Japanese analysts speak so boldly regarding U.S. policies, particularly 
on Taiwan, Okazaki seems hopeful that the U.S., as a true global superpower, will use its 
power to support the interests of its ally, Japan. In essence, Okazaki, above all else, is 
arguing for strategic clarity from the U.S., especially in the cross-Strait issue; if there is 
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true strategic alignment, there should be no need for ambiguity.240 In terms of how 
Okazaki’s perspective can be incorporated into efforts to improve the U.S.–Japan 
alliance, it should first be evaluated for what it is: a highly charismatic perspective that 
directly influences the conservative factions of the LDP, and that will be the force behind 
Japan’s security-policy development for domestic law and foreign affairs. Secondly, if 
Japan continues to expand its security relations with Taiwan, the Okazaki Institute would 
be the most likely host for developing a trilateral track-1.5 (semi-official) forum that 
includes academics, businessmen, politicians, diplomats, and active and retired senior 
military officers from the U.S., Taiwan, and Japan.  
Another prominently featured Japanese perspective in this thesis is that of 
Yasuhiro Matsuda. Matsuda’s can be considered a nuanced, moderate view in strong 
alignment with Asia-hands influential in the current U.S. administration, such as Susan 
Shirk and Joseph Nye. Matsuda advocates a balanced approach that maintains the 
alliance and seeks partnerships with other countries as well, noting that “Asian countries 
that previously had antagonistic relations with China—India, Vietnam, and Taiwan—
now seek improved status.”241 He sees value in the hedge approach so long as it targets 
the “uncertainty” of China’s rise instead of prematurely labeling it as a threat. 
Furthermore, he does not see “hard balancing” as a viable option for Japan, making the 
case that “Japan will likely be the sole loser if it alone takes the containment path.”242 
Matsuda believes that the domestic debate in Japan might shift support away from a 
stronger hedge against China, and thereby the alliance—an assessment aligned with 
Samuels’s Goldilocks prescription, in which Japan’s future rests somewhere “just right” 
in the middle of engagement with China and the credible hedge of the U.S.–Japan 
security alliance.243 Matsuda’s observation on Japan’s relationship with Taiwan is 
similarly objective. Primarily he sees that, although Japan and Taiwan’s relationship is 
one of the steadiest in East Asia, the current moderate and stable environment in the 
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Strait allows enhanced political ties between them. It is doubtful that Matsuda would 
endorse continued enhancement of Japan–Taiwan ties if a more hostile cross-Strait 
environment developed.244 Evidence presented in this thesis runs counter to this 
assertion, as Japan–Taiwan political and security ties seem to have advanced significantly 
in the periods of greatest cross-Strait tensions. With Japanese public opinion hardened 
against the PRC and increasingly favorable to Taiwan, it really boils down to how much 
Japan is willing to risk in its relationship with Taiwan. The primary implications of 
Matsuda’s assessments for the alliance is that Japan still very much needs the U.S., as the 
more powerful member of the alliance, to provide top cover for the pragmatic interests 
and the genuine sentiment Japan has invested in Taiwan, but that continued relevance for 
the alliance will require skilled management and coordination.  
3. Methods for a More Functional Alliance 
This thesis has attempted to identify Japan’s interests in Taiwan through modern 
history and in the current context. It should be understood that Japan has independent 
strategic interests to maintain and protect in Taiwan. Taiwan, of course, has its own 
agenda, which appears to include a significant relationship with Japan. Japan’s enduring 
interests could diverge significantly from specific U.S. policy-based approaches to the 
cross-Strait issue in the short-term, but could also greatly complement U.S. long-term 
strategy in the region. The security alliance continues to be the foundation for peace and 
stability in the region and also serves as a functional mechanism for strategic alignment 
for the U.S. and Japan. This assertion is based on the simple reality that the U.S. and 
Japan are deeply invested in the alliance and have validated its worth through many 
significant iterations of strategic change; as such, the institutionalized nature of the 
alliance could not only serve to maintain mutual commitment, even in times of tension, 
but also could serve as a coordination mechanism to alleviate tension as areas of strategic 
divergence develop. Every effort should be made to continue to augment and refine the 
functionality of the alliance. Particularly as relates to Taiwan, the U.S. and Japan should 
identify areas of divergence early, and address nascent concerns under the auspices of the 
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alliance. The following ten recommendations were made by Mike Green in the 
conclusion of Reluctant Realism in 2001. Though Green did not connect his 
recommendations specifically to Taiwan, they are especially applicable to the U.S.–Japan 
alignment over Taiwan: (In the following listing, the comments as to how Green’s 
recommendations relate to Taiwan are those of the author, and not coordinated with 
Green) 245 
1. “Recognize Japan as an independent actor.” It should not be assumed that 
Japan will defer to U.S. policy on Taiwan, though it recognizes that the U.S. still 
has the lead for security in the Taiwan Strait in case of PRC aggression. Japan is 
reconciling the gap between its strategic interests and strategic capabilities, and 
the U.S.–Japan alliance would benefit from having a stronger strategic ally in a 
“normal” Japan.  
2. “Support an active Japanese foreign policy identity.” The paradigm of Japan 
as a constrained power is rapidly shifting. As Japan’s foreign-policy identity takes 
shape in Taiwan, it could be seen as a benefit to U.S. strategy in the region if 
managed correctly. For the U.S., having plausible deniability for Japan’s quiet 
objectives to support Taiwan could be beneficial, as long as strategic alignment 
between Japan and the U.S. remains unbroken.  
3. “Form common strategies early.” Appropriate mechanisms for a stronger U.S.–
Japan–Taiwan interaction, such as Track-II and even Track 1.5 trilateral forums, 
are needed to evaluate potential strategies early. After early conceptual 
collaboration, continuous coordination for incremental implementation and 
analytic and operational validation is also necessary. 
4. “Raise the bar of expectations.” That something has not been done in the past 
does not mean it cannot be done. The U.S.–Japan alliance will continue to be the 
strongest security presence in the region, until both countries cease to act in a 
manner representative of that strength. Japan and the U.S. should be confident in 
the unifying principles of freedom and prosperity, especially with regard to 
Taiwan. Although Taiwan’s democratic development has been somewhat 
problematic for the U.S., the virtues of a Chinese democracy should not be 
brushed aside. More effort should be made within the trilateral framework or in 
the Japan–Taiwan bilateral relationship to support Taiwan’s democracy, which 
would surely be in line with U.S. grand strategy.  
5. “Avoid hitting down the nail that sticks up.” Some amount of deviation from 
U.S. policy on Taiwan is natural and could be beneficial. Allowing Japan to push 
the envelope with its ties to Taiwan, although seemingly contentious, is more 
likely to receive muffled responses from the PRC, as it tries to remain 
magnanimous in the current cross-Strait reconciliation process. Any more 
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substantial fallout would fall squarely on Japan, likely in the form of economic 
coercion, such as the rare-earth minerals case in 2010, which in the end does not 
look good for the PRC. 
6. “Invest in personal relationships.” The long history of Japan and Taiwan has 
shown that individuals matter greatly in shaping relations between nations. This 
has always been the case with the U.S.–Japan alliance as well. Particularly in the 
case of the Taiwan lobby, specific people in the Japanese government, such as 
faction leaders, matter more than others. Smart engagement of key individuals 
who are influential in the Taiwan lobby would bring significant dividends for the 
alliance.  
7. “Elevate formal consultations.” While personal relationships and informal 
coordination mechanisms matter greatly, so does process and bureaucracy. 
Formality can serve to reach consensus, especially in Japan. While Taiwan 
remains a sensitive topic for formal coordination, Japan and the U.S. should use 
all mechanisms available, especially those out of public view.  
8. “Listen to Japan.” The alliance would benefit from thinking not only in terms of 
what the U.S. can get Japan to commit to, but how it can solicit Japan’s help on 
issues in which Japan has a greater stake. Particularly regarding China and 
Taiwan, Japan’s opinions should be seen as valuable and potentially key to the 
combined strategy.  
9. “Beware of brokering.” As seen in the East China Sea dispute, the U.S. 
maintains its stance of non-intervention on territorial disputes, yet has committed 
to the defense of any territory Japan administers. In the case of Taiwan, the U.S. 
should not try to limit or intervene in Japan’s interaction with Taiwan, as it has 
generally proven to be a stabilizing and productive interaction, despite China’s 
ephemeral protests. 
10. “Encourage interagency cooperation.” The Taiwan issue involves many 
stakeholders. Any substantial progress between agencies such as MOD to DOD 
will be limited without interagency coordination. The format of the “2+2” 
Security Consultative Committee has been validated... perhaps an AIT-IAJ 
consultative committee should be investigated.  
Green’s recommendations for the U.S.-Japan alliance are especially valuable 
because they worked. His time on the National Security Council staff is still viewed as 
one of the most functional periods of U.S.–Japan–Taiwan trilateral relations, despite 
serious challenges in the political and strategic situation. Green concludes his 
examination of Japan’s foreign policy poignantly, writing, “The United States should 
welcome a Japan that focuses more on its core national interests. And as Japan raises its 
head, it should always see its ally, the United States, standing ready to help.”246  
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In the realm of foreign affairs in East Asia, there are many uncomfortable 
realities. The U.S. has struggled to execute strategy and maintain its interests in Asia 
when not dealing squarely with certain uncomfortable realities. The reality of Japan’s 
national interests in Taiwan is also one that falls into the category of an uncomfortable 
reality. The comfort level, however, only further deteriorates when artificial expectations 
are levied. If the PRC is able to unify with Taiwan, Japan will be left with difficult 
decisions, most of which have less than optimal outcomes for the U.S. position in the 
region. Certainly the U.S.’s ultimate responsibility is to its own national interests. There 
are certainly many other possible and even unforeseen scenarios, such as a unified China, 
with authorities on Taiwan acting as a mediator for Japan and mainland China; the U.S. 
and China as greater strategic partners, with the U.S. mediating for peace between China 
and Japan; and a variety of unforeseen “gray” or “black swan” scenarios.247 All this 
considered, in the interests of maximizing the functionality of what should be viewed as 
the most important bilateral alliance (U.S.-Japan), in a region that carries the majority 
stake of U.S. interests (Asia-Pacific), it is important that the U.S. acknowledge the 
potentially diverging perspective of its ally (Japan) concerning the issue of the greatest 
magnitude (Taiwan), with its most important strategic competitor (China). 
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APPENDIX 1: DOCUMENTS RELATED TO JAPAN–TAIWAN RELATIONS. 
Table 1.   The World and Japan" Database Project (Database of Japanese Politics 
and International Relations Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, 
University of Tokyo) 
Titles Languages Date




Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of China and Japan 
Protocol (1953) Japanese English Chinese 
Jul 18 
1953




Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of China and Japan 
Protocol (1955) Japanese English Chinese 
Jul 2 
1955
Trade and Payments Arrangement Between the Republic of 




Exchange of Notes Between the Government of The 
Republic of China and the Government of Japan 
Concerning Load of Japanese Yen (1965) 




Exchange of Notes Between the Government of The 
Republic of China and the Government of Japan Amending 
the Provisional Air Transport Agreement (1966) 




Exchange of Notes Between the Government of The 
Republic of China and the Government of Japan Amending 
the Provisional Air Transport Agreement (1969) 




Agreement between the Government of The Republic of 
China and the Government of Japan for the Establishment 
of a Vocational Training Centre for Metal Manufacturing 
Industries 
Japanese English Chinese Dec 5 1969
Exchange of Notes Between the Government of The 
Republic of China and the Government of Japan 
Concerning Load of Japanese Yen (1971) 
Japanese English Chinese Jul 9 1971
Agreed Minutes of the Seventh Round Economic and 
Trade Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 
Japanese English Chinese Oct 30 1982
Agreed Minutes of the Eighth Round Economic and Trade 
Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 






Agreed Minutes of the Ninth Round Economic and Trade 
Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 




Agreed Minutes of the Tenth Round Economic and Trade 
Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 




Agreed Minutes of the Eleven Round Economic and Trade 
Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 




Agreed Minutes of the Twelve Round Economic and Trade 
Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 
Japanese English Chinese Jul 23 1987
Agreed Minutes of the Thirteen Round Economic and 
Trade Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 
Japanese English Chinese Jul 21 1988
Agreed Minutes of the Fourteen Round Economic and 
Trade Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 
Japanese English Chinese Jul 27 1989
Agreed Minutes of the Fifteen Round Economic and Trade 
Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 
Japanese English Chinese Sep 7 1990
Agreed Minutes of the Sixteen Round Economic and Trade 
Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 




The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China's 
statement on Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro 
Hosokawa's Government Statement Apology on the Sino-
Japanese War 
Japanese English Chinese Jun 12 1992
Agreed Minutes of the Seventeen Round Economic and 
Trade Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 
Japanese English Chinese Aug 1 1992
President Lee's meeting with Luis Alberto Monge, the 
President of Costa Rica  Japanese English Chinese 
Jan 9 
1993
President Lee's meeting with Japanese Senators Japanese English Chinese Jan 13 1993
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China's 
statement about the Japan Self-Defense Force participation 
in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. 




Agreed Minutes of the Eighteen Round Economic and 
Trade Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 
Japanese English Chinese Oct 27 1993
139 
Titles Languages Date
President Lee's meeting with Japanese Congressmen 
Masayuki Fujio, Chairman of the Japan-ROC 
Parliamentarians Council 
Japanese English Chinese Dec 9 1994
President Lee's meeting with Sadanori Yamanaka, 
Japanese Congressman  Japanese English Chinese 
Dec 9 
1994
Agreed Minutes of the Eighteen Round Economic and 
Trade Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 








President Lee's Meeting with Yukio Edano, Japanese 








President Lee's Meeting with Japanese Congressmen Japanese English Chinese Jul 7 1997
President Lee's meeting with Japanese Congressmen of 




Vice President Lein's meeting with Shinzo Abe, Japanese 




President Lee's meeting with Yukio Hatoyama, Japanese 




Agreed Minutes of the Twenty-Five Round Economic and 
Trade Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 








Agreed Minutes of the Twenty-Six Round Economic and 
Trade Conference Between the Association of East Asian 
Relations and the Interchange Association 




President Chen's meeting with Naoto Kan, Japanese 






Agreed Minutes of the Twenty-Seven Round Economic 
and Trade Conference Between the Association of East 
Asian Relations and the Interchange Association 




President Ma's Meeting with Japan Interchange 
Association Taipei Office New Chief Representative 
Masaki Saito 
Japanese English Chinese Aug 1 2008
President Ma's Attending the New Year Gathering of 
Japanese Expatriates in Taiwan Japanese English Chinese 
Jan 7 
2009
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China's 
Announcement about 'The Year to Bolster Japan and 
Taiwan's Special Partnership' 
Japanese English Chinese Jan 20 2009
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China's 
statement about Saito Masaki, Chief Representative of 
Japan Interchange Association Taipei Office, comment that 
Taiwan's status is "still unresolved" 
Japanese English Chinese May 1 2009
The Interchange Association Exchange of Letter between 
the Japanese and Taiwanese Governments on the 
Maintenance of Civil Aviation Business 




President Ma's Meeting with Japan Interchange 
Association Taipei Office Chief Representative Masaki 
Saito 




Taiwan and Japan's Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) for the Enhancement of Exchanges and 
Cooperation to Further Bilateral Collaboration 




The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China's 
statement about the Japan Ministry of Defense plan to 
redraw the ADIZ westward from Yonaguni Island 




The Japan Ministry of Defense's Statement about 
Redrawing the ADIZ Westward from Yonaguni Island Japanese English Chinese 
Jun 24 
2010
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China's 
Statement about the Taiwan-Japan ADIZ demarcation line 
remains unchanged 
Japanese English Chinese Jun 24 2010
President Ma's meeting with delegation of Japanese 
parliamentarians Japanese English Chinese 
Jul 23 
2010
The Cooperation Agreement Between the Japan Chamber 
of Commerce and Taiwan Japan Association for Business 
Communication 
Japanese English Chinese Sep 1 2010
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (TAIWAN)
's statement about the Sovereignty over the Diaoyutai 
Islands (September 13, 2010) 






Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (TAIWAN) 
's statement about the Sovereignty over the Diaoyutai 
Islands (September 14, 2010) 




Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (TAIWAN) 
's statement about the Sovereignty over the Diaoyutai 
Islands (September 24, 2010) 




Office of the President issuing statement regarding the 
Diaoyutai Islands Japanese English Chinese 
Oct 5 
2010
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China 
(TAIWAN)’s statement about the Sovereignty over the 
Diaoyutai Islands, October 21, 2010? 
Japanese English Chinese Oct 21 2010
President Ma's meeting with former Japanese prime 
minister Shinzo Abe Japanese English Chinese 
Oct 31 
2010
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (TAIWAN) 
's statement about the Sovereignty over the Diaoyutai 
Islands (November 4, 2010) 
Japanese English Chinese Nov 4 2010
Japan-Taiwan Mutual Cooperation on the Liberalization




The Memorandum on Mutual Cooperation of Patent 
Procedures between Association of East Asian Relations 
and Interchange Association (the Memorandum on Japan-
Taiwan Patent Prosecution Highway) 




The Memorandum Relating to Exchange of Financial 
Information on Money laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism between Association of East Asian Relations and 
Interchange Association 
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